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Like any other creatures human beings are ‘mere bundles of habits’, as William James stated more 
than a century ago (James, 1890). Habits result from learning. If something worked well for us in the 
past and it did so repeatedly, such as the delicious taste of chocolate that made us forget all about 
our sorrows, then slowly a habit slips in. The brain creates a shortcut so that whenever we encounter 
this goodness again, we don’t need to think about it, we just go for it. Habits can be very efficient 
when it comes to riding a bicycle or brushing our teeth (imagine having to think about every single 
action every time!), but they can also become detrimental. For example, when we always calm our 
nerves by eating chocolate even though we are full – or instead, by smoking, gambling, gaming, or 
turning to drugs of abuse. Once bad habits are acquired they are notoriously hard to break. When 
habits go from bad to worse behavior becomes compulsive, as we see for example in addiction 
or clinical overeating. Compulsive behavior results from a failure to exert control over automatically 
triggered behavior. 
 How can a useful mechanism such as our habit system come to work against us? Why 
does this happen only for some and not others when faced with tempting rewards? And how can we 
cope with our bad habits? In this thesis I aim to shed light on the neural and cognitive mechanisms 
that underlie compulsive gambling and eating in particular. I also aim to further our understanding of 
how mindfulness can help break bad eating habits. This introductory chapter provides an overview 
of the key concepts and rationale behind the studies presented in the empirical chapters 2 to 5. 
COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR IN ADDICTION
Compulsivity is defined as behavior that is persistently repeated despite negative consequences 
(Robbins et al., 2012). It is a hallmark of substance addiction and is one of the key criteria to be 
fulfilled for a diagnosis of substance use disorder according to the Diagnostic Manual of Statistics 
(DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In the DSM-5, released in 2013, gambling disorder 
(Box 1.1) is recognized as a behavioral addiction based on similarities with substance addiction in 
terms of personality traits (impulsivity and compulsivity), clinical symptoms (tolerance, withdrawal and 
craving), and associated neurocognitive mechanisms (Petry, 2007; Potenza, 2008, 2013; van Holst 
et al., 2010). Gambling addiction is the first behavioral addiction recognized as such, but other forms 
of compulsive behavior like overeating are also under consideration for the next edition of the DSM 
(Devlin, 2007; Barry et al., 2009). Chronic overeating, i.e., consuming more calories than expended, 
is likely to result in obesity. Similar to gambling addiction, neurocognitive parallels between obesity 
and addiction have been observed (Volkow et al., 2008, 2013; Barry et al., 2009; Wise, 2013; Garcia-
Garcia [incl. accenten!] et al., 2014; but see chapter 6). 
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Box 1.1 Gambling addiction
Gambling addiction, formally referred to as disordered gambling (previously: pathological 
gambling), is a psychiatric disorder that is estimated to affect between 1% and 2% of the Western 
population (Wardle et al., 2010; Welte et al., 2014). The disorder is characterized by elevated risk 
seeking and persistent gambling behavior despite negative consequences. The full diagnostic 
criteria as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition 
(DSM-5) are listed below. 
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An important difference between substance addiction and both gambling addiction and overeating 
is the target of abuse. In substance addiction, a chemical substance (e.g. cocaine, alcohol, nicotine) 
affects the brain directly and can produce toxic effects in the brain, contributing to the neurocognitive 
deficits characterizing addiction. Disordered gambling and overeating do not involve chemical 
substances toxic to the brain and can therefore be thought of as behavioral addictions (Hebebrand 
et al., 2014; but see Ziauddeen et al., 2013). This makes them very useful for investigating the 
mechanisms of compulsive, reward-driven behavior, because they are not confounded by drug-
related neurotoxic effects. 
 Decades of research into the mechanisms underlying substance addiction have revealed 
an important role of dopamine in addiction (Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Comings and Blum, 
2000; Franken et al., 2005; Wise, 2013; Nutt et al., 2015), which is accompanied by alterations in 
several aspects of reward processing (Robinson and Berridge, 1993, 2008a; Redish, 2004; García-
García et al., 2014) and loss of cognitive control (Goldstein and Volkow, 2011). However, equivalent 
research on gambling addiction and particularly on overeating is still in its infancy. In this thesis, I 
take a neurocognitive approach to shed light on these types of compulsive behavior in a clinical as 
well as non-clinical sample by employing a variety of cognitive paradigms borrowed from addiction 
research combined with neuroimaging (chapter 3 & 5). In addition, I investigate the effects of a 
pharmacological (chapter 2) and a behavioral intervention (chapter 4 & 5) on reward processing.
REWARD PROCESSING
We generally think of something as rewarding when it makes us feel good and when it motivates 
us to perform certain actions to obtain it. Natural rewards such as food, water, sex and nurturing are 
essential for our survival as a species. By making us feel pleasurable, these rewards can reinforce 
the behaviors associated with obtaining them so that rewarded actions are likely to be repeated, 
as was already proposed in Thorndike’s Law of Effect (Thorndike, 1911). This process is known 
as positive reinforcement learning. Non-rewarding stimuli can also become associated with reward 
through a process called classical or Pavlovian conditioning (Pavlov, 1927). When a neutral stimulus 
is consistently followed by a natural reward, it becomes predictive of that reward (i.e., conditioned) 
and will come to elicit similar responses as the reward itself. Think for example of the famous golden 
arches of MacDonalds that get many to salivate because they predict the availability of high caloric 
food. Conditioned stimuli can also acquire incentive salience similar to the reward they are associated 
with, i.e., they can result in a feeling of wanting and motivate us to act; to go get ourselves a greasy 
burger from MacDonalds when we are hungry for instance.  
13
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Figure 1.1 Human brain regions and dopamine pathways that play a role in the control of reward-driven behavior. 
Dopamine is produced by neurons in two midbrain (MB) nuclei, the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia 
nigra (SN), and finds its way to reward and control regions throughout the brain via distinct pathways (left 
panel). The mesolimbic pathway connects VTA and ventral striatum (VS), in particular nucleus accumbens. The 
corticolimbic pathway consists of projections from VTA to frontal cortical areas, such as ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex. The nigrostriatal pathway originates in SN 
neurons and projects to dorsal striatal regions, i.e. posterior putamen (PUT) and caudate nucleus (CN). Control 
processes involve frontal regions (right panel), such as OFC and other parts of lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) 
for motivational and cognitive control, and primary and secondary motor cortex (M1 and M2) for motor control.
DOPAMINE IN REWARD-BASED LEARNING AND INCENTIVE MOTIVATION
Several dopamine pathways exist in the human brain (Figure 1.1) that serve different functions. 
Although the notion of dopamine as the pleasure chemical in the brain has become obsolete, 
dopamine does play an important role in reinforcement, which includes reward-based learning 
(Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2006) as well as incentive motivation (Salamone 
et al., 1997; Salamone and Correa, 2002; Berridge, 2007, 2012; Robbins and Everitt, 2007). These 
functions are known to involve the mesolimbic and mesocortical pathways (Kelley and Berridge, 
2002) connecting dopaminergic neurons in ventral tegmental area (VTA) to ventral striatum (VS) 
and prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions, respectively. Seminal work by Schultz and colleagues (1997) 
convincingly showed the involvement of dopaminergic midbrain neurons in classical conditioning (see 
also Montague et al., 1996). Critically, when monkeys learnt to associate a neutral cue (conditioned 
stimulus) with the delivery of a rewarding juice (unconditioned stimulus), over time, dopaminergic 
midbrain neurons started firing in response to the cue rather than to the delivery of the juice; that is, 
the cue became predictive of the reward and elicited a conditioned response (neuronal firing). This, 
and future work spurred by this finding have been taken as strong evidence for the hypothesis that 
dopamine codes reward prediction errors and thus acts as a teaching signal subserving reward-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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based learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2006; Glimcher, 2011). However, many studies aimed 
at interfering with dopamine, e.g. by administering dopamine antagonists or by dopamine depletion, 
have found effects on performance and motivation rather than reinforcement learning per se 
(Montague et al., 2004). In several theoretical accounts the role of dopamine is therefore proposed 
to go beyond learning through prediction error coding, extending to aspects of incentive motivation 
such as incentive salience (Berridge, 2007, 2012), behavioral activation (Robbins and Everitt, 1992, 
2007), or overcoming response costs (Salamone et al., 1997, 2007; Salamone and Correa, 2002). 
Incentive salience or ‘wanting’ of rewards, elicited by their predictive cues, reflects motivational value 
by integrating learned reward-associations and physiological state, for example, hunger or stress. 
Such physiological states are known to modulate reward-based responses and motivated behavior 
(Berridge, 2012; Dagher, 2012). In a related account Robbins and Everitt (1992, 2007) proposed that 
dopamine rather mediates behavioral activation, i.e., the vigor and persistence with which behavior 
is performed. This can be induced by states and stimuli, including hunger, stress, drugs of abuse, 
or conditioned stimuli (Robbins and Everitt, 1992). Salamone and Correa (2002) in turn considered 
dopamine-mediated behavioral activation as a resource to overcome instrumental response costs, 
or effort, required for reinforcement. Despite apparent differences, these frameworks all capitalize on 
a central role for dopamine in incentive motivation.   
 In human studies, responsiveness to rewards is usually assessed using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The blood-oxygenated-level-dependent (BOLD) signal that we 
measure with fMRI is an indirect measure of neuronal activity within a region, as it reflects increased 
blood flow, which we assume to result from enhanced energy demand upon activation. A widely-
used cognitive paradigm for assessing neural responses to rewards and reward-predictive cues is 
the monetary incentive delay task (Knutson et al., 2000, 2001). This is an instrumental task in which 
subjects can earn small amounts of money by simply pressing a button as fast as possible each 
time they get to see a target stimulus (e.g. a white circle) on the screen in front of them. Before the 
target appears on the screen a cue is shown informing the subject what can be earned that trial. 
Cues commonly predict either a low or high reward, but other versions of the task can also include 
rewards other than money (e.g. juice, milkshake, social or erotic rewards) and even losses. Although 
indirect, greater BOLD signals in the mesolimbic pathway (i.e., midbrain and ventral striatum) – when 
contrasting activation of large- versus small-reward-predictive cues – are generally thought to reflect 
increased dopamine release and greater incentive motivation (O’Doherty, 2004; Knutson and Gibbs, 
2007; Tang et al., 2012; Sescousse et al., 2013b). 
DOPAMINE THEORY OF ADDICTION 
A plethora of research has shown a central role for dopamine in addiction (reviewed by Nutt et al., 
2015). Here, I will briefly cover the two most common dopamine-anomalies in substance addiction 
that have also been associated with disordered gambling and overeating: low dopamine D2-
receptor density and altered dopamine release. Furthermore, I will link them to observed deficits in 
reward-based learning and incentive motivation.
15
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1Early genetic studies have shown that a genetic variant associated with reduced striatal dopamine 
D2-receptor density (Taq1A, A1-carriers) is more prevalent in individuals suffering from substance 
addiction, disordered gambling and obesity (Blum et al., 1995). These observations led to an 
influential theory stating that addiction may result from deficient dopamine transmission (Blum et al., 
1996). Later positron emission tomography (PET) studies imaging D2-receptor density have indeed 
revealed evidence for decreased striatal density in substance addiction, obesity and binge eating 
(Wang et al., 2004; but see Horstmann et al., 2015b). Several indices of gambling severity have 
also been associated with lower density of striatal dopamine D2-receptors in disordered gambling 
(see also Clark et al., 2012; Boileau et al., 2013), although overall group differences have not been 
reported so far (Linnet et al., 2010). Because of the putative dysfunction of the brain’s reward 
cascade, individuals are hypothesized to enjoy natural rewards less and, consequently, are in need 
of larger rewards to compensate for the deficiency. However, rather than a dopamine deficiency, 
reduced D2-receptor density at presynaptic sites may also lead to enhanced dopamine release 
through reduced autoregulation. 
 Many substances of abuse act directly or indirectly on dopamine neurons, ‘hijacking’ the 
natural reward system and leading to excessive increases in dopamine release in the mesolimbic 
pathway (Kelley and Berridge, 2002; Montague et al., 2004; Redish, 2004). The incentive sensitization 
theory of addiction proposes that repeated bouts of dopamine release lead to sensitization of 
dopaminergic neurons, such that they increase their dopamine release even further with regular 
use. Sensitization results in excessive incentive salience for cues predictive of the target of abuse 
(Robinson and Berridge, 1993). Indeed, substance addiction has frequently been associated with 
striatal hyperreactivity to these type of cues (Volkow et al., 2013; García-García et al., 2014; but 
also see Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2013). Although the original incentive sensitization model only 
emphasizes effects on performance, not learning, it has been argued that excessive dopamine 
release in response to substance use or substance-related cues may lead to impaired reinforcement 
learning through aberrant prediction error signals (Redish, 2004; Robbins and Everitt, 2007; Robinson 
and Berridge, 2008a). 
 In spite of the fact that disordered gambling and compulsive eating do not involve chemical 
substances acting on the central dopamine system, they too have been associated with altered 
dopamine signaling. Interestingly, dopamine agonist treatment in Parkinson’s disease has been 
associated with the development of compulsive gambling and overeating in a subset of patients 
(Dagher and Robbins, 2009). Furthermore, aberrant responses in anticipation of rewards relative to 
healthy control subjects (Wang et al., 2004; Dagher and Robbins, 2009; Voon et al., 2011; Limbrick-
Oldfield et al., 2013; García-García et al., 2014; Horstmann et al., 2015b) and impaired reinforcement 
learning (de Ruiter et al., 2009; Boog, 2014; Vanes et al., 2014; Kroemer and Small, 2016) have been 
observed for both types of compulsive behavior.  
 It is conceivable that impaired learning from unexpected positive or negative outcomes 
can result in compulsive over-selection of actions directed at the highly salient target of abuse 
(Redish, 2004) and/or to decreased sensitivity to the negative consequences associated with 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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the use of it. Restoring the sensitivity to rewards and/or punishment might be a promising way 
to counteract compulsive reward-driven behavior. The compulsive aspects of pathological reward-
seeking can be investigated using reversal learning paradigms (Izquierdo and Jentsch, 2012). 
Reversal learning reflects the ability to flexibly adapt one’s behavior in response to contingency 
changes in the environment. Some empirical evidence supports the link between dopamine D2-
receptor deficiency, impaired reversal learning and substance addiction. For example, D2-receptor 
stimulation has been shown to remediate cognitive impairments in human drug addicts in the context 
of reversal learning (Ersche et al., 2011). However, no such evidence exists for compulsive gambling 
or obesity. In chapter 2 I aim to bridge this gap for compulsive gambling by investigating the effect 
of a pharmacological intervention targeted at dopamine D2-receptors on a deterministic reversal 
learning task in individuals who are diagnosed with disordered gambling (for details see Aims and 
outline)(Box 1.1).  
COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Obtaining rewards often requires complex action sequences. Also, individuals may value different 
types of rewards (e.g., food, sex, drugs, money) and can thus engage in a variety of (competing) 
goal-directed behaviors (e.g., feeding, reproduction, drug-seeking, gambling). Cognitive control 
reflects the capacity to guide behavior in the service of internally represented goals (Montague et al., 
2004), and requires maintenance of goals, as well as the selection and planning of goal-directed 
actions. In addition to dopamine-mediated alterations in reward processing, loss of prefrontal cortex-
based cognitive control is another key characteristic of addiction (Goldstein and Volkow, 2011; 
Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2013). Here I will, focus on two types of control in particular: attentional 
control and goal-directed control. 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL
Salient, biologically relevant stimuli have the capacity to grab our attention and thus increase the 
likelihood that we act upon them (Redgrave et al., 1999; Franken et al., 2005; Berridge, 2007, 2012). 
This may be mediated by cue-triggered midbrain dopamine responses (Redgrave et al., 1999). 
Schachter (1971) already appreciated how obese individuals (as well as rats) processed food-
related stimuli more efficiently than healthy-weight controls (Box 1.2). 
17
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DEGREE OF OBESITY BMI = weight in kglength in m2
<18.5 18.5-24.9 25-29.9 30-34.9 35>
waist
hip
underweight healthy weight overweight obese morbidly obese
Box 1.2 Obesity
Obesity has reached pandemic proportions, with approximately 13% of the adult population 
worldwide classified as clinically obese and an additional 39% as overweight (WHO, 2015). 
Obesity is defined as excessive adiposity that may impair health. 
 Body mass index (BMI) is a simple measure that is commonly used to classify 
overweight and obese adults. Clear cut-off scores exist to determine the degree of obesity (see 
below). Although BMI has proven a relatively good predictor of obesity-related health risks, it is 
not an accurate measure of adiposity, because it cannot distinguish between different types of 
mass, such as fat and muscle mass (Huxley et al., 2009; Nuttall, 2015). 
 Other anthropometrics of obesity include waist circumference and the ratio between 
waist and hip circumference. Both are considered to outperform BMI as a measure of abdominal 
obesity, which better predicts obesity-related health risks. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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However, when salient stimuli distract us from our goals to eat healthily or lose weight the so-called 
attentional bias becomes detrimental. Attentional bias for stimuli related to the target of abuse 
and difficulty exerting control of attention are hallmarks of substance addiction and are argued to 
contribute to compulsive drug use (Franken, 2003; Robbins and Ehrman, 2004). Attentional bias 
has been found to correlate to altered lateral and medial prefrontal cortex-based attentional control 
(Chase et al., 2011; Hester and Luijten, 2014); brain regions that are part of the mesocortical 
dopamine pathway (Figure 1.1). Using a variety of paradigms, attentional bias has also been shown 
for disordered gambling (van Holst et al., 2009; Hønsi et al., 2013), as well as for obesity (Nijs and 
Franken, 2012; Hendrikse et al., 2015) and other forms of disordered eating (Werthmann et al., 
2015). However, whether the attentional bias hypothesis of addiction can be extended to these forms 
of compulsive behavior is unclear. 
 One of the most common cognitive paradigms to assess attentional bias in humans is the 
emotional Stroop task (Robbins & Ehrman 2004). In this task, the simple goal is to name the color 
of a word on the screen as fast and accurately as possible. When words are related to the target of 
abuse, and are thus highly salient, individuals are generally distracted from the goal, which results 
in an attentional bias to those words as reflected by slower response times (Phaf and Kan, 2007; 
Field and Cox, 2008). Similar to addiction, attentional bias to palatable food words has been related 
to (future) obesity in children and adults (Braet and Crombez, 2003; Calitri et al., 2010). However, 
two other studies have not found a relationship between attentional bias to food words and obesity 
(Nijs et al., 2010a; Phelan et al., 2011). The neural mechanism underlying attentional bias for food 
words has not yet been investigated and could shed light on these inconsistent behavioral findings. 
I addressed this gap in chapter 3 (for details see Aims and outline). 
FROM GOAL-DIRECTED TO HABITUAL CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR
The sight of the golden arches of MacDonalds can grab our attention, it is likely to lead to dopamine 
release, and may motivate us to drop by for a burger. Now how do we get from being motivated 
to the actual behavior of getting the burger? Behavior can be controlled by two systems, the goal-
directed and the habitual system (Dickinson, 1985; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Dolan and Dayan, 
2013), both of which I will briefly discuss below. 
 Initially, motivation to go for a burger when seeing the golden arches will be voluntary 
and goal-directed, and will be mediated by prefrontal cortex-based top-down control. Goal-directed 
behavior is guided by learned response-outcome associations (R-O) and can thus be flexibly 
adjusted when an outcome changes. In the burger example, a sequence of actions (R) may be 
performed to obtain the burger and relieve hunger (O). Alternatively, when we are on a diet, we might 
not want to drop by MacDonalds even though the golden arches attract our attention and remind 
us of that tasty burger. If we want to stick to our goal (‘adhere to diet’) we need to use our prefrontal 
cortex to remind ourselves of our goals and of the possible outcomes of our actions to decide to get 
back to what it was that we were actually doing; we decide not to go for a burger. Individuals with 
diminished prefrontal cortex control may not be able to resist the temptation of the tasty burger and 
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1go get one anyway. Addiction and obesity have both been associated with diminished prefrontal 
cortex-based cognitive control (Hare et al., 2009, 2011; Goldstein and Volkow, 2011; Limbrick-
Oldfield et al., 2013; Lopez et al., 2014, 2016).    
 But when an action has been repeated often it is likely to be taken again, independent of 
its past consequences, as proposed in Thorndike’s Law of Exercise (Thorndike, 1911). This is a key 
feature of habits. Habits are a form of learned ‘automatic’ behavior and are formally defined as stimulus-
response (S-R) associations that are no longer directly sensitive to changes in the outcome (O). They 
have been divorced from the reward previously associated with the action. So when we always drop by 
MacDonalds after a night out, we might automatically go for a burger even though we are not hungry 
at all, simply because the golden arches (S) are so strongly associated with going in (R). 
 Optimal behavior requires a balance between goal-directed and habitual control. Whether 
behavior is under goal-directed or habitual control can be tested in the lab using an instrumental 
task including an outcome devaluation procedure, during which one of the rewards is devalued 
(Dickinson, 1985). If behavior is under habitual control (i.e., insensitive to the value of the outcome) 
devaluation will not affect subsequent behavior. However, if behavior is under goal-directed control, 
behavior will be adjusted accordingly. Incentive sensitization is thought to greatly facilitate habit 
learning, and to ultimately tip the balance toward maladaptive habitual control of behavior at the 
expense of goal-directed control (Robbins and Everitt, 1999). Animal studies have shown that 
compulsive behavior is accompanied by a shift from goal-directed to habitual control, mediated 
by a shift from prefrontal to striatal control and from ventral to dorsolateral striatum (Robbins and 
Everitt, 1999). Some indirect evidence exists for such a shift in humans (Hogarth et al., 2013). For 
example, Valentin and colleagues (2007) showed the involvement of OFC (which is part of vmPFC) 
in goal-directed choices when choosing a devalued food reward. This region interacts with the 
mesolimbic pathway through reciprocal connections with ventral striatum. Conversely, posterior 
putamen, which is part of dorsolateral striatum in the nigrostriatal dopamine pathway (Figure 1.1), 
has been shown to be activated more strongly with greater training. This was related to decreased 
sensitivity to devaluation (Tricomi et al., 2009). The nigrostriatal pathway has been strongly involved 
in motor control. Similarly, in a “slips of action task” structural corticostriatal connectivity with vmPFC 
was found to predict goal-directed action, whereas connectivity between posterior putamen and 
premotor cortex (part of secondary motor cortex, see Figure 1.1) predicted habitual slips of action 
(de Wit et al., 2012b). 
 Studies implementing outcome devaluation paradigms have found evidence for reduced 
goal-directed control in highly impulsive individuals (Hogarth et al., 2012), smokers (Hogarth and 
Chase, 2011) and in obese men (Horstmann et al., 2015a). The likelihood of making habitual cue-
triggered choices might be greater when people have a stronger attentional bias to high-calorie 
food cues (see section Attentional control). This would indeed be predicted from an attentional 
bias theory of obesity. But are those people who are more easily distracted by food cues indeed 
more likely to make habitual choices? Whether loss of goal-directed control of food choices relates 
to diminished attentional control in the face of distracting food cues in obesity is yet unknown. In 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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chapter 3, I test this hypothesis by relating the degree of obesity to both attentional bias to food 
words and to outcome devaluation in the same group of healthy subjects (for details see Aims and 
outline). 
MINDFULLY BREAKING BAD HABITS
Although it is notoriously hard to break bad habits, let alone reverse compulsive behavior, it is not 
impossible. If we are able to tap into the mechanism underlying compulsive habits in the right way, 
we might be able to restore goal-directed control of behavior. A behavioral approach that claims to 
increase self-regulation and reduce automatic, reactive behavior is mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 
Shapiro et al., 2006; Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2015a).  
 Mindfulness is aimed at cultivating attention to present-moment experience without 
judgment and is practiced through different forms of meditation (Kabat-Zinn, 1984). Kabat-Zinn 
introduced a westernized form of mindfulness in an intensive mindfulness-based program for 
patients suffering from stress-related symptoms, such as chronic pain and anxiety, that effectively 
reduced their symptomatology (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Kabat-Zinn and Massion, 1992). This resulted 
in the highly protocolized mindfulness-based stress reduction program (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) 
and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002) programs as we know them 
today (for a review about the past, present and future of mindfulness-based interventions see Kabat-
Zinn, 2003). These mindfulness-based interventions have led to beneficial effects in a great variety 
of clinical as well as non-clinical populations (Grossman et al., 2004; Chiesa and Serretti, 2009). In 
addition, more recent adaptations from these interventions targeted at compulsive behavior have 
shown to be effective in overeating (Kristeller and Hallett, 1999; Kristeller et al., 2013; O’Reilly et 
al., 2014), substance addiction (Vallejo and Amaro, 2009; Black, 2014; Chiesa and Serretti, 2014; 
Witkiewitz et al., 2014a) and gambling disorder (Toneatto et al., 2007, 2014).
 But how does mindfulness result in mental health improvements? How can it get at our 
automatic, reactive behavior? Despite the lack of well-designed actively-controlled investigations of the 
mechanisms underlying mindfulness, evidence is starting to converge on some key neurocognitive 
targets of mindfulness meditation, in particular attentional control, emotion regulation and self 
awareness (Tang et al., 2015). Central to practicing mindfulness meditation is the development and 
refinement of attentional skills, resulting in improved attentional control (Malinowski, 2013). These 
attentional skills are thought to underlie emotional and cognitive flexibility, and may lead to increased 
behavioral flexibility through the cultivation of non-judging awareness (Malinowski, 2013; Malinowski et 
al 2009). In line with the development of mindfulness-based interventions for stress-related disorders, 
much of the research on the mechanisms of mindfulness has focused on the regulation of negative 
emotions. A wealth of evidence supports mindfulness-mediated improvements in negative emotion 
regulation involving structural and functional changes in affective as well as cognitive control brain 
regions (Tang et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2014). Mindfulness-based improvements in emotion regulation 
are hypothesized to result from better prefrontal cognitive control mechanisms that downregulate 
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1the processing of emotional stimuli in affective brain regions, such as the amygdala. Evidence from 
longitudinal mindfulness studies including novice or beginning meditators support this hypothesis, 
showing increased prefrontal control and decreased amygdala responses to negative emotional 
stimuli (Chiesa et al 2013). Note that, with time and practice, mindfulness might rather facilitate 
bottom-up emotion regulation strategies, as evidence from expert meditators suggests (Chiesa et al 
2013; Tang et al 2015). 
 As discussed in the sections above, compulsivity is characterized by behavioral inflexibility 
that may result from aberrant responses to emotionally salient, positive stimuli and/or from diminished 
cognitive control. An obvious question is therefore whether mindfulness affects regulation of reward-
driven responses, such as bad eating habits, in a similar fashion as responses driven by negative 
stimuli (Tang et al., 2015b, 2016). To this date, only few studies have been conducted on mindfulness-
mediated effects in the reward domain (Papies et al., 2012; Hendrickson and Rasmussen, 2013; 
Tang et al., 2013; Kirk et al., 2014a, 2014b; Kirk and Montague, 2015). These studies suggest 
that mindfulness is indeed associated with decreased responses to positive emotional stimuli in 
affective brain regions. For example, meditators have been found to exhibit reduced striatal BOLD 
responses to primary reward prediction errors (Kirk and Montague, 2015) as well as to monetary 
reward anticipation (Kirk et al., 2014a) relative to non-meditating controls. However, because these 
are cross-sectional studies, the observed decreases in striatal reward processing might be due to 
pre-existing between-group differences (Mascaro et al., 2013) or non-specific effects of practice. 
 The mindfulness field would greatly benefit from carefully designed longitudinal 
active-control studies that at the same time implement cognitive paradigms to tap into specific 
neurocognitive processes, an approach that I use in this thesis. Kirk and colleagues (2014b) recently 
performed such a randomized actively controlled study including pre and post measurements, in 
which they found that vmPFC value signals were modulated by the mindfulness intervention for both 
primary (juice) and secondary (monetary) rewards in a healthy population. Furthermore, Tang and 
colleagues (2013) reported increased resting state activity in cognitive control regions of the brain 
(i.e., ACC and prefrontal cortex) of smokers who had engaged in a two week meditation training 
(relative to a relaxation training). But how are these findings related to incentive motivation and actual 
reward-driven behavior? Two other studies have shown that a brief mindfulness instruction (Papies et 
al., 2012) or a 50-minute mindful eating workshop (Hendrickson and Rasmussen, 2013) can reduce 
food-related impulses relative to an active control condition, suggesting that mindfulness may 
counteract reward-driven eating by regulating responses to salient food or food-related stimuli. This 
has not yet been investigated in the context of compulsive eating behavior. In chapter 4 and 5 I used 
a longitudinal randomized actively controlled design to address the question whether mindfulness 
can indeed counteract reward-driven eating behavior by increasing behavioral flexibility (chapter 
4) and/or by reducing incentive motivation for rewards (chapter 5). Behavioral inflexibility as seen 
in compulsive behavior may be reflected in reversal learning deficits, as I described in the section 
Dopamine theory of addiction of this introduction. In chapter 4, I therefore investigate whether an 
intensive mindfulness-based intervention targeted at bad eating habits (relative to an active control 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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intervention) can restore such deficits (for details see Aims and outline). Reducing hyperreactivity of 
the reward system might be another promising target of mindfulness for counteracting compulsive 
reward-driven behavior. Controversy exists as to the specificity of the hyperactive reward responses 
in addiction. Some argue for aberrant responses only to the target of abuse (Sescousse et al., 
2013a), which might go at the expense of the value of other types of rewards (Volkow et al., 2008). 
Other theories predict a general hyperreactivity to rewards (Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2013; Opel et 
al., 2015), which is supported by a recent study showing increased ventral striatal responses for 
obese relative to lean control subjects when anticipating monetary rewards in an incentive delay task 
(Balodis et al., 2013). In chapter 5, I address the question whether the mindful eating intervention 
as implemented in chapter 4 can lead to diminished subcortical responses to either reward cues in 
general or food cues specifically (for details see Aims and outline). 
AIMS AND OUTLINE
In this thesis I aim to elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying compulsive gambling 
and eating behavior. Building on an extensive body of addiction literature, I use a variety of cognitive 
paradigms to tap into different aspects of compulsive behavior. I focus in particular on altered 
processing of rewards and loss of control over automatic tendencies triggered by reward-related 
stimuli. In addition, I hope to shed light on the mechanisms by which an intensive mindfulness-
based intervention might counteract undesired eating habits. 
 First, I assessed compulsive gambling behavior in a clinical population. In chapter 2, I 
established the role of dopamine-mediated abnormalities in reinforcement learning in disordered 
gambling, which has hitherto only been observed for substance addiction. Given the role of 
dopamine D2-receptors in addiction, I investigated the effect of the D2-receptor antagonist sulpiride 
on reversal learning in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-subjects design. To assess the 
ability to flexibly adjust behavior following unexpected rewards and punishments, subjects suffering 
from disordered gambling (referred to as pathological gambling; Box 1.1) and matched healthy 
control subjects performed a deterministic reversal learning task that has been shown to be sensitive 
to changes in dopamine (Cools et al., 2006, 2009; van der Schaaf et al., 2014). We hypothesized 
that sulpiride would remediate pre-existing reversal learning deficits in gamblers relative to controls. 
 To learn more about a different type of compulsive behavior I turned to bad eating habits, 
which are particularly common in the healthy population. We are all conditioned for high caloric foods 
in our obesogenic environment (Dagher, 2012). Many of us every so often struggle with negative 
consequences from eating too much, such as an uncomfortably full stomach in the short term 
or maybe even health risks associated with overweight or obesity in the long term (Box 1.2). In 
chapters 3 to 5, I present data from a large sample of healthy subjects that were motivated to 
change their undesired eating habits. 
 In chapter 3, I focused on food-directed attentional as well as goal-directed control and 
related both of them to differing degree of obesity. I administered a food Stroop task in the MRI scanner 
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1to assess attentional control in terms of attentional bias to food words (i.e., slowing of response times) 
and lateral prefrontal cortex BOLD responses. To investigate the degree of goal-directed versus 
habitual control when faced with food choices, the same subjects performed a separate behavioral 
outcome devaluation task. Diminished lateral prefrontal cortex-based attentional control and goal-
directed control of food choices were expected to be associated with higher degree of obesity. If food 
attentional bias would predict habitual overeating, I expected to find a putative loss in attentional control 
in the face of food words to correlate with diminished goal-directed food choices. 
 Mindfulness has been shown effective in reducing compulsive overeating in both clinical 
and non-clinical populations. However, the mechanism by which such changes would occur is largely 
unknown. To fill this gap, I investigated the effects of a mindfulness-based intervention targeted at 
changing undesired eating habits on reward processing in a largely overlapping sample using a 
randomized, actively controlled design (chapter 4 and 5). Subjects were randomized to either an 
intensive 8-week mindful eating intervention or an educational cooking intervention (i.e., the active 
control) that was carefully matched in terms of time investment and social contact, which enabled us 
to investigate mindfulness-specific effects in contrast to many previous studies. The mindful eating 
intervention was aimed at increasing awareness on how to eat, whereas the educational cooking 
intervention was aimed at increasing awareness on what to eat. 
 Given the claim that mindfulness may decrease reactive, automatic behavior, I expected 
that practicing mindful eating would improve behavioral flexibility. More specifically, I investigated the 
effects of mindfulness on the ability to adjust behavior following unexpected positive or negative 
outcomes in chapter 4, using the same reversal learning task as in chapter 2. Furthermore, 
mindfulness-based interventions have been shown to reduce subcortical reactivity (Goldin et al., 
2012; Lutz et al., 2013) and increase emotion regulation in the context of negative stimuli (Tang 
et al., 2015a). Whether the same holds for the reward domain is unclear. I hypothesized that our 
mindful eating intervention would similarly reduce subcortical responses to reward-predictive cues, 
which are thought to be increased in obesity. I addressed this hypothesis in chapter 5 by assessing 
midbrain and striatal anticipatory responses to reward cues in an incentive delay task. The task 
included both monetary and caloric rewards to distinguish between domain-specific effects (i.e., for 
caloric rewards only), or domain-general effects (i.e., extending to monetary rewards).  
 In chapter 6, I summarize the findings presented in the empirical chapters (chapters 2 
to 5) and discuss them in the light of the current literature. Furthermore, I discuss limitations of and 
future directions following from my work.

Adapted from: Janssen, LK*, Sescousse, G*, Hashemi, MM, Timmer, MHM, ter Huurne, N,Geurts, 
D, Cools, R (2015). Abnormal modulation of reward versus punishment learning by a dopamine D2-
receptor antagonist in pathological gamblers. Psychopharmacology, 232(18): 3345-3353.
CHAPTER 2
ABNORMAL MODULATION OF REWARD VERSUS 
PUNISHMENT LEARNING BY A DOPAMINE D2-RECEPTOR 
ANTAGONIST IN PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLERS
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ABSTRACT
Pathological gambling has been associated with dopamine transmission abnormalities, in particular 
dopamine D2-receptor deficiency, and reversal learning deficits. Moreover, pervasive theoretical 
accounts suggest a key role for dopamine in reversal learning. However, there is no empirical 
evidence for a direct link between dopamine, reversal learning and pathological gambling. The aim of 
the present study is to triangulate dopamine, reversal learning, and pathological gambling. Here we 
assess the hypothesis that pathological gambling is accompanied by dopamine-related problems 
with learning from reward and punishment by investigating effects of the dopamine D2-receptor 
antagonist sulpiride (400mg) on reward- and punishment-based reversal learning in 18 pathological 
gamblers and 22 healthy controls, using a placebo-controlled, double-blind, counter-balanced 
design. In line with previous studies, blockade of D2-receptors with sulpiride impaired reward 
versus punishment reversal learning in controls. By contrast, sulpiride did not have any outcome-
specific effects in gamblers. These data demonstrate that pathological gambling is associated with 
a dopamine-related anomaly in reversal learning from reward and punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
Pathological gambling is a psychiatric disorder characterized by elevated risk seeking and compulsive 
gambling behavior. It can have dramatic consequences including bankruptcy, unemployment, 
relationship problems and even attempted suicide in up to 24% of individuals (DeCaria et al., 1996), 
and its prevalence is estimated between 1% and 2% in Western countries (Wardle et al., 2010; 
Welte et al., 2014). In the DSM-5, pathological gambling (renamed gambling disorder) is recognized 
as a behavioral addiction based on similarities with substance addiction in terms of personality 
traits (impulsivity and compulsivity), clinical symptoms (tolerance, withdrawal and craving), and 
associated neurobiological mechanisms (Petry, 2007; Potenza, 2008, 2013). For example, both 
substance addiction and pathological gambling have been associated with dopamine transmission 
abnormalities, in particular dopamine D2-receptor deficiency (Comings et al., 1996; Dalley et al., 
2007; Linnet et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2012; but also see Joutsa et al., 2012; Boileau et al., 2013). 
Moreover, pervasive theoretical accounts of addiction suggest a key role for dopamine-dependent 
abnormalities in reinforcement learning in both substance addiction (Redish, 2004; Everitt and 
Robbins, 2005) and pathological gambling (Redish et al., 2007). In these accounts, aberrant reward 
prediction error signals lead to compulsive over-selection of actions directed at targets of addiction. 
 Empirical evidence supports the link between dopamine, learning and substance 
addiction. For example D2-receptor stimulation has been shown to remediate cognitive impairments 
in human drug addicts in the context of reversal learning, which reflects the ability to flexibly adapt 
one’s behavior in response to contingency changes in the environment (Ersche et al., 2011). This 
concurs with the suggestion that low levels of dopamine D2-receptor availability might predispose to 
compulsive drug taking (Dalley et al., 2007; Belin et al., 2008) and the claim that reversal learning is 
a valuable tool for investigating D2-dependent compulsive aspects of pathological reward-seeking 
behaviors (Izquierdo and Jentsch, 2012). 
 By contrast to substance addiction, there appears to be no empirical evidence for a direct 
link between dopamine, reversal learning and pathological gambling. Indeed, while research supports 
links between dopamine and gambling, and between gambling and learning, there is no evidence 
for dopamine-dependent learning abnormalities in gamblers. Thus, several indices of gambling 
severity have been associated with lower density of striatal dopamine D2-receptors (see also Clark 
et al., 2012; Boileau et al., 2013), even though overall group differences have not been reported so 
far (Linnet et al., 2010). In rodents, D2-receptor agents have been found to influence a behavioral 
analogue of loss-chasing (Rogers et al., 2013)however, this phenomenon mediates the relationship 
between diminished control over gambling and the adverse socioeconomic consequences of 
gambling problems. Modeling loss-chasing through analogous behaviors in rats could facilitate 
its pharmacological investigation as a potential therapeutic target. Here, rats were trained to make 
operant responses that produced both food rewards, and unpredictably, imminent time-out periods 
in which rewards would be unavailable. At these decision points, rats were offered choices between 
waiting for these time-out periods to elapse before resuming responding for rewards responses as 
well as risk-taking behavior (St. Onge et al., 2011; Winstanley et al., 2011). Further, gamblers were 
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shown to exhibit diminished ability to update previously learned reward contingencies, as measured 
with classic instrumental reversal learning tasks (de Ruiter et al., 2009; Boog, 2014; Vanes et al., 
2014). However, a direct link between dopamine D2-receptor dysfunction, abnormal learning, and 
pathological gambling is still missing. 
 The aim of the present study was to triangulate dopamine, gambling and reversal learning 
by investigating the effects of the dopamine D2-receptor antagonist sulpiride (400 mg) on reversal 
learning in pathological gamblers. Performance was assessed using a deterministic reversal learning 
paradigm that enables separate investigation of reward- and punishment prediction learning. This 
feature of the task is particularly pertinent here, because gamblers have been suggested to be 
preoccupied with rewards rather than with punishments (Kreussel et al., 2013; Romanczuk-Seiferth et 
al., 2014). Moreover this paradigm was previously shown to be particularly sensitive to manipulation 
of dopamine (Cools et al., 2006, 2009; van der Schaaf et al., 2014). Specifically, we have shown that 
administration of 400 mg of sulpiride to young healthy volunteers altered reward- versus punishment-
based reversal learning (van der Schaaf et al., 2014). This finding is in line with a series of other 
studies (Frank and O’Reilly, 2006; Jocham et al., 2011, 2014; Eisenegger et al., 2014) showing 
effects of D2-receptor blockade in healthy volunteers on reward- versus punishment-based learning 
and reinforcement-based decisions. As such, this paradigm is a valuable tool to assess whether 
pathological gambling is accompanied by a dopamine D2-dependent imbalance in learning from 
reward versus punishment.
 This question is particularly relevant in the light of current inconsistencies in the literature 
regarding the effects of dopaminergic drugs, and specifically dopamine D2-receptor antagonists, 
in human gamblers. Whereas administration of the D2-receptor antagonist haloperidol has been 
reported to increase the self-reported desire to gamble in pathological gamblers (Zack and Poulos, 
2007) and to enhance the impact of reward on betting behavior (Tremblay et al., 2011), the same drug 
(although at a lower dose) did not alter subjective, physiological or motivation-to-gamble responses 
in recreational gamblers in another study (Porchet et al., 2013). So far no study has investigated 
the effects of D2-receptor antagonism on reward- versus punishment-based learning in human 
gamblers. Based on previous work (Frank et al., 2004; van der Schaaf et al., 2014), we expected 
sulpiride to impair reward versus punishment-based learning in healthy controls.  In gamblers, 
we expected impaired punishment versus reward-based learning under placebo. Moreover, we 
expected that this impairment would be remediated by sulpiride.
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METHODS
SUBJECTS
Twenty-two male pathological gamblers and twenty-two healthy men were included following an 
in depth structured psychiatric interview administered by a medical doctor (MINI Plus (Sheehan et 
al., 1998) and the gambling section of the DSM-IV Diagnostic Interview Schedule (Robins et al., 
1998)). Two gamblers were excluded from the analyses because of their difficulty understanding the 
task. An additional two gamblers were excluded from the analyses because of comorbid cannabis 
dependence within the past six months (for details see Supplementary Materials). Therefore, the 
reported results are based on data from eighteen gamblers and twenty-two controls. Supplementary 
analyses including the two cannabis addicts are reported in Supplementary Materials and 
confirmed the effects of primary interest reported in the main text. All subjects provided written 
informed consent, which was approved by the regional research ethics committee (Commissie 
Mensgebonden Onderzoek, regio Arnhem-Nijmegen, Registration Number: 2011/204, Date: 14 
November 2011), and received compensation for participation.
 Pathological gamblers were recruited through advertisement (n=14) and addiction 
treatment centers (n=4), and reported not to be medicated or in treatment for their pathological 
gambling at the time of testing. Controls were recruited through advertisement. All gamblers, with the 
exception of one, qualified as pathological gambler as they met ≥5 DSM-IV-TR criteria for pathological 
gambling, and were otherwise healthy. One gambler qualified as problem gambler as he met only 4 
DSM-IV criteria. The severity of gambling symptoms was assessed using the South Oaks Gambling 
Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987). All gamblers had a minimum SOGS score of 6 (range = 
6-18), whereas controls, with the exception of 2 subjects, had a SOGS score of 0 (range = 0-2). 
 The two groups were matched for age, net income, body mass index, and verbal IQ as 
estimated by the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test (NART)(Table 2.1). Subjects were 
excluded (from both groups) if they were currently following psychiatric treatment (except cognitive 
behavioral therapy; n=2); were using more than 4 alcoholic beverages daily; were using psychotropic 
medication; had a lifetime history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, autism, bulimia or anorexia, anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder; or had a past 
6 months history of major depressive episode. Given the high comorbidity between pathological 
gambling and other psychiatric disorders (Lorains et al., 2011), gamblers with the following 
comorbidities were included: lifetime history of dysthymia (n=1); and remitted posttraumatic stress 
disorder (n=1; remitted >4 years). Excluding these gamblers from the analyses did not change the 
results. In addition, three gamblers used cannabis weekly in the past 6 months, but did not meet the 
DSM criteria for abuse/dependence. Control subjects had no relevant psychiatric history. 
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Self-report questionnaires were administered to further characterize the subjects (Table 2.1): 
the Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence (FTND; Heatherton et al., 1991), the Alcohol Use 
Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders et al., 1993), the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995), and 
the Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System scale (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 
1994). Frequent forms of gambling were assessed using item 1 of the SOGS and are expressed in 
terms of the percentage of gamblers who play the following games at least once a week for money: 
slot machines (61%), card games (61%), casino games (33%), sports betting (28%), lotteries (22%), 
bowling, pool, golf, darts or alike (5,5%), stock market (5,5%). 
Table 2.1 Demographics and self-report measures
Healthy controls Pathological gamblers p-value
n 22 18
Age 32.2  (2.4) 35.2 (1.9) .353
Net income 1,715.9  (235.1) 1750.0 (193.9) .914
Body Mass Index 23.1 (0.7) 24.1 (0.5) .280
  
Education – NART 5.6 (0.2) 5.2 (0.2) .202
Verbal IQ – NART 105.2  (2.2) 98.7 (2.8) .072
Digit span – total 15.6  (0.9) 15.1 (0.8) .691
Number of 
current smokers
10 12 .180
FTND 0.6 (0.3) 2.9 (0.7) .002
AUDIT 6.0 (0.8) 7.3 (0.9) .284
HADS – depression 1.6 (0.5) 4.7 (1.1) .008
HADS – anxiety 2.6 (0.6) 5.1 (0.8) .014
BIS-11 57.5 (1.8) 68.3 (2.9) .002
BIS 17.6 (0.8) 18.4 (0.9) .502
BAS 38.1 (1.2) 42.3 (1.0) .013
SOGS 0.2 (0.1) 12.3 (0.9) <.001
If not otherwise stated values represent mean (SEM). NART: National Adult Reading Test (Dutch version); FTND: 
Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence; AUDIT: Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; HADS: Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale; BIS-11: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; BIS: Behavioural Inhibition System; BAS: 
Behavioural Activation System; SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen.
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PROCEDURE
Subjects visited the lab on two occasions; they were tested once after receiving an oral dose of 
sulpiride (Dogmatil®, Sanofi-Aventis; 400mg), and once after a placebo. The order of administration 
was randomized according to a double-blind, cross-over design. The test sessions were separated 
by at least one week. Starting time of test sessions was always between 9 and 10am. Subjects were 
asked to abstain from recreational drugs one week before testing, from alcohol 24h before testing, 
and from caffeine and nicotine the morning before testing. The behavioral task was part of a larger 
protocol and was performed approximately 3.5h after drug intake, and thus coincided with high 
plasma concentrations of sulpiride (Mehta et al., 2003). 
 Background neuropsychological tests (digit span, verbal fluency, number cancellation, and 
block completion) were administered at the end of the day, 4.25h after drug intake. Mood, blood pressure 
and heart rate were measured immediately prior to drug intake, as well as 1h and 4.5h following drug 
intake. Subjective mood was measured using the Bond and Lader visual analogue scales (Bond and 
Lader, 1974) and the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We employed a deterministic reversal learning task similar to that described elsewhere (Cools et al., 
2006; van der Schaaf et al., 2014). The task was programmed with Presentation software (Version 16, 
Neurobiobehavioral Systems, Inc.). The layout of the task was adjusted to fit the original instructions 
of a casino setting (see Cools et al., 2006) and to be more intuitive for gamblers. 
 On each trial, subjects were presented with two gambling cards simultaneously (Figure 
2.1). One of the two cards was associated with upcoming reward, the other one with upcoming 
punishment. Unlike classic instrumental reversal learning tasks, subjects did not choose between 
the two stimuli. Instead one card was highlighted, and subjects had to learn to predict the outcome 
associated with this preselected card by trial-and-error. Responses were made by pressing one 
of two buttons – one for reward, the other for punishment – with the right index or middle finger 
(counterbalanced across subjects), and were self-paced. After a 1000-ms post-response delay the 
outcome was presented for 500-ms followed by a 500-ms intertrial interval. Note that the outcomes 
were not contingent on the subjects’ responses, but on the highlighted stimulus; thus, contingencies 
were Pavlovian rather than instrumental. The stimulus-outcome contingency reversed after five to 
nine consecutive correct predictions. 
 Subjects performed two blocks, each consisting of two runs of 120 trials (i.e. a total of 
480 trials). In one block, reversals were always signaled by unexpected rewards (“reward block”), 
and in the other block reversals were always signaled by unexpected punishments (“punishment 
block”). Reward consisted of a smiling emoticon with a “+€100” sign. Punishment consisted of a 
sad emoticon with a “−€100” sign. The order of blocks was counterbalanced between sessions 
and across subjects. Error rate on the trials immediately after reversals (i.e. unexpected reward 
or punishment) indexes the ability to update predictions of reward and punishment, i.e. how well 
subjects learned from either unexpected reward or unexpected punishment. On these reversal 
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trials, the same stimulus was highlighted as on the previous unexpected outcome trial such that 
non-outcome-specific requirements for motor switching and prediction updating were matched 
between reward and punishment conditions. This enabled direct comparison between reward and 
punishment reversals. Subjects were instructed according to the original procedure by Cools et al. 
(2006) and were trained extensively before the experiment so that they understood the structure 
of the task and the Pavlovian, rather than instrumental, nature of the contingencies (for details see 
Supplementary Materials).
+100  
ITI 500 ms
Stimulus until response
Delay 1000 ms
Outcome 500 ms
Figure 2.1 Sample trial of the reversal learning task. On each trial, subjects were presented with 2 gambling 
cards. One of the cards was selected by the computer and highlighted with a blue border. Subjects then had 
to predict, with a left or right button press, whether the card would be followed by a reward (a smiling emoticon, 
+100€ sign, and a high-pitch tone) or punishment (a sad emoticon, -100€ sign, and a low-pitch tone). After a 
short delay, the outcome was presented. The card-outcome associations were deterministic, and reversed after 
5 to 9 correct responses.
ANALYSES
Error rates on reversal trials (trials immediately after unexpected outcomes) were arcsine transformed 
as is appropriate when variance is proportional to the mean (Howell, 1997). Error rates on reversal 
trials were analysed using a mixed ANOVA (SPSS 19, Chicago, IL) with drug (placebo vs. sulpiride) 
and outcome (unexpected reward vs. punishment) as within-subject factors and group (gamblers 
vs. controls) as a between-subject factor. In addition, we assessed the total number of reversals 
obtained throughout the task. Because the stimulus-outcome contingency in the task reversed after 
five to nine consecutive correct predictions, and the total number of trials was fixed, the number of 
reversals for the reward and punishment block reflects performance also on the non-reversal trials. 
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RESULTS
Figure 2.2 shows that sulpiride altered reward versus punishment reversal learning in controls, while 
not altering reversal learning in gamblers. This observation was substantiated by an ANOVA of the 
error rates on reversal trials (Table 2.2), which revealed a significant interaction of group x drug x 
outcome (F(1,38)=5.288, p=.027). When decomposing the three-way interaction effect into two-way 
interaction effects for each group, we found that this was driven by a drug x outcome interaction in 
controls (F(1,21)=4.768, p=.040). By contrast, there was no drug x outcome interaction in gamblers 
(F(1,17)=1.183, p=.292). The drug x outcome interaction in controls was due to a significant 
simple main effect of drug on reward learning (F(1,21)=5.439, p=.030), not punishment learning 
(F(1,21)=.523, p=.478). Thus, sulpiride induced a shift away from reward learning in controls, while 
not altering the balance between reward and punishment learning in gamblers. Under placebo there 
was no group x outcome interaction (F(1,38)=.976, p=.329). 
Table 2.2 Mean error rates on reversal trials
Healthy controls Pathological gamblers
Placebo Sulpiride Placebo Sulpiride
Reward 0.12(0.031) 0.17(0.036) 0.13(0.031) 0.16(0.039)
Punishment 0.13(0.033) 0.10(0.019) 0.09(0.023) 0.14(0.028)
Values represent mean (SEM). 
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Figure 2.2 The effect of sulpiride on outcome-specific error rates (i.e. mean error rates on trials following 
unexpected rewards – mean error rates on trials following unexpected punishment). Sulpiride significantly impairs 
reward versus punishment learning in controls  while not altering the balance between reward and punishment 
learning in gamblers. Error bars represent 1 SEM; * denotes p<.05, ns denotes not significant.
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In addition to the outcome-specific effects of sulpiride on reversal learning, there was also an outcome-
nonspecific main effect of drug on error rate (F(1,38)=4.452, p=.041). This was due to sulpiride 
impairing performance across groups and outcomes. This raises the question whether the impairment 
is specific to reversal trials or extends to non-reversal trials. Supplementary analysis including the 
within-subjects factor trial type (reversal, non-reversal reward, and non-reversal punishment trials) 
revealed a significant group x drug x outcome x trial type interaction (F(2,37)=3.581, p=.038). When 
decomposing this interaction into the simple three-way interaction effect for each trial type, we found 
that this four-way interaction was driven by a group x drug x outcome interaction for reversal trials only. In 
line with that, there was no significant effect of group, drug or outcome on performance on non-reversal 
trials as measured by the total number of reversals (Supplementary Figure S2.1). 
 When excluding gamblers with other comorbidities (PTSD and dysthymia; n=2) the effects 
did not change. The interaction of group x drug x outcome remained highly significant (F(1,36)=7.698, 
p=.009). Decomposing the three-way interaction effect into two-way interaction effects for gamblers 
revealed a marginally significant outcome x drug interaction effect (F(1,15)=3.637, p=.076) driven 
by a highly significant impairing effect of drug on punishment learning (F(1,15)=9.370, p=.008), but 
not on reward learning (F(1,15)=.206, p=.657). Thus in the comorbidity-free pathological gamblers, 
sulpiride tended to induce a shift away from punishment learning.
The groups did not differ in terms of alcohol use or in terms of the number of smokers, but they 
did differ significantly in terms of nicotine dependence (FTND), depression and anxiety (HADS), 
impulsivity (BIS-11), and reward sensitivity (BAS; Table 2.1). However, there were no correlations 
between these measures and the drug x outcome interaction effect of interest, suggesting that these 
between-group differences did not drive the current observations (all |r|<.35, p>.155). 
 Our results are unlikely driven by nonspecific effects of the drug manipulation, because 
heart rate, blood pressure, mood, and global cognitive function (as measured by background 
neuropsychological tests) did not significantly differ between the placebo and sulpiride sessions 
in either group (Supplementary Tables S2.1-2.3). Working memory capacity – as a proxy for 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the striatum (Cools et al., 2008) – was previously shown to predict 
the effect of sulpiride on learning from reward versus punishment in this paradigm (van der Schaaf et 
al., 2014). In the current study, working memory capacity did not correlate with the effect of the drug 
in either group. However it should be noted that the majority of our sample (independent of group) 
falls in the low working memory group as reported by van der Schaaf et al. (2014), although the 
difference in the proportion of high and low working memory capacity subjects between the studies 
was only marginally significant (cut-off digit span=17.4; chi(1)=2.967, p=.085).  
 
DISCUSSION
Pathological gambling is thought to implicate dopamine, which is well established to modulate learning 
from reward versus punishment (Maia and Frank, 2011). Like substance addiction, pathological 
gambling has been hypothesized to be accompanied by dopamine-related impairments in learning 
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(Redish et al., 2007). However, this hypothesis has hitherto never been tested. Here we establish 
for the first time a link between pathological gambling, dopamine and learning from reward versus 
punishment. Specifically, we show that administration of sulpiride, a D2-receptor antagonist, impaired 
reward- versus punishment-based reversal learning in controls, while not altering reward- versus 
punishment-based reversal learning in gamblers. However, caution is needed as to the interpretation 
of the lack of drug effect in gamblers, as supplementary analyses suggest that sulpiride might even 
have the diametrically opposite effect, i.e. impairing punishment rather than reward-based reversal 
learning, when only considering gamblers without comorbidities (n=16).
 The effect of sulpiride on outcome-specific reversal learning in controls is generally 
consistent with previous work using the same drug and task in healthy volunteers (van der Schaaf 
et al., 2014). In this prior study, we showed that the direction of the effect of sulpiride depended on 
baseline working memory capacity, so that sulpiride impaired reward relative to punishment learning 
in low working memory subjects, whereas it improved reward relative to punishment learning in high 
working memory subjects. The behavior of our subjects is consistent with the impairments observed 
in low working memory subjects. Examination of working memory capacity in our subjects showed 
that the majority of our sample falls in the low working memory group as reported by van der Schaaf 
et al. (2014). This might reflect the fact that the current sample is more heterogeneous in terms of 
age and received lower education than the sample of van der Schaaf et al. (2014).
 The present results reveal a striking difference in how pathological gamblers and healthy 
controls respond to the same antipsychotic drug. The differential effect of sulpiride on punishment 
learning  in controls versus non-comorbid gamblers is intriguing and might be relevant in the context 
of evidence that antipsychotic drugs can impair conditioned avoidance responding (Smith et al., 
2004)(although note that our task was not optimized for measuring actual avoidance of punishment). 
One possibility is that these results reflect an underlying difference in the endogenous dopamine 
system. In this context, it is interesting to note that pathological gambling has been argued to be 
accompanied by reduced availability of D2-receptors (Comings and Blum, 2000). Some evidence 
for this hypothesis comes from PET studies, showing that gambling severity and impulsiveness in 
pathological gamblers correlate with D2/D3-receptor availability (Clark et al., 2012; Boileau et al., 
2013). In addition, there is evidence for enhanced drug- and task-induced dopamine release in 
individuals exhibiting compulsive gambling behavior (Evans et al., 2006; Steeves et al., 2009; Linnet 
et al., 2010; O’Sullivan et al., 2011; Boileau et al., 2014). 
 According to current modeling work of striatal dopamine, D2-receptor blockade might 
alter reward- versus punishment-based learning and performance by shifting the balance between 
processing in the D1-mediated GO-pathway and D2-mediated NOGO-pathway of the basal ganglia 
(Frank, 2005; Maia and Frank, 2011). In line with the present observation in controls, Pessiglione et al. 
(2006) found that the D2-receptor antagonist haloperidol impaired reward-learning and attenuated 
reward prediction error signals in the striatum, suggesting a shift to processing in the D2-mediated 
NOGO-pathway favoring learning from punishment over learning from reward. Similarly, in a study 
by Eisenegger et al. (2014) a high dose (800mg) of the D2-receptor antagonist sulpiride impaired 
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reward-related performance. However, in apparent contrast to those previous findings as well as 
our current observation in controls, Frank and O’Reilly (2006) found that the D2-receptor antagonist 
haloperidol improved reward- versus punishment-based learning. In addition, a low dose (200mg) 
of the D2-antagonist amisulpride has been found to improve reward- versus punishment-based 
learning and enhance reward prediction error signal in the striatum (Jocham et al., 2011), suggesting 
a shift to processing in the D1-mediated GO-pathway. Note however that at a higher dose (400mg), 
amisulpride impaired both reward and punishment learning (Jocham et al., 2014). These seemingly 
paradoxical findings may be explained by the use of different doses, which may in turn lead to 
differential action of D2-receptor antagonists on pre- vs. postsynaptic receptors in different studies 
(Frank and O’Reilly, 2006). Reward-related improvements with D2-receptor antagonists are generally 
attributed to action at self-regulatory presynaptic receptors (enhancing dopamine in the synapse), 
whereas reward-related impairments with D2-receptor antagonists are generally associated with 
action at postsynaptic receptors. In our study sulpiride might have shifted the balance away from 
reward learning in controls, consistent with postsynaptic action, but not in gamblers, suggesting a 
reduction in postsynaptic action of sulpiride in gamblers versus controls. In fact, when assessing 
a comorbidity-free group of gamblers, sulpiride tended to actually impair punishment- rather than 
reward-based learning, raising the possibility that sulpiride might have acted pre- rather than 
postsynaptically. Preferential sensitivity of pre- versus postsynaptic D2-receptors might make 
particular sense when synaptic dopamine levels are supra-optimal, e.g. through enhanced dopamine 
release (Boileau et al., 2014). We emphasize that this hypothesis about the specific mechanism 
underlying our effect in pathological gamblers remains speculative. One reason is that sulpiride has 
dose-dependent effects on pre- vs postsynaptic striatal D2-receptors (Eisenegger et al., 2014). Our 
dose of 400mg has been shown to occupy ~30% of striatal postsynaptic D2-receptors (Mehta et al., 
2008). However, we have no way of quantifying the exact occupancy of pre- and postsynaptic D2-
receptors in this study. The pre- versus postsynaptic nature of these D2-receptor effects might be 
disentangled in future work, for example by administering a higher dose of sulpiride, or by exploiting 
common polymorphisms in the dopamine receptor D2 gene that are thought to affect the balance 
between pre- and postsynaptic action (Frank et al., 2007).
 One might have expected a baseline difference in reward- and punishment-based learning 
between the groups. Indeed previous studies have reported slowed learning from punishment 
on an instrumental reversal learning task (de Ruiter et al., 2009; Vanes et al., 2014) and possibly 
increased preoccupation with rewards rather than punishments (Kreussel et al., 2013) in pathological 
gamblers versus controls. Surprisingly, in our study, gamblers and controls learned equally well from 
unexpected rewards and unexpected punishments under placebo. We are puzzled about this, and 
hypothesize that this might reflect compensatory mechanisms in the dopamine system, related 
e.g. to upregulation of dopamine synthesis capacity, dopamine release, or postsynaptic dopamine 
receptor sensitivity. This generally concurs with the view that underlying pathology might not surface 
as impairment under baseline conditions, but only when probing the system, for example by using a 
pharmacological challenge (Verdejo-García et al., 2008). This also corresponds with the finding that 
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gambling-related abnormalities in baseline D2-receptor availability (Clark et al., 2012; Joutsa et al., 
2012; Boileau et al., 2013) are more subtle than these in drug- or task-induced dopamine release 
(Linnet et al., 2010; Boileau et al., 2014).  
 In short, we found that blockade of D2-receptors with sulpiride impaired reward versus 
punishment learning in controls, but not in gamblers. By contrast, in comorbidity-free gamblers, 
sulpiride impaired punishment, but not reward learning. This strongly suggests that pathological 
gambling is associated with a dopamine D2-receptor-related anomaly in learning from reward and 
punishment. Future neurochemical work, using PET or genetics is required to address the exact 
neurochemical mechanisms of this anomaly. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
TASK INSTRUCTION AND PRACTICE
Subjects were instructed according to the original procedure by Cools et al. (2006) and were trained 
extensively so that they understood the structure of the task and the Pavlovian, instead of instrumental 
nature of the contingencies; they performed a practice run at the time of intake, and another one before 
the start of the experiment on each test day. On the intake, the practice run consisted of two stages, 
one initial acquisition stage and one reversal stage. Following attainment of an initial learning criterion 
of 20 correct trials, the practice run proceeded to the reversal stage. The practice run was terminated 
if the subject reached a learning criterion of 20 correct trials in the reversal stage or if a maximum of 80 
trials was performed. On the test days, the practice run consisted of 40 trials of the actual task, in which 
the stimulus-outcome contingency reversed after 5 to 9 consecutive correct predictions. Subjects were 
required to perform above chance-level to proceed to the actual task. Subjects who did not perform 
above chance-level were instructed again and did the practice run once more (ncontrols=4, ngamblers=2). 
No more than two practice sessions were required for any of the subjects. 
EXCLUSION OF SUBJECTS
Two subjects were excluded because of difficulty understanding the task. Both subjects passed the 
learning criterion of the practice run after thorough instructions, but on several runs of the actual task 
their error rates were three standard deviations above the group mean.  
 An additional two gamblers were excluded from the analyses because of comorbid 
cannabis dependence within the past six months. These subjects were initially included because we 
could not predict how the recruitment of a comorbidity-free sample of gamblers would go. However, 
given the association between substance dependence, dopamine and reversal learning, our results 
could be biased by including subjects with comorbid cannabis dependence (Comings and Blum, 
2000; Dalley et al., 2007; Belin et al., 2008; Ersche et al., 2011). Since we were successful in including 
a sufficiently large sample of gamblers without comorbidities, we finally decided to exclude gamblers 
with comorbid cannabis dependence. 
RESULTS 
Including the gamblers with comorbid cannabis-dependence (within the past six months) in the 
analysis (n=2) confirmed the effects of primary interest reported in the main text. ANOVA of error 
rates on reversal trials revealed a marginally significant interaction of group x drug x outcome 
(F(1,40)=3.408, p=.072). When decomposing the three-way interaction effect into two-way 
interaction effects for each group, we found that this was driven by a drug x outcome interaction in 
controls (F(1,21)=4.768, p=.040). By contrast, there was no drug x outcome interaction in gamblers 
(F(1,19)=.180, p=0.677). Indeed there was a strong simple main effect of outcome in the sulpiride 
condition in controls (F(1,21)=8.270, p=.009) but not in gamblers (F(1,19)=0.014, p=.906).
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Figure S2.1 Mean number of reversals per group (controls, gamblers), drug (placebo, sulpiride), and outcome 
(unexpected reward, unexpected punishment). There were no significant differences in the number of reversals 
between groups, drugs, or outcomes. 
Table S2.1 Physiological measures. ANOVAs for each of the measures showed no main effect of 
drug, nor any interactions with drug, ruling out a potential non-specific effect of the drug.
Healthy controls Pathological gamblers
Placebo Sulpiride Placebo Sulpiride
Heart rate
T1 70.8 (2.2) 70.0 (2.3) 66.8 (1.9) 69.4 (1.7)
T2 61.7 (2.0) 62.4 (1.3) 59.7 (2.0) 60.6 (2.1)
T3 64.6 (1.3) 64.1 (1.7) 65.4 (2.5) 64.4 (2.5)
Systolic blood 
pressure
T1 129.4 (2.4) 130.2 (2.7) 127.7 (2.7) 127.4 (3.1)
T2 127.1 (2.1) 130.6 (2.7) 125.9 (3.0) 126.3 (2.9)
T3 128.1 (2.5) 128.0 (3.0) 129.4 (2.9) 127.1 (2.3)
Diastolic blood 
pressure
T1 75.6 (1.8) 76.6 (1.8) 75.1 (2.0) 74.8 (2.2)
T2 76.7 (1.6) 78.9 (2.6) 75.6 (2.1) 74.2 (1.6)
T3 77.5 (1.6) 76.4 (1.7) 75.2 (1.9) 75.1 (1.5)
Values represent mean (SEM). T1: time point 1, before drug intake; T2: time point 2, 1.h after drug intake; T3: time 
point 3, 4.5h after drug intake
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Table S2.2. Mood ratings, as assessed by the Bond and Lader and PANAS scales. ANOVAs for 
each of the measures showed no main effect of drug, nor any interactions with drug, ruling out a 
potential non-specific effect of the drug.
Healthy controls Pathological gamblers
Placebo Sulpiride Placebo Sulpiride
Bond and 
Lader
Alertness
T1 78.0 (3.1) 77.7 (3.2) 78.0 (3.6) 76.4 (5.2)
T2 83.8 (2.7) 78.4 (3.2) 77.7 (3.8) 81.8 (3.8)
T3 84.3 (2.6) 84.3 (2.3) 76.0 (5.3) 77.2 (4.8)
Calmness
T1 76.9 (3.0) 76.1 (3.3) 72.6 (5.3) 71.0 (5.4)
T2 79.2 (3.5) 75.3 (3.4) 75.7 (5.3) 77.1 (4.1)
T3 84.5 (2.7) 84.0 (2.4) 79.1 (4.1) 81.6 (3.8)
Contentedness
T1 75.5 (3.5) 80.0 (2.9) 77.1  (4.9) 77.1  (5.4)
T2 80.9 (3.8) 81.7 (2.6) 77.7 (4.6) 81.5 (4.7)
T3 83.5 (3.2) 84.3 (2.3) 83.0 (3.5) 79.6 (4.3)
PANAS
Positive affect
T1 35.9 (1.5) 32.6 (1.4) 34.6 (1.9) 34.6 (2.1)
T2 34.1 (1.6) 33.5 (1.2) 34.3 (2.2) 35.1 (2.3)
T3 34.7 (1.2) 33.6 (1.1) 34.1 (2.4) 33.6 (2.5)
Negative affect
T1 12.3 (0.8) 14.3 (1.8) 16.5 (1.7) 14.5 (1.2)
T2 11.9 (1.0) 12.1 (0.7) 13.5 (0.8) 14.4 (1.3)
T3 12.5 (0.9) 12.5 (0.7) 13.0 (0.7) 12.9 (1.1)
Values represent mean (SEM). T1: time point 1, before drug intake; T2: time point 2, 1.h after drug intake; T3: time 
point 3, 4.5h after drug intake.
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Table S2.3 Global cognitive function as assessed by classical neuropsychological tests (performed 
at the end of each test day). ANOVAs for each of the measures showed no main effect of drug, nor 
any interactions with drug, ruling out a potential non-specific effect of the drug.
Healthy controls Pathological gamblers
Placebo Sulpiride Placebo Sulpiride
Digit span
forward 8.3 (0.5) 8.4 (0.6) 8.0 (0.5) 8 (0.5)
backward 7.3 (0.6) 7.4 (0.5) 7.2 (0.4) 7.0 (0.5)
total 15.6 (1.0) 15.8 (0.9) 15.2 (0.8) 15.1 (0.8)
Number cancellation
time 241.1 (10.2) 245.0 (8.2) 225.0 (8.9) 225.2 (9.2)
#misses 3.5 (0.8) 3.4 (0.7) 4.4 (1.3) 5.8 (2.2)
Block completion Time 70.0 (3.6) 71.6 (4.0) 75.7 (3.4) 76.8 (5.3)
Verbal fluency #words 38.6 (2.1) 39.5 (1.8) 41.3 (2.7) 40.9 (2.4)
Values represent mean (SEM). 

CHAPTER 3
LOSS OF LATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX CONTROL IN 
FOOD-DIRECTED ATTENTION AND GOAL-DIRECTED 
FOOD CHOICE IN OBESITY
Adapted from: Janssen, LK, Duif, I, van Loon, I, Wegman, J, de Vries, JHM, Cools, 
R, Aarts, E (2017). Loss of lateral prefrontal cortex control in food-directed attention 
and goal-directed food choice in obesity. NeuroImage, 146: 148-156.
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ABSTRACT
Loss of lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC)-mediated attentional control may explain the automatic 
tendency to eat in the face of food. Here, we investigate the neurocognitive mechanism underlying 
attentional bias to food words and its association with obesity using a food Stroop task. We tested 
76 healthy human subjects with a wide body mass index (BMI) range (19-35 kg/m2) using fMRI. As 
a measure of obesity we calculated individual obesity scores based on BMI, waist circumference 
and waist-to-hip ratio using principal component analyses. To investigate the automatic tendency 
to overeat directly, the same subjects performed a separate behavioral outcome devaluation task 
measuring the degree of goal-directed versus automatic food choices. We observed that increased 
obesity scores were associated with diminished lPFC responses during food attentional bias. 
This was accompanied by decreased goal-directed control of food choices following outcome 
devaluation. Together these findings suggest that deficient control of both food-directed attention 
and choice may contribute to obesity, particularly given our obesogenic environment with food cues 
everywhere, and the choice to ignore or indulge despite satiety.
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INTRODUCTION
Obesity is reaching pandemic proportions and is associated with major health problems.  Although 
many factors contribute to obesity, altered neural regulation of appetite has been repeatedly 
associated with body mass index (BMI) variation (Dagher 2012). Through a lifetime of conditioned 
responses, high caloric foods act as strong rewards. This may lead to loss of control and the 
automatic tendency to overeat (Papies et al. 2008; Johnson 2013), particularly in our obesogenic 
environment with an abundance of high caloric food cues. Individual differences in controlling the 
automatic tendency to eat when facing food cues, may therefore explain some variation in obesity. 
Lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) has been consistently associated with exercising control over food 
choices (Hare et al. 2009, 2011; Lopez et al. 2014) and regulating food craving (Giuliani et al. 2014; 
Silvers et al. 2014; Dietrich et al. 2016). However, obesity-related loss of lPFC-mediated attentional 
control in the face of food cues has not yet been shown. 
 In drug addiction, which is suggested to show neurocognitive parallels with obesity (Volkow 
et al. 2008, 2013; Hebebrand et al. 2014; but see Ziauddeen et al. 2012), there is evidence for loss of 
attentional control in, for example, emotional color-naming Stroop tasks (Field and Cox 2008; Hester 
and Luijten 2014). In these tasks, the simple goal is to name the color of a word as fast and accurately 
as possible. When words are related to their target of abuse, and thus highly salient, individuals are 
generally distracted from their goal, resulting in an attentional bias to those words reflected by slower 
response times. In substance addiction, attentional bias has been found to correlate with craving 
and drug use severity (Franken 2003; Field and Cox 2008), as well as with altered lateral and medial 
prefrontal and striatal (e.g. putamen) responses (Chase et al. 2011; Hester and Luijten 2014). In 
addition, BOLD responses in putamen for smoking-related attentional bias were found to correlate 
positively with craving in smokers (Luijten et al. 2011). Similar to addiction, using a color-naming 
Stroop task, attentional bias to palatable food words has been related to (future) obesity in children 
and adults (Braet and Crombez 2003; Calitri et al. 2010). However, two other studies have not found 
a relationship between attentional bias to food words and obesity (Nijs et al. 2010a; Phelan et al. 
2011). The neural mechanisms underlying attentional bias to food words and their relation to obesity 
has not yet been investigated, and could shed light on these inconsistent behavioral findings.
 Attentional bias is often interpreted as decreased control over the automatic tendency to 
attend to salient cues, possibly leading to craving and habitual intake (Field et al. 2009). However, the 
automatic tendency to attend to salient cues is different from automatic, or habitual, choices when 
faced with these cues. The latter can be measured more directly with instrumental tasks implementing 
an outcome devaluation procedure. Such tasks have revealed that habitual behavior, as opposed to 
goal-directed control, in animals and humans is associated with responses in dorsolateral striatum 
(i.e. putamen)(Tricomi et al. 2009; Balleine and O’Doherty 2010) and with reduced white matter 
strength between putamen and premotor cortex in humans (de Wit et al. 2012). However, whether 
increased food attentional bias is paralleled by the failure to exert goal-directed control during food 
choices is unknown. Here, we investigated these two types of control as a function of obesity.
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Our aim was to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying food attentional bias and choice. 
We tested 76 healthy human subjects with a wide body mass index range (19-35 kg/m2) using fMRI, 
while performing a food Stroop task (Nijs et al. 2010a). We hypothesized that increased obesity would 
be related to a stronger behavioral and neural attentional bias to food words. Increased neural food 
attentional bias would be reflected in reduced lPFC-control and perhaps altered lPFC-connectivity with 
putamen, associated with habitual behavior. In addition, we included a separate behavioral outcome 
devaluation task (adapted from Hogarth et al. 2012) to measure the degree to which subjects make 
goal-directed versus automatic food choices. We hypothesized that enhanced attentional bias effects 
would be paralleled by decreased goal-directed – and thus increased automatic – food choices with 
increased obesity.
METHODS
SUBJECTS
The reported results are based on data from 76 healthy right-handed subjects (65 women; mean 
age: 31.5 years old, SD: 10.7, range: 18-53; mean BMI: 26.4 kg/ m2, SD: 3.8, range: 19-35) with 
adequate demand of Dutch and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects were recruited 
from Nijmegen and surroundings through advertisement. To be eligible for the study, subjects were 
required to be motivated to change their eating habits (not per se losing weight, but also targeting 
unhealthy snacking or irregular eating patterns), as this study was part of a larger protocol including 
a behavioral intervention program to change eating habits. Here, only data acquired prior to the 
intervention are presented. Subjects were excluded from participation if they reported any (history of) 
clinically relevant neurological or psychiatric disorders, current psychological treatment, current use 
of psychotropic medication, (history of) taste or smell impairments, eating disorders (including binge 
eating disorder), extremely high restrained eating scores (Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire, 
males ≥4.0, females ≥3.6; van Strien et al., 1986), current dieting (i.e. following a strict diet to lose 
weight and/or being in treatment with a dietitian), changes in body weight >5 kg during the last two 
months, and contra-indications for MRI. Following scanning, seven subjects (3 males, 4 females) 
were excluded from the analyses due to:  being extreme outliers in terms of task performance (n=3; 
see Behavioral Analyses below), bad image quality (n=2; excessive signal intensity spikes and signal 
dropout), incidental finding (n=1), and no longer meeting the inclusion criteria due to a concussion 
(n=1). All subjects provided written informed consent, which was approved by the regional research 
ethics committee (Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek, regio Arnhem-Nijmegen, Registration 
Number: 2013/188, Date: 20 June 2013), and received financial compensation for participation.
OBESITY SCORE
As a measure of obesity we calculated an obesity score, which reflects common variance in 
three highly correlated variables that have been related to degree of obesity and the associated 
health risks: body mass index (BMI), waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) and waist circumference (all r’s>.4, 
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all p-values<.001)(Huxley et al., 2009). We z-scored these variables and ran principal component 
analysis on the z-scored variables using the built-in function ‘princomp’ in MATLAB (version 7.9.0, 
Mathworks, Natick, MA) for reducing the number of correlated variables under consideration whilst 
retaining most of the information in the data (Jolliffe, 2002). We then selected the first principal 
component, which explained 80.1% of the common variance in these measures. Finally, to correct 
the resulting score for gender and age, which are known to co-vary with obesity, we regressed them 
against the first principal component and saved the unstandardized residuals as the obesity score. 
PROCEDURE
Test sessions started at 11am or 12:30pm and lasted approximately 3.5 hours. Subjects were 
asked to refrain from eating and drinking anything else than water 4 hours prior to testing. They 
were also asked to abstain from recreational drugs one week, and from alcohol 24 hours prior to 
testing. Compliance was assessed by administering a self-report compliance questionnaire. The 
tasks described below were part of a larger protocol and were performed approximately 1 hour after 
the start of the test session. The order of the tasks was the same across subjects. All tasks were 
programmed with Presentation software (Version 16, Neurobiobehavioral Systems, Inc.).
 Weight (in kg), height (in cm), and waist and hip circumference (in cm) were measured at the 
start of the test session. During scanning, subjects performed a color-naming Stroop task to assess 
attentional bias. Before the task started, they rated how hungry they felt using a visual analogue scale 
ranging from 0 (not hungry) to 10 (very hungry) on the screen. After scanning, subjects performed 
a food-choice satiety task to assess the degree of goal-directed control over their choices after 
outcome devaluation. In between these tasks, subjects also performed an incentive delay task in the 
scanner in which small monetary and caloric rewards could be earned. This task was programmed 
such that the accumulative earnings were similar across subjects. Data from the incentive delay task 
are not reported here. On a separate intake session prior to the test days, subjects were screened 
for exclusion criteria, rated the Stroop words (see below), and the Dutch version of the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART) was administered to assess education level ranging from 0 (no degree) to 7 
(college degree)(M: 6.3, SD: 0.6, range: 5-7) and verbal IQ (M: 104.7 SD: 9.9, range: 83.0-127.0)
(Schmand et al., 1991). 
PARADIGMS
Stroop task
Subjects were instructed in the Stroop task before going into the scanner and were further familiarized 
with the task by practicing the color-button contingency and performing 10 practice trials with feedback 
(correct/incorrect) in the scanner. For task details see Figure 3.1A. 
 In short, subjects had to indicate the color of the word presented on the screen pressing 
the button reflecting that color as fast and accurately as possible. Subjects were presented with 
food, positively valenced emotional and neutral words. All task stimuli were presented with a digital 
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projector on a screen at the back end of the MRI scanner bore, which was visible via a mirror 
mounted on the head coil. Responses were made using an MRI-compatible button box. 
 Twenty generally high-calorie, palatable food words were selected from word lists reported 
in previous studies (Nijs et al., 2010a; Phelan et al., 2011). Twenty positively valenced emotional 
words were selected from the Dutch Words Database (Moors et al., 2013) based on reported arousal 
and positive valence ratings (>5). Forty neutral words with low arousal and positive valence ratings 
(3-5) were selected from the same database. Food and emotional words were matched to twenty 
neutral words each in terms of word length, number of syllables and frequency of use according to 
the SUBTLEX-NL norms (Keuleers et al., 2010). On the intake session, subjects rated all stimuli in 
terms of arousal (from not arousing to highly arousing) and valence (from negative to positive) using 
visual analogue scales to confirm that the food and emotional words were rated higher than neutral 
words (see Supplemental Materials).  
FOOD-CHOICE SATIETY TASK
Following scanning, subjects performed a food-choice satiety task (adapted from Hogarth et al., 2012) 
outside the scanner that was presented on a computer screen. The food-choice satiety task is an outcome 
devaluation task consisting of three phases (i.e. training, devaluation and test (nominal extinction)) and 
measures changes in snack choices after sensory-specific satiety in terms of devaluation magnitude 
(%choices training phase-%choices test phase). For task details see Figure 3.4A.  
 A high devaluation magnitude shows that subjects adjusted their choice behavior after 
devaluation of the snack, whereas a score around zero shows that subjects did not adjust their 
behavior, signaling reduced goal-directed control over their choices following sensory-specific satiety. 
Unbeknownst to subjects, we calculated the amount of kilocalories (kcal) consumed by weighting the 
bowl before and after the satiation phase, and by multiplying the amount of grams consumed by the 
amount of kcal/gram of that particular snack. Before the devaluation phase we asked subjects again 
how hungry they felt on a scale from 0 (not hungry) to 10 (very hungry).  
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES
Mean reaction times (RTs) and accuracies on the Stroop task, as well as valence and arousal 
ratings, were analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA (SPSS 19, Chicago, IL) with Condition 
(interference, neutral) and Type (food, emotional) as within-subject factors. The interaction with 
degree of obesity was analyzed by adding Obesity score as a continuous covariate of interest to 
the model. Devaluation magnitude (%choices training - test phase) on the food-choice satiety task 
was analyzed using non-parametric statistics because the assumption of normality was violated. 
We used one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test to test whether median devaluation magnitude was 
significantly greater than 0 (i.e., goal-directed rather than automatic choices) and Spearman’s rho (rs) 
to investigate the relationship with Obesity score.
 Subjects who were outliers in terms of response times when color-naming words (i.e., 
>3SD above the mean for each condition; n=2), Stroop accuracies (i.e., accuracy=50%; n=1), 
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or devaluation magnitude in the food-choice satiety task (i.e., >3SD above the mean; n=1) were 
excluded from the corresponding analyses. Grubb’s test (also known as the maximum-normed 
residual test; Barnett and Lewis 1994) was used to identify outliers.
IMAGING AND FMRI ANALYSES
To measure blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast, whole-brain functional images were 
acquired on a Siemens 3T Skyra MRI scanner (Siemens Medical system, Erlangen, Germany) using 
a 32-channel coil. A multi-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence was used to acquire 34 axial 
slices per functional volume in ascending direction (voxel size 3.5x3.5x3mm; repetition time (TR) 
2070 ms; TE 9ms, 19.25ms, 29.5ms, and 39.75ms; flip angle 90 ͦ; field of view 224mm). This is a 
method that uses accelerated parallel imaging to reduce image artifacts (in plane acceleration 3) and 
acquire images at multiple TEs following a single excitation (Poser et al., 2006). Before the acquisition 
of functional images, a high-resolution anatomical scan was acquired (T1-weighted MPRAGE, voxel 
size 1x1x1mm, TR 2300ms, TE 3.03ms, 192 sagittal slices, flip angle 8 ͦ, field of view 256 mm).
 Data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The 
volumes for each echo time were realigned to correct for motion (estimation of the realignment 
parameters was done for the first echo and then copied to the other echoes). The four echo images 
were combined into a single MR volume based on 31 volumes acquired before the actual experiment 
started using an optimized echo weighting method (Poser et al., 2006). Combined functional images 
were slice-time corrected by realigning the time-series for each voxel temporally to acquisition of the 
middle slice. Structural and functional data were then co-registered and spatially normalized to a 
standardized stereotactic space (Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template). After segmentation 
of the structural images using a unified segmentation approach, the mean of the functional images 
was spatially coregistered to the bias-corrected structural images. The transformation matrix resulting 
from segmentation was then used to normalize the final functional images into MNI space (resampled 
at voxel size 2x2x2 mm). Finally, the normalized functional images were spatially smoothed using an 
isotropic 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
 Statistical analysis of fMRI data was performed using a general linear model (GLM) 
approach. At the first level, subject-specific data were analyzed in an event-related design using a 
fixed effects model, which included four regressors of interest that reflected the onset of presentation 
of food, neutral matched to food (fneu), emotional (emo), and neutral matched to emotional (eneu) 
words. Incorrect responses and misses were modeled in two separate regressors. All onsets were 
modeled using a stick function and convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. 
Time and dispersion derivatives of the hemodynamic response function were included, as well as 
out-of-brain signal variation. To account for head movement the six movement parameters resulting 
from the realignment procedure and their six time derivatives were included. High pass filtering (128 
seconds) was applied to the time series of the functional images to remove low-frequency drifts and 
correction for serial correlations was done using an autoregressive AR(1) model.
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We investigated whole-brain group effects in a random effects analysis (second level). To investigate 
the main task effect of Condition (interference, neutral), we contrasted food to neutral activations 
(food-fneu), and emotional to neutral activations (emo-eneu) across all subjects. To investigate the 
interaction between the Condition (interference, neutral) and Type (food, emo), we contrasted food 
to neutral activations versus emotional to neutral activations ([food-fneu]-[emo-eneu]). In a separate 
analysis, we investigated the relationship between obesity and our effect of interest (food-fneu) by 
adding obesity score as a covariate on the second level in line with our behavioral analyses. Statistical 
inference (pFDR<.05) was performed at the peak-level, correcting for multiple comparisons over the 
search volume, i.e. whole brain or a priori defined small search volume: lateral prefrontal cortex (i.e. 
combination of left and right superior frontal gyrus (dorsolateral), middle frontal gyrus and inferior 
frontal gyrus (opercular, triangular and orbital parts) from the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) 
atlas; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002)). The intensity threshold necessary to determine the peak-level 
threshold was set at p<.001, uncorrected. Upon significant effects, we extracted the mean betas 
from the significant functional cluster within the lPFC search volume and correlated them with the 
behavioral food attentional bias effect. 
 In addition, we performed a generalized psychophysiological interaction (gPPI; McClaren 
et al., 2012) analysis to investigate obesity-related differences in functional connectivity with lateral 
prefrontal cortex. As a seed, we used the region of lateral prefrontal cortex activated in the main effect 
for food words (food-fneu) masked by the interaction between food and emotional words ([food-
fneu]-[emo-eneu])(Figure 3.2C) extracted at intensity threshold p<.001 (uncorrected). The rationale 
for this approach was that the seed should be a task-specific region involved in attentional bias for 
food words. To further enhance the task specificity and reduce the extent of the seed, we selected a 
task-related region in lateral prefrontal cortex that was more activated for food (versus neutral) words 
than for emotional (versus neutral) words (Figure 2A). To estimate the neural activity producing the 
physiological effect in the seed region for each subject, the BOLD signal was extracted from this 
region and deconvolved (Gitelman et al., 2003). This was included in the model as the physiological 
regressor, as were the onset times for each of the task conditions (food, fneu, emo and eneu words), 
and the psychophysiological interaction was entered by multiplying the estimated neural activity by 
the onset times for each of the task conditions separately convolved with the HRF, resulting in nine 
regressors of interest on the first level (i.e., one physiological, four psychological, and four interaction 
regressors). Two PPI contrasts were created for each subject: food-fneu, and the interaction effect 
[food-fneu]-[emo-eneu]. On the second level, these PPI contrasts were analyzed separately using a 
one-sample t-test with obesity score again as a continuous covariate of interest. Statistical inference 
(pFDR<.05) was performed at the peak-level, correcting for multiple comparisons over the a priori 
defined small search volume: bilateral putamen (AAL atlas; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002). The 
intensity threshold necessary to determine the peak-level threshold was set at p<.001, uncorrected. 
We extracted mean betas from a functional region of interest based on an independent contrast (i.e. 
main task contrast: food-fneu, at threshold p<0.001), and subsequently correlated them with the 
obesity score and the behavioral food attentional bias effect.
51
CH
AP
TE
R 
3
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL ATTENTIONAL BIAS 
All subjects were included in the analyses of the color-naming Stroop task (n=76). We observed 
an attentional bias effect in RTs for food words, relative to emotional words (Condition (interference, 
neutral) x Type (food, emotional): F(1,74)=11.038, p=.001)(Figure 3.1B). Specifically, subjects were 
slower to name the color of food relative to neutral words (F(1,74)=10.950, p=.001), but not slower 
to name the color of positively valenced emotional relative to neutral words (F(1,74)=1.903, p=.172). 
We did not observe a 3-way interaction between Condition, Type and Obesity (F(1,74)=.290, p=.592). 
However, we did find an interaction between Condition and Obesity (F(1,74)=4.677, p=.034), 
suggesting that obesity was associated with a differential response to interference words (food+emo) 
versus neutral words (fneu+eneu), although this was not driven by any significant simple effects (main 
effect Obesity: interference: F(1,74)=.983, p=.325; neutral: F(1,74)=3.519, p=.065). There was no 
main effect of Obesity for both RTs and accuracies, suggesting that performance was unrelated to 
obesity scores (Table 3.1), neither did the behavioral food attentional bias effect correlate with the 
observed neural effects described below (Table S3.1). There were no correlations between obesity 
scores and valence or arousal ratings of the Stroop words (Table S3.1).
 Subjects reported moderate hunger prior to the Stroop task (M: 5.9, SD: 2.5, range: 0-9.4), 
which showed a trend towards correlating negatively with obesity score (rs=-.214, p=.066). Feelings of 
hunger have previously been associated with increased food attentional bias (Nijs et al., 2010b). However, 
we did not find such a correlation (rs=-.148, p=.201)(Table S3.1).
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Figure 3.1 Food Stroop task. A) On each trial, subjects had to name the color of the word presented in the 
center of the screen as fast and accurately as possible by pressing one of four buttons using their right hand. 
The buttons reflected the four colors in which the words could be displayed (i.e. red, blue, yellow or green). 
Button-color contingencies remained the same throughout the task and were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Subjects were presented with interference words (i.e. 20 food and 20 positively valenced emotional words), and 
matched neutral words in an event-related design. During scanning, each word was presented twice, and always 
in a different color, resulting in 160 trials and a task duration of approximately 10 minutes. Halfway, subjects had 
a 30-second break. Each trial consisted of a jittered fixation period of 2-4s (drawn from a Poisson distribution, 
mean=2.6s) followed by a colored word, which remained on the screen for 1.5s. No feedback was given. The 
order of words was pseudorandomized and counterbalanced across subjects. B) Behavioral attentional bias 
for food and positively valenced emotional (emo) words versus neutral words. Error bars represent 1 SEM;  ** 
denotes p=0.001.
Table 3.1 Raw data of the Stroop task for low versus high obesity scores
food words emotional words neutral words
M(SEM) range M(SEM) range M(SEM) range
response time  
(in ms)
841.4 (11.4) 648.0-1110.4 816.0 (10.8) 625.5-1045.1 822.3 (11.3) 630.7-1168.7
accuracy  
(in %)
95.2 (0.5) 80-100 95.8 (0.5) 80-100 95.9 (0.4) 76-100
arousal (not arousing(1)-very arousing(100)) a
44.4 (2.3) 0-76.9 65.1 (2.0) 12.6-91.1 23.0 (2.0) 0-63.2
valence (negative(1)-positive(100)) a
60.2 (1.4) 25.2-80.9 84.4 (0.9) 64.5-98.6 51.1 (0.4) 37.3-58.1
Values represent mean (SEM) and range. a arousal and valence ratings were available for n=75
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NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
Neural attentional bias 
First, we investigated the neural network involved in the attentional bias to food and emotional words. 
BOLD responses in frontoparietal, temporal, and cerebellar regions were significantly increased for 
food relative to neutral words (Figure 3.2A; Table 3.2). In addition, we found a significant interaction 
effect when contrasting activation in response to food relative to emotional ([food-fneu]-[emo-
eneu]) words in left angular gyrus (Figure 3.2B; Table 3.2). No significant clusters were found 
for positively valenced emotional relative to neutral words, which is in line with the absence of a 
behavioral attentional bias to the emotional words. Also, in contrast to the behavioral Condition x 
Obesity interaction reported above, we observed no such interaction at the neural level in a post hoc 
analysis ([food+emo]-[fneu+eneu]).
 Second, we investigated the interaction between neural responses to food words and 
obesity score, and found that BOLD responses in left superior frontal gyrus (BA9/8) during food 
attentional bias (food-fneu) correlated negatively with obesity score (Figure 3.3A-B; Table 3.2). For 
the interaction contrast ([food-fneu]-[emo-eneu]) we found no correlation with obesity score.
Functional frontostriatal connectivity
To investigate the relationship between functional connectivity with lPFC and obesity scores, we 
performed generalized PPI analysis. As a seed we used the region of lPFC (BA8/6) that showed 
greater responses for food than neutral words (food-fneu), masked by the interaction effect between 
food and emotional words ([food-fneu]-[emo-eneu]) to increase the specificity to food words and 
to confine the number of voxels of the seed (Figure 3.2C). Note that this region was located more 
posterior in lPFC (BA8 extending into premotor cortex (BA6)) than the region in left superior frontal 
gyrus (BA9/8) that showed a significant interaction between neural responses to food attentional bias 
and obesity score (see Figure 3.3A). This seed region did not show a correlation with obesity (r=-
.153, p=.188; rs=-.192, p=.097). On a low threshold (p<.001 uncorrected) we found that obesity 
score was related to increased functional connectivity between this more posterior region in lPFC 
and left posterior putamen during food attentional bias (peak-coordinates [x,y,z]: [-26,-12,6], k=1, 
t-value: 3.26). However, this did not survive the appropriate corrections for multiple comparisons 
(i.e., FDR<.05, peak level), neither did post hoc analysis show a significant correlation between 
the obesity score and premotor-connectivity in the bilateral, anatomical putamen region of interest 
(r=.014, p=.903; rs=.114, p=.327).  
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Figure 3.2 Neural attentional bias effect. A) Contrast of food versus matched neutral words (food>fneu). B) 
Contrast of food minus matched neutral versus positively valenced emotional minus neutral words ([food>fneu] 
> [emo>eneu]). C) Overlay of (A) in violet and (B) in yellow to show the overlap in activation maps in blue. All 
statistical parametric maps  were overlaid onto a T1-weighted canonical image. Images are shown in neurological 
convention (left=left) and with axial slice coordinates as defined in MNI152 space. For illustrative purposes full 
brain statistical parametric maps were thresholded at p<.001 (uncorrected).
B  Interaction effect ([food>fneu] > [emo>eneu])
C  Overlay of the main and interaction effect
A  Main effect (food > fneu)
t-value
-15 8 35 50
-15 8 35 50
-15 8 35 50
7.0
4.5
3.0
3.0
t-value
Overlay
55
CH
AP
TE
R 
3
A
t-value
B
O
LD
 B
A
9/
8 
(in
 a
.u
.)
4 5
-1
0
1
2
3
-3 -2 -1
0
1 2 3
Obesity score
6
0
[Food > Neutral] x Obesity score
50
B
men
women
Figure 3.3 Obesity-related neural attentional bias effect. A) Whole brain effect of obesity score on BOLD 
responses when color-naming food versus neutral words (food>fneu)(p=.030). Image is shown in neurological 
convention (left=left) and with axial slice coordinate as defined in MNI152 space. The statistical parametric map 
was thresholded at p<.001. For illustrative purposes the extracted betas are shown in B). Increased obesity 
score was associated with diminished BOLD responses in left lPFC (BA9/8) when color-naming food versus 
neutral words. In the scatter plot open circles (o) represent females, filled circles ( ) represent males. 
OUTCOME DEVALUATION EFFECT
Finally, we investigated whether the observed neural effects during food attentional bias would be 
accompanied by decreased goal-directed, i.e. increased automatic, food choices in subjects with increased 
obesity scores. We measured automatic behavioral tendencies by assessing the degree of goal-directed 
control over food choices on an instrumental outcome devaluation paradigm, i.e. a food-choice satiety task. 
 The reported results for the food-choice satiety task are based on data from 76 subjects. Two 
subjects did not perform the task. One other subject was an outlier in terms of devaluation magnitude 
and was therefore excluded (see Materials and Methods). Note that the outliers on the Stroop task 
were no outliers on this task and were therefore included in the analyses reported below. Across the 
group, we observed a significant devaluation effect (Figure 3.4B; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p<.001), 
suggesting that subjects generally adjusted their choices following devaluation, which is a sign of goal-
directed (as opposed to automatic) choice behavior. Importantly, we found that devaluation magnitude 
was significantly decreased with increased obesity scores (Figure 3.4C; rs=-.325, p=.004). Thus, 
higher obesity scores were associated with less goal-directed control over food choices. The group 
difference in devaluation magnitude could not be explained by the amount of kilocalories consumed 
in the devaluation phase (M: 307.7, SD: 222.0, range: 31.3-1800.7), as this was not related to obesity 
score (rs=.142, p=.223), nor did the amount of kilocalories consumed correlate with devaluation 
magnitude (rs=-.060, p=.607). Before the devaluation phase, subjects still reported moderate feelings 
of hunger (M(SD): 6.9(2.2)), which was not correlated with obesity score, devaluation magnitude or 
amount of kilocalories consumed during devaluation (all p’s>.11).  
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Figure 3.4. Food choice satiety task. A) In phase one (i.e., training), subjects were instructed to choose between 
a left or right button press on each trial (80 trials, approximate duration: 10 minutes). Each of the two buttons 
was associated with either a sweet or salty snack that they could win in 50% of the trials. Prior to the task, 
subjects selected their preferred sweet snack (wine gums, Skittles or chocolate M&M’s) and salty snack (Pringles 
(original), TUC-crackers (paprika) or cocktail nuts). Immediately after the training phase, subjects received 1/5 of 
their winnings and consumed the snacks. Key-reward assignment was counterbalanced across subjects, and 
learnt by trial and error. Responding was self-paced. In phase two (i.e., devaluation), a bowl filled with one of 
the snacks was placed in front of the subjects, and they were asked to eat to satiation. Which reward they were 
satiated on (sweet or salty) was counterbalanced across subjects. The duration of phase two was self-paced 
and varied between 2 and 18 minutes (M(SD): 7.6(3.3) minutes). Phase three (i.e., test) was similar to phase 
one (72 trials, approximate duration: 8 minutes), except that no direct feedback was delivered (i.e., nominal 
extinction). Subjects again received 1/5 of their winnings afterwards, of which they were informed beforehand. 
Devaluation magnitude was calculated by subtracting the percentage of the devalued snack in phase 1 and 3 
(%choices training phase-%choices test phase), and reflected how well subjects adjusted their choice behavior 
after devaluation of the snack. B) On average subjects adjusted their food choices after devaluation as reflected 
in the median devaluation magnitude (black line) that was significantly greater than 0 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
p<.001). The red dot represents the mean. C) Increased obesity score was related to decreased devaluation 
magnitude across the sample (rs=-.325, p=.004). In the scatter plot open circles (o) represent females, filled 
circles ( ) represent males.
BETWEEN-TASK CORRELATIONS 
Despite the differences in stimuli and outcomes between the tasks in this study, we ran post hoc (non-
parametric) correlational analyses to investigate the relationship between devaluation magnitude 
and the observed behavioral and neural food Stroop effects, as well as correlations with possible 
confounding factors such as arousal and valence ratings of the Stroop words, hunger ratings, 
and the amount of kilocalories consumed in the food-choice satiety task. However, no significant 
between-task correlations were found (Table S3.1). 
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Table 3.2 Summary of brain regions exhibiting main and interaction task effects, and interactions 
with obesity score 
Region Side  
(L/R)a
MNI-coordinates 
x, y, z (mm)
Size  
(# voxels)
pFDR 
(voxel-level)
t-value 
(peak) 
Main effect Food > Neutral
angular gyrus L -36 -62 38 2933 <.001   8.02
angular gyrus L -44   -60 34 <.001   6.84
supramarginal gyrus L -58   -52 30 <.001   6.78
middle temporal gyrus L -56 -38 -8 1510 <.001   7.04
middle temporal gyrus L -48 -42 -6 .009   5.41
inferior temporal gyrus L -48 -52 -14 .045   4.73
inferior orbitofrontal cortex L -30  32 -10 8218 <.001   7.03
precentral gyrus L -34  10 44 .001   6.60
middle orbitofrontal cortex L -22  34 -14 .001   6.35
angular gyrus R 38 -58 34 1808 .001   6.59
inferior parietal cortex R 38 -52 40 .002   6.02
angular gyrus R 46 -48 30 .003   5.88
middle temporal gyrus R 60 -42 -2 475 .009   5.41
middle temporal gyrus R 54 -34 -8 .036   4.84
inferior frontal gyrus R 52   34 24 1125 .012   5.31
inferior frontal gyrus R 44 30 24 .012   5.30
inferior frontal gyrus R 34 26 18 .044   4.75
middle cingulum gyrus L -4 -34 36 1388 .018   5.14
precuneus L -6 -64 40 .021   5.07
posterior cingulum gyrus L -4 -42 32 .024   5.01
cerebellum R 14  -84 -34 377 .036   4.83
inferior orbitofrontal cortex R 30 30 -20 238 .041   4.77
Interaction effect [Food > Neutral]  >  [Emo > Neutral] 
angular gyrus L -34 -62 38 564 .044 5.66
Interaction effect [Food > Neutral] x Obesity score 
b
middle frontal gyrus L -28 32 50 53 .030 4.49
a L = left, R = right; b p < 0.05, small volume, FDR corrected
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DISCUSSION
In this cross-sectional study we aimed to unravel the neurocognitive mechanism underlying 
food attentional bias and choice. More specifically, we determined whether lPFC responses and 
connectivity during attentional bias to food words are associated with obesity, and whether we 
could find evidence of decreased goal-directed control of food choice in the same subjects. Our 
findings suggest that higher degree of obesity is associated with reduced control over both attention 
as well as choice in the face of food. We found that higher obesity scores were associated with 
diminished lPFC BOLD-responses in left superior frontal gyrus (BA9/8) during food attentional bias. 
We also found reduced goal-directed, and thus more automatic food choices with increased obesity 
scores on a separate outcome devaluation task, which was not correlated with loss of lPFC-based 
attentional control.
 Our neural effects are generally consistent with literature showing that activation of lateral 
prefrontal cortex predicts the ability of individuals to exercise self-control on food choices (Hare et al. 
2009, 2011; Lopez et al. 2014). For example, Hare et al. (2009) found greater left dorsolateral prefrontal 
BOLD-responses when dieters successfully controlled their food choices relative to when they failed 
to do so. In another study, successful weight-loss maintainers showed greater BOLD-responses to 
food pictures in left superior frontal gyrus than both obese and normal-weight controls not restraining 
their food intake (McCaffery et al., 2009). Diminished lateral prefrontal activity has also been related to 
greater BMI when regulating craving responses in both adults (Giuliani et al., 2014) and children (Silvers 
et al., 2014), and when inhibiting prepotent responses to appetizing foods in adolescents (Batterink et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, a meta-analysis by Jansen et al. (2013) showed that non-invasive stimulation 
of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can reduce craving to food and other substances of abuse. In this 
context, and given the addiction model of Franken (2003), which explains craving in terms of attentional 
bias, our finding of diminished lPFC activation may reflect decreased attentional control in more obese 
subjects when attentional bias to food words needs to be overcome. 
 We did not find a larger behavioral attentional bias to food words for subjects with increased 
obesity scores as we had hypothesized. This is inconsistent with previous studies that did find a 
relationship between (future) BMI and attentional bias to food words (Braet and Crombez, 2003; 
Calitri et al., 2010). However, some other studies also did not find a difference in attentional bias to 
food words between healthy weight and overweight/obese individuals when using a food Stroop 
task (Nijs et al., 2010a; Phelan et al., 2011). These mixed results in obesity are in contrast to more 
consistent behavioral drug attentional bias effects in addicts (for a review see Field and Cox, 2008). 
In spite of the suggested similarities in the underlying neurocognitive mechanism of obesity and 
addiction (Volkow et al. 2008; Volkow et al. 2013; Hebebrand et al. 2014), a key difference should be 
noted in the saliency of the used stimuli. Everyone in the Western world is conditioned for high caloric 
foods, whereas being conditioned for drug cues only applies to substance users. It is therefore 
not surprising that group differences in attentional bias to substance-related words are generally 
shown for addicted versus non-addicted individuals who are not conditioned for these cues (with the 
exception of alcohol). Differences in food attentional bias between individuals may be more subtle 
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and have been shown to depend on factors such as craving as well as worry towards high caloric 
foods rather than obesity per se (Werthmann et al., 2015). For example, individuals who strongly 
restrain their food intake and are preoccupied to maintain a healthy weight or lose weight also show 
behavioral food attentional bias (Papies et al., 2008; Hollitt et al., 2010). In the current sample, all 
subjects were motivated to change their eating habits independent of their BMI, and were therefore 
likely to be more preoccupied with healthy eating habits and a healthy weight. This may explain why 
we do not find obesity-related differences in attentional bias to food words. Although a limitation of 
the study is that we did not systematically record preoccupation, or the intention to change eating 
habits. Despite the absence of an attentional bias to food stimuli in terms of reaction times, we show 
that the neural measures underlying the process of overcoming food attentional bias may be better 
associated with obesity.
 Attentional bias is often interpreted as decreased control over the automatic tendency to 
attend to salient cues, possibly leading to craving and habitual intake (Field et al., 2009). However, 
the links between attentional bias and craving or habitual intake are indirect. In order to address 
whether increased food attentional bias is paralleled by the failure to exert goal-directed control 
during food choices more directly, we administered a separate instrumental outcome devaluation 
task to the same subjects. We extend previous findings by Horstmann et al. (2015a) who showed 
decreased goal-directed food choices following sensory-specific satiety with increased BMI in a 
group of exclusively male subjects, whereas our sample consisted predominately of female subjects. 
However, we observed no correlations between goal-directed food choices and either the neural or 
behavioral food attentional bias effect in a relatively large sample. A likely explanation is that the food 
words in the Stroop task are not associated with a particular response, therefore, the task cannot 
assess instrumental habit-like behavior, such as automatic food choice. This concurs with the present 
absence of significant obesity-related differences in functional connectivity between premotor cortex 
and putamen during this non-instrumental food attentional bias task. One might rather expect to find 
obesity-related differences in connectivity with putamen for the outcome devaluation task, in line with 
previous studies showing that dorsal frontostriatal connectivity was associated with habitual slips of 
action (de Wit et al., 2012b). This hypothesis should be confirmed by future studies implementing 
an fMRI version of the outcome devaluation task. Together, our findings suggest that food attentional 
bias and habit-like food choice are largely separate constructs, and that loss of both lPFC-based 
attentional control and goal-directed food choice may independently contribute to obesity.  
 Note that we operationalized obesity in terms of an obesity score reflecting common 
variance in BMI, waist-circumference and waist-to-hip ratio to capture more obesity-related 
information relative to BMI. Whereas BMI is widely used as a measure of obesity and has been 
shown a relatively accurate predictor of obesity-related health risks, it might not be an accurate 
predictor of the cognitive processes and underlying neural mechanism of obesity because it is a 
poor indicator of percent body fat (Nuttall, 2015). Indeed, this is reflected in the inconsistent results 
in functional neuroimaging studies on brain responses to food and food-related stimuli in relation 
to BMI (Ziauddeen et al., 2012). Combining obesity-related variables can capture more information 
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and give us a better measure of obesity and overeating. A limitation of this study is that we only 
combined simple anthropometrics, rather than more sophisticated bodily measurements (e.g. body 
composition) or behavioral indices of compulsive eating. Future studies are required to address 
which (combination of) variables might more accurately predict cognitive processes and the 
underlying neural mechanisms (see also Ziauddeen et al., 2012).  
 In conclusion, we found diminished lateral prefrontal control with increasing obesity when 
resisting the distraction of food words in a food attentional bias task. This was accompanied by 
less goal-directed, i.e. more automatic food choices following satiation on a separate outcome 
devaluation paradigm. Our findings suggest that both reduced lPFC-based control during food-
related distraction, and increased automatic food choices, at the expense of goal-directed control, 
may contribute to obesity. Treatments to increase control over food-directed attention and choices 
could therefore be a fruitful target to reduce overeating.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
AROUSAL AND VALENCE RATINGS 
Arousal and valence ratings of the Stroop words measured at the intake session were significantly 
higher for interference than for neutral words (main Condition: arousal: F(1,73)=383.6, p<.001; valence: 
F(1,73)=448.0, p<.001). In addition, we found that emotional words were rated significantly more positively 
and arousing than food words relative to their matched neutral control words (Condition x Type interaction: 
valence: F(1,73)=146.2, p<.001; arousal: F(1,73)=272.5, p<.001). We observed no main effect or 
interactions with Obesity score (all p’s>.25). The differences in arousal and valence ratings between the 
interference and neutral words did not correlate with attentional bias for food (arousal:  r=-.156, p=.183; 
valence: r=.132, p=.259) or emotional words (arousal: r=.218, p=.058; valence: r=.070, p=.549).
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a arousal, valence and hunger ratings (measured before the food Stroop task) were available for n=75
b devaluation scores on the food-choice satiety task and hunger ratings (measured before the food-choice satiety 
task) were available for n=73, due to missing data  (n=2), outliers in terms of devaluation magnitude (n=1); c 
amount of calories consumed during the satiation phase of the food-choice satiety task was available for n=72, 
due to missing data (n=1) from the sample in c.

Adapted from: Janssen, LK*, Duif, I, Speckens, AEM, van Loon, I, de Vries, JHM, Cools, 
R, Aarts, E (in preparation). Greater mindful eating practice improves reversal learning.
CHAPTER 4
GREATER MINDFUL EATING PRACTICE 
IMPROVES REVERSAL LEARNING
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ABSTRACT
Mindfulness-based interventions are claimed to reduce compulsive behavior such as overeating 
by promoting behavioral flexibility. Here we aimed to provide support for mindfulness-mediated 
improvements in reversal learning as a direct measure of behavioral flexibility. We investigated 
whether an 8-week mindful eating intervention improved outcome-based reversal learning relative 
to an educational cooking (i.e., active control) intervention. Sixty-five healthy subjects, motivated 
to change their bad eating habits, performed a deterministic reversal learning task that enabled 
the investigation of reward- and punishment-based reversal learning at baseline and following the 
intervention. No group differences in reversal learning were observed. However, we found that time 
invested in the mindful eating, but not the educational cooking, intervention correlated positively with 
changes in reversal learning, in a manner independent of valence. Our findings suggest that greater 
amount of mindfulness practice can lead to increased behavioral flexibility, which, in turn, might help 
overcome compulsive eating on the long-term. 
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INTRODUCTION
Mindfulness has been associated with a multitude of beneficial health outcomes (Grossman et al., 
2004; Khoury et al., 2013) and improvements in cognition (Tang et al. 2015) in both clinical as well as 
non-clinical populations. Mindfulness is defined as paying attention to present moment experience, 
purposefully and non-judgmentally (Kabat-Zinn, 1984). Shapiro and colleagues (2006) have 
proposed that practicing mindfulness may lead to reperceiving, or deautomization, and suggest that 
one direct mechanism of action underlying the beneficial effects of mindfulness-based interventions 
may be increased cognitive, emotional and behavioral flexibility. Some studies have indeed shown 
a mindfulness-mediated increase in the ability to inhibit automatic responses, as measured with 
classic or emotional Stroop tasks (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Lee and 
Orsillo, 2014). This has been interpreted as evidence for increased cognitive flexibility. However, 
studies investigating cognitive flexibility with paradigms that require switching of attention have not 
shown effects of mindfulness (Anderson et al., 2007; Chambers et al., 2008). No studies to date 
have investigated the effects of mindfulness on reward-based flexibility, such as reversal learning. 
 Reversal learning requires the ability to flexibly adapt one’s behavior in response 
to outcome-contingency changes in the environment, and is highly relevant in the context of 
compulsive behavior such as addiction (Izquierdo and Jentsch, 2012) or overeating (i.e., consuming 
more energy than is expended). Although occasional overeating is a common phenomenon in our 
obesogenic environment, chronic overeating often results in obesity. Recent theory suggests that, 
rather than hyper- or hyposensitivity to food rewards, obesity may be related to impaired outcome-
based learning (Kroemer and Small, 2016). Impaired reward and punishment learning may maintain 
overeating behavior in obesity by leading to compulsive over-selection of actions directed at food 
rewards and/or decreased sensitivity to the negative consequences associated with overeating, 
such as an uncomfortably full feeling on the short term or health risks on the long term. From studies 
investigating cue-reward learning, there is indeed some evidence for impaired learning from positive 
(Burger and Stice, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014) as well as from negative outcomes (Coppin et al., 2014) 
in reward-related disorders such as obesity. Others have hypothesized that obesity is accompanied 
by learning impairments that generalize across outcomes (Kroemer and Small, 2016). A mindfulness-
based intervention that targets compulsive eating behavior might thus remediate altered reversal 
learning in a manner that depends on the valence of the outcome or independent of valence. 
 The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of an intensive 8-week mindful 
eating intervention on reward- and punishment-based reversal learning. Previously, mindfulness-
based interventions targeted specifically at compulsive eating behavior have been shown effective 
in reducing measures of overeating in healthy (Papies et al., 2012; Marchiori and Papies, 2014), 
overweight and clinically obese subjects (Tapper et al., 2009; Daubenmier et al., 2011; Alberts et al., 
2012), as well as in individuals suffering from binge-eating disorder (Kristeller et al. 2013; Leahey et 
al. 2008; but see Daubenmier et al. 2016). However, only few studies have investigated the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying the beneficial effects of mindful eating (chapter 5, Papies et al. 2012), and 
no study so far has focused on behavioral flexibility. In the current study, sixty-five healthy human 
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subjects who were motivated to change their eating habits were tested before and after an intensive 
8-week mindful eating intervention or a carefully matched educational cooking intervention (i.e., 
the active control) to which they were randomized. We employed a deterministic reversal learning 
task (Cools et al., 2006; Janssen et al., 2015) that enabled the investigation of two separate forms 
of reversal learning (van der Schaaf et al., 2011). First, subjects were required to learn Pavlovian 
associations between stimuli and their outcomes (i.e., reward or punishment). The ability to learn 
from positive and negative prediction errors, i.e. unexpected rewards and punishments respectively, 
could be quantified in terms of valence-dependent reversal learning (error rate unexpected reward 
> unexpected punishment). Second, averaging learning across reward and punishment in this task, 
i.e., valence-independent reversal learning, provides a measure of behavioral flexibility in general. 
METHODS
SUBJECTS
The results reported in this study are based on data from 65 healthy right-handed subjects (55 
women; mean age: 31.9 years old, SEM: 1.4, range: 19-53; mean body mass index (BMI): 26.5 
kg/m2, SEM: 0.5, range: 19-35), and are part of a larger protocol of which previous data are 
presented elsewhere (JJanssen et al., 2017; chapter 5). Subjects were recruited from Nijmegen 
and surroundings through advertisement. Only subjects (aged: 18-55 years old; BMI: 19-35 kg/m2) 
with no (history of) eating disorders or current dieting and who were highly motivated to change their 
eating behavior were included in the study. 
 Exclusion criteria were: left-handedness, inadequate demand of Dutch, current pregnancy, 
MRI-incompatibility, diabetes mellitus, (history of) hepatic, cardiac, respiratory, renal, cerebrovascular, 
endocrine, metabolic or pulmonary diseases, uncontrolled hypertension (diastolic pressure > 90 
mmHg, systolic pressure > 160 mmHg), (history of) eating, neurological, or psychiatric disorders, 
depression/anxiety state scores > 11 on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond 
& Snaith, 1983), current strict dieting, high restrained eating score on the Dutch Eating Behavior 
Questionnaire (DEBQ ≥3.60 for females and ≥4.00 for males; van Strien et al., 1986a), current 
psychological or dietary treatment, taste or smell impairments, use of psychotropic medication, 
food allergies relevant to the study, deafness, blindness, and sensorimotor handicaps, drug or 
alcohol addiction, and a change in body weight of more than 5 kg in the past two months. Crucially, 
subjects who previously participated in an MBSR (Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction) or MBCT 
(Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy) course were not included in the study. 
 Five subjects were excluded from the analyses following testing because of unexpected 
neurological findings (n=2), and poor task performance (n=3)(for details see Analyses). 
 All subjects gave written informed consent and were reimbursed for participation 
according to institutional guidelines of the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands, 2013-188).
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PROTOCOL
Subjects were screened for inclusion and exclusion criteria, and matching criteria (age, gender, BMI, 
experience with meditation and yoga) were assessed by taking physical measures and administering 
self-report questionnaires on a separate intake session. To assess verbal intelligence and education 
level, the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test was administered (Schmand et al., 
1991). Experience with meditation and yoga was assessed by means of an in-house self-report 
questionnaire.
 After inclusion, subjects came to the laboratory twice, in the month before and after the 
intervention, referred to as pre- and post-test session. Test sessions started at 11:00 AM or 12:30 PM, 
which was kept constant within subjects as much as possible. Subjects were instructed to abstain 
from drinking alcohol 24 hours before the test session. Before testing, anthropometric measurements 
of obesity were taken (weight, waist and hip circumference), digit span was assessed (Groth-Marnat, 
2009), and self-report questionnaires were administered to characterize the subjects (Table 4.1). 
The following self-report questionnaires and scales were administered: the Fagerstrom Test for 
Nicotine Dependence (Heatherton et al., 1991) to assess smoking and nicotine dependence; the 
Positive And Negative Affect Scale (Watson et al., 1988) to assess positive and negative affect before 
scanning; the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (Barratt and Patton, 1995) to assess impulsivity; the 
Behavioral Inhibition System / Behavioral Approach System questionnaire (Carver and White, 1994) 
to assess punishment and reward sensitivity; the Kirby questionnaire (Kirby, 2009) to assess delayed 
reward discounting; the Food Frequency Questionnaire, Dutch Healthy Diet (van Lee et al., 2013) 
to assess the degree to which subjects eat according to the national guidelines for a Dutch healthy 
diet; a shortened version of the Food Behavior Questionnaire to assess behaviour towards food; 
the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (van Strien et al., 1986b) to assess emotional, external 
and restraint eating behavior; the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire – Short Form (Baer et al., 
2006) to assess degree of mindfulness; the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and 
Snaith, 1983) to assess levels of anxiety and depression; a Treatment Credibility Questionnaire (TCQ) 
to assess how much subjects believed the intervention would work for them. Note that the pre-
measurement of the TCQ was taken at the first session of the intervention program rather than on 
the pre-test session, as subjects were unaware of the contents of their intervention at that time. Prior 
to the reversal learning task reported here, subjects underwent a one hour MR scanning session, in 
which they performed a food Stroop task (Janssen et al, 2017) and a monetary and caloric incentive 
delay task (chapter 5), followed by an outcome devaluation task outside the scanner (Janssen et 
al., 2017). The results from these tasks are reported elsewhere as the tasks addressed different 
research questions. 
PARADIGM
We administered a version of the deterministic reversal learning task (Janssen et al., 2015) adapted 
from Cools et al. (2006, 2009). The task was programmed with Presentation software (Version 16, 
Neurobiobehavioral Systems, Inc.). On each trial, subjects were presented with two playing cards 
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simultaneously, one of which was highlighted (Figure 4.1). One of the two cards was associated 
with upcoming reward, the other one with upcoming punishment. Subjects had to learn to predict 
the outcome associated with this preselected card by trial-and-error. Responses were self-paced 
and were made by pressing one of two buttons associated with either reward or punishment 
using the right index or middle finger (counterbalanced across subjects). After a short delay (1000 
ms) the outcome was presented (500 ms). Note that the outcomes were not contingent on the 
subjects’ responses, but on the highlighted stimulus; thus, contingencies were Pavlovian rather 
than instrumental. The stimulus-outcome contingency reversed after five to nine consecutive correct 
predictions. Subjects performed two blocks, each consisting of 240 trials (i.e. a total of 480 trials). In 
one block, reversals were always signaled by unexpected rewards (smiling emoticon with a “+€100” 
sign and a high-pitch tone), and in the other block reversals were always signaled by unexpected 
punishments (sad emoticon with a “−€100” sign and a low-pitch tone). The order of blocks was 
counterbalanced between sessions and across subjects. Error rate on the trials immediately after 
reversals (i.e. unexpected reward or punishment) indexes the ability to update predictions of reward 
and punishment, i.e., how well subjects learned from either unexpected reward or unexpected 
punishment (valence-dependent reversal learning), or both (valence-independent reversal learning). 
Subjects were instructed according to the original procedure by Cools et al. (2006) and were trained 
extensively before the experiment so that they understood the structure of the task and the Pavlovian, 
instead of instrumental nature of the contingencies.
+100  
ITI 500 ms
Stimulus until response
Delay 1000 ms
Outcome 500 ms
Figure 4.1 Sample trial of the reversal learning task. On each trial, subjects were presented with 2 gambling 
cards. One of the cards was selected by the computer and highlighted with a blue border. Subjects then had to 
predict, with a left or right button press, whether the card would be followed by a reward (a happy smiley, +100€ 
sign, and a high-pitch tone) or punishment (a sad smiley, -100€ sign, and a low-pitch tone). After a short delay, 
the outcome was presented. The card-outcome associations were deterministic, and reversed after 5 to 9 correct 
responses.
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INTERVENTIONS
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two intervention programs: mindful eating (ME) or 
educational cooking (EC; active control), using minimization (Scott et al., 2002) with respect to 
age (categories: 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55 years old), gender (categories: male, female), BMI 
(categories: 19-24.9, 25-29.9, 30-35 kg/m2) and experience with meditation and yoga (categories: 
never, 0-2, 2-5, 5-10, >10 years). An algorithm assigned subjects to one of the groups by taking into 
account the given minimization factors, which guaranteed that the groups were balanced in terms 
of these factors. 
 The intervention programs were matched in terms of time, effort, and group contact, 
but differed significantly in terms of content. Both programs consisted of 8 weekly, 2.5 hour group 
sessions from 7PM-9:30PM, plus one day dedicated (6 hours) to the intervention goals. Subjects 
were asked to spend 45 minutes per day on homework assignments and to record the amount of 
time spent on homework forms. Subjects were encouraged to complete as much of the homework 
as possible, but more importantly, to accurately report on their actual time-investment to prevent 
dishonest reporting. The intervention programs were described as “eating with attention” (ME) and 
“eating with knowledge” (EC) to prevent a selection-bias of subjects interested in mindfulness. 
Only after the first test session, subjects were informed about the intervention to which they were 
randomized, to ensure that baseline measurements were not influenced by intervention expectations. 
Because group size was set to 10 to 15 subjects per round, included subjects were divided across 
three rounds for each intervention (3xME, 3xEC). The final sample for the analyses reported here 
consisted of 35 subjects in the ME intervention and 30 subjects in the EC intervention (for a flow 
diagram see supplemental Figure S4.1).
MINDFUL EATING (ME)
The aim of the ME intervention was to increase experiential awareness of food and eating (e.g. 
being more aware of food taste and smell, thoughts and feelings during eating or cravings, and 
internal signals like satiety). The program was based on the original MBSR program developed 
by Kabat-Zinn et al. (1990) at the Stress Reduction and Relaxation Clinic, Massachusetts Medical 
Center. Subjects performed formal mindfulness practices (i.e. body scan, sitting meditation, walking 
meditation and mindful movement), aimed at increasing general mindfulness skills, which were 
similar to the original program. In addition, subjects performed informal mindfulness practices based 
on the Mindful Eating, Conscious Living program (MECL; Bays, 2009), which were mainly directed to 
mindful eating and not part of the original MBSR program. Sessions focused on themes, such as: the 
automatic pilot, perception of hunger and other internal states, creating awareness for boundaries 
in eating behavior, stress-related eating, coping with stress, coping with (negative) thoughts, self-
compassion, and how to incorporate mindfulness in daily life. Towards the end of the program, 
subjects had a silent day. During this day, the whole group performed formal mindfulness exercises 
and ate a meal together in complete silence. Homework consisted of a formal mindfulness practice, 
using CDs with guided mindfulness exercises, and an informal mindfulness practice directed at 
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one moment (e.g. a meal) a day. Time spent on homework was noted on homework forms every 
day. The ME intervention was developed and delivered by qualified psychologists/psychiatrists, who 
graduated from the post-graduate mindfulness teacher training at the Radboud University Medical 
Centre for Mindfulness.
EDUCATIONAL COOKING (EC)
The aim of the EC intervention was to increase informational awareness of food and eating. The 
program was based on the Dutch healthy diet guidelines (www.voedingscentrum.nl). To establish 
similar group contact and activities (vs. passive listening) as in the ME, subjects were actively enrolled 
in cooking workshops during the group meetings of the EC. Sessions focused on healthy eating, 
healthy cooking of vegetables and fruit, use of different types of fat and salt for cooking, reading of 
nutrition labels on food products, healthy snacking, guidelines for making healthy choices when 
eating in restaurants, and how to incorporate healthy eating and cooking in daily life. Towards the 
end of the program, subjects had a balance day, during which the subjects adhered to all nutritional 
health guidelines for every snack and meal. Homework assignments entailed practicing cooking 
techniques, or grocery shopping with informational awareness (i.e. reading food labels for nutritional 
content), and counting the amount of calorie intake for one meal a day (to be noted in a homework 
diary). The EC intervention was developed and delivered by a qualified dietitian from Wageningen 
University and the cooking sessions were guided by a professional chef. Sessions took place at a 
large kitchen facility of the Nutrition and Dietetics faculty of the Hogeschool of Arnhem-Nijmegen.  
ANALYSES
Between-group comparisons in anthropometric and self-report measures were analyzed using 
independent-samples t-tests, Fisher’s Exact Tests, or Mann-Whitney U tests (see Table 4.1). 
 Overall error rates (ER) and error rates on reversal trials (trials immediately following 
unexpected outcomes) were arcsine transformed as is appropriate when variance is proportional to 
the mean (Howell, 1997). To investigate performance in general we analyzed the transformed overall 
error rates using a mixed ANOVA (SPSS 19, Chicago, IL) with Time (pre vs. post) as within-subject 
factor and Intervention (ME vs. EC) as a between-subject factor. Transformed error rates on reversal 
trials were analyzed using the same design, but with Valence (unexpected reward vs. punishment) 
as an extra within-subject factor. Valence-dependent and valence-independent reversal learning 
scores were calculated by computing, respectively, the difference between, and the average of the 
error rates on reward and punishment reversal trials (see Figure 2B-C). Since effects of mindfulness-
based interventions have been shown to depend on the amount of time individuals have spent on it 
(Allen et al., 2012), we ran post hoc correlational analysis using Pearson’s r to investigate the change 
in both valence-dependent as well as valence-independent reversal learning scores (post – pre) as 
a function of time investment for both interventions, and statistically compared the slopes between 
the ME and EC group using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation (Fisher, 1915). The significance level was 
Bonferroni-corrected for the two comparisons and set to α=0.025. 
71
CH
AP
TE
R 
4
In addition, we analyzed the total number of reversals obtained throughout the task using the same 
mixed design. Because the stimulus-outcome contingency in the task reversed after five to nine 
consecutive correct predictions, and the total number of trials was fixed, the number of reversals 
for the reward and punishment block reflects performance also on the non-reversal trials. Three 
subjects performed poorly on the task in terms of overall error rate (n=1, ER>0.7) or number of 
reversals (n=2, <10 reversals per condition) and were excluded from the task based on Grubbs’ 
test for outliers (Grubbs, 1969). 
RESULTS
ANOVA of error rates on reversal trials (i.e. trials immediately following reversals) revealed that 
subjects were relatively impaired on learning from unexpected reward compared with unexpected 
punishment (main Valence: F(1,63)=10.1,p=0.002)(Figure 4.2A). We observed no differential 
effect of the interventions on valence-independent reversal learning (interaction Time x Intervention: 
F(1,63)=0.044, p=0.835) nor on valence-dependent reversal learning (interaction Valence x Time 
x Intervention: F(1,63)=1.7, p=0.200). These findings suggest that overall the mindful eating (ME) 
intervention did not differentially affect reversal learning relative to educational cooking (EC). 
 However, we observed large individual differences between subjects in terms of total time 
invested in the intervention program (i.e., time on attended sessions and homework), which did not 
significantly differ between the groups (Table 4.1). One might expect that effects of the mindfulness 
intervention on reversal learning depend on total time invested. We investigated this by running 
post hoc correlational analyses for change (post – pre) in both valence-dependent and valence-
independent reversal learning. We observed a significant correlation between time investment 
and reduced error rates for valence-independent reversal learning in the ME group (r=-0.464, 
p=0.005), but not in the EC group (r=0.117, p=0.538)(Figure 4.2). The correlation coefficients 
differed significantly between groups (Fisher’s z=-2.37, p=0.0178). This suggests that subjects 
who invested more time on the mindful eating intervention improved more on valence-independent 
reversal learning, whereas no such improvement was observed for subjects in the active control 
group. We did not find intervention effects on valence-dependent learning as a function of time-
investment (all p’s< 0.15). 
 The reported findings cannot be explained by group differences in overall performance 
between the ME and EC groups since we observed no main or interaction effects of Intervention on 
error rates across trials, i.e. reversal and non-reversal trials (F(1,63)’s<1, p’s>0.5), nor did overall 
performance correlate with time investment (all p’s>0.4). In addition, ANOVA of the number of 
reversals revealed no interaction effect of Valence x Time x Intervention (F(1,63)=2.603, p=0.112), 
or other Intervention effects (F(1,63)’s<1, p>0.5). 
 Furthermore, the groups were well matched in terms of the minimization factors age, 
gender, BMI and experience with yoga and meditation (Table 4.1). However, the ME group scored 
significantly higher in terms of verbal IQ (Mann-Whitney U=366.5, p=0.036) and was marginally 
72
MINDFUL EATING AND REVERSAL LEARNING
more highly educated than the EC group (Mann-Whitney U=405.0, p=0.076)(Table 4.1). Post 
hoc analyses revealed no correlation of change in valence-independent reversal learning score 
(post-pre) with education (rho=-0.093, p=0.461), but a significant correlation with verbal IQ (rho=-
0.313, p=0.011). Verbal IQ did not significantly correlate with time invested in the intervention either 
within or across the groups (p’s>0.1). Importantly, multiple regression on valence-independent 
error rates following mindful eating including time invested and verbal IQ as regressors (as well as 
baseline valence-independent error rate) showed that time investment significantly predicted error 
rates (βstandardized=-0.397, p=0.014), whereas verbal IQ did not (βstandardized=-0.117, p=0.490)(baseline 
valence-independent error rate: βstandardized=0.516, p=0.005). This suggests that verbal IQ cannot 
explain the observed findings. 
Table 4.1 Between-group comparisons.
Mindful eating 
(n=35)
Educational cooking 
(n=30) p test-statistic a
Gender (Male:Female) 5:30 5:25 1.000 na b
Age (yrs) 32.3 ±1.9 20-52 31.3 ±2.2 19-53 .717 .364 
Body mass index  
(kg/m2)
26.7 ±0.7 19-35 26.3 ±0.7 20-35 .635 .476 
Yoga/meditation  
experience (yrs) 
2.2 ±0.8 0-21 3.8 ±1.2 0-31 .271 -1.110 
Education  
(NART) 
6.5 ±0.1 5-7 6.3 ±0.1 5-7 .076 405.0 c
Verbal IQ  
(NART)
107.9 ±1.8 90-132 102.4 ±1.5 88-123 .036 366.5 c
Working memory  
(digit span total)
15.7 ±0.6 9-23 14.3 ±0.6 9-22 .110 1.622
Smoking  
(FTND)
0 ±0 0 0.03 ±0.03 0-1 .280 507.5 c
Time on training  
(hrs)
29.8 ±2.6 0-51 33.4 ±3.5 3-78 .404 -.840 
Attendance  
(# of sessions)
6.2 ±0.4 1-9 6.5 ±0.5 1-9 .582 484.0 c
Attendance  
< 4 sessions (n)
7 5 .761 na b
If not otherwise stated, values represent mean ±SEM, and min-max. NART: National Adult Reading Test (in Dutch 
(NLV)) was administered to assess education, which is measured on a scale of 1-7 (no degree – academic 
degree); FTND: Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence. aIf not otherwise stated: independent samples-tests 
(degrees of freedom: 63) b Based on Fisher’s Exact Test; c Mann-Whitney U test
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As reported in a largely overlapping sample (chapter 5), the interventions differentially affected 
anthropometric measures of obesity as indicated by a significant Time x Intervention interaction 
(Table 4.2), i.e. BMI and waist were decreased following educational cooking (EC; main Time: BMI: 
F(1,29)=6.7, p=0.015; waist circumference: F(1,29)=13.4, p=0.001), but not following mindful 
eating (ME; main Time: BMI: F(1,34)=2.0, p=0.166; waist circumference: F(1,34)<1, p=0.881). 
Across the intervention groups, we observed greater reductions in BMI with greater time spent on 
the intervention (r=-0.286, p=0.021), although this was not significant for either group (ME: r=-
0.252, p=0.145; EC: r=-0.280, p=0.134).  Furthermore, we found that EC subjects reported closer 
compliance to the Dutch guidelines for healthy eating (main Time: F(1,29)=17.3, p<0.001) than ME 
subjects (main Time: F(1,34)=1.1, p=0.311) as substantiated by a significant Time x Intervention 
interaction for FFQ-DHD scores (Table 4.2). EC subjects also showed a significant increase in 
knowledge on healthy eating following the intervention (main Time: F(1,29)=59.6, p<0.001), 
whereas ME subjects did not (main Time: F(1,34)<1, p=0.356) as evidenced by a significant Time 
x Intervention interaction for FBQ scores (Table 4.2). Analysis of the other self-report questionnaires 
revealed no significant interactions between Time and Intervention. 
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Table 4.2 Means and standard errors of the mean of pre and post intervention measurements for 
each group, and Time (pre, post) x Intervention (ME, EC) statistics.
Mindful eating 
(n=35)
Educational cooking 
(n=30)
p
test- 
statistic apre post pre post
Physical measurements
BMI (kg/m2) 26.7 ±0.7 26.9 ±0.7 26.3 ±0.7 25.9 ±0.7 .005 8.634
Waist (in cm) 90.3 ±2.3 90.2 ±2.4 87.9 ±2.3 86.0 ±2.4 .021 5.565
Waist-to-hip ratio 0.85 ±0.01 0.84 ±0.01 0.84 ±0.01 0.84 ±0.01 .738 .113
Self-report questionnaires
BIS 21.0 ±0.5 20.5 ±0.5 20.0 ±0.6 19.5 ±0.6 .978 .001
BAS 41.8 ±0.6 42.2 ±0.7 43.7 ±0.7 43.4 ±0.8 .370 .814
FFQ-DHD 52.9 ±1.8 54.5 ±1.7 48.9 ±2.5 58.8 ±2.1 .005 8.670
FBQ-short version
Knowledge 15.6 ±0.2 15.9 ±0.2 14.8 ±0.3 16.7 ±0.1 <.001 23.522
Temptation 27.9 ±1.0 27.9 ±0.9 27.8 ±0.7 26.7 ±0.7 .241 1.398
DEBQ
Restraint 2.5 ±0.2 2.9 ±0.1 2.7 ±0.1 3.0 ±0.1 .693 .157
Emotional 2.6 ±0.2 2.7 ±0.1 2.9 ±0.2 2.7 ±0.2 .218 1.551
External 2.8 ±0.2 3.1 ±0.1 3.2 ±0.1 3.2 ±0.1 .116 2.544
FFMQ-SF c 77.3 ±1.5 75.1 ±1.3 76.4 ±1.5 76.6 ±1.5 .517 .426
HADS
Anxiety 3.9 ±0.5 6.0 ±0.4 5.3 ±0.6 5.9 ±0.7 .050 3.977
Depression 2.1 ±0.4 2.7 ±0.4 2.7 ±0.5 2.8 ±0.5 .281 1.180
TCQ d 26.9 ±2.0 27.0 ±1.5 32.2 ±0.9 32.4 ±1.5 .977 .001
If not otherwise stated, values represent mean ±SEM. BIS/BAS: Behavioral Inhibition System / Behavioral 
Approach System questionnaire; FFQ-DHD: Food Frequency Questionnaire, Dutch Healthy Diet; FBQ: Food 
Behavior Questionnaire, a shortened version; DEBQ: Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire; FFMQ-SF: Five 
Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire – Short Form; HADS: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; TCQ: Treatment 
Credibility Questionnaire. Note that the pre-TCQ was filled out at the first session of the intervention, not on the pre 
test session, as subjects were unaware of the contents of the assigned intervention at that time. a If not otherwise 
stated, the reported test-statistic is the F-value (degrees of freedom: 1,63); b Mann-Whitney U; c FFMQ-SF: N = 
54 (NME=24, NEC=30; degrees of freedom: 1,52); 
 dTCQ: N = 55 (NME=29, NEC=26; degrees of freedom: 1,53). 
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Figure 4.2 Intervention effects on reversal learning A) The mindful eating (ME) and educational cooking (EC; 
active control) intervention did not differentially affect reversal learning from reward or punishment. Overall 
subjects were impaired at learning from reward relative to punishment (main effect Valence: F(1,63)=10.073, 
p=.001). B) Valence-dependent reversal learning (i.e. mean error rates on trials following reversals signaled by 
unexpected reward - unexpected punishment) was not associated with the amount of time subjects invested 
in either intervention (p’s>.15). C) Better valence-independent reversal learning (i.e. lower mean error rates on 
trials following reversals in general ([unexpected reward + unexpected punishment]/2)) was related to increased 
time investment in the mindful eating (dashed line: r=-.464, p=.005), but not the educational cooking training 
(solid line: r=.117, p=.538). Note that whereas the statistics were performed on the transformed error rates (see 
Methods), the untransformed error rates were plotted for illustrative purposes. Error bars in reflect 1 SEM.
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DISCUSSION
In this actively controlled study, we investigated the effects of an 8-week mindful eating (ME) 
intervention on reward- and punishment-based reversal learning using a stimulus-outcome reversal 
learning task. We found no overall group differences in either form of reversal learning following 
the interventions. However, relative to the educational cooking (EC; i.e. active control) group, the 
mindful eating (ME) group showed mindfulness-mediated changes in valence-independent reversal 
learning depending on the time subjects invested in the program. More specifically, subjects who 
invested more time in the mindful eating intervention improved in valence-independent reversal 
learning, suggesting increased behavioral flexibility after practicing mindful eating. The effect did not 
vary as a function of the valence of the outcome that signaled the need for reversal. 
 This is the first study investigating the effects of an intensive mindfulness-based intervention 
on the ability to adjust behavior following unexpected outcomes. The observed mindfulness-mediated 
increase in behavioral flexibility is in line with the cognitive, emotional and behavioral flexibility theory by 
Shapiro and colleagues (2006) on the mechanisms underlying the beneficial effects of mindfulness. 
Flexibility requires the ability to switch and adapt a strategy to face unexpected conditions (Moore 
& Malinowski, 2009). Oberle et al. (2011) have indeed found inhibitory control in a task-switching 
paradigm to correlate positively with dispositional mindfulness in adolescents. Furthermore, previous 
studies have shown mindfulness-mediated increases in the ability to inhibit prepotent responses 
during response conflict as measured using classic or emotional Stroop tasks (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; 
Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Lee and Orsillo, 2014). Although overcoming response conflict is less 
in line with the above-mentioned definition of flexibility, it has been argued that the response conflict 
effect is smaller for those individuals who can more flexibly disengage from the highly automatized 
response (Moore & Malinowski 2009). A decrease of the Stroop conflict effect was found for 
experienced meditators relative to meditation-naive controls (Moore and Malinowski, 2009), as well 
as following a brief mindfulness meditation in meditation-naive individuals (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005) and 
in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (Lee and Orsillo, 2014). In contrast, several studies 
tapping into cognitive flexibility more directly by investigating improvement in attention switching have 
shown no effect of an intensive 10-day mindfulness meditation retreat (Chambers et al., 2008) or 
an 8-week mindfulness-based stress reduction course (Anderson et al., 2007) relative to a passive 
control group. It is possible that effects of mindfulness on attention switching in these previous 
studies would have surfaced as a function of time invested in the interventions, similar to the currently 
observed improvement in behavioral flexibility.  
 The absence of a group effect of mindful eating on reversal learning in the context of 
monetary rewards concurs with a previous study reporting reduced impulsive choices in the food, but 
not monetary domain following only a brief mindful eating workshop relative to an active control group 
(Hendrickson and Rasmussen, 2013). Note that our mindfulness-based intervention was specifically 
targeted at reducing bad eating habits, which may particularly reduce saliency for food rewards 
and have less of an effect on other (less problematic) reward domains. Affective saliency across 
reward domains might only be targeted by more advanced stages of mindfulness practice. This was 
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suggested by Allen and colleagues (2012), who found improvements in affective processing in a 
number-counting Stroop task, with interfering negatively valenced pictures, only in those individuals 
with the greatest amounts of mindfulness practice, whereas behavioral and neural measures of 
cognitive control improved across the whole mindfulness group relative to the active control group. 
This may also explain why Kirk and Montague (2015) have found a relationship between mindfulness 
and neural measures of Pavlovian prediction errors in experienced meditators relative to naive 
controls, while we do not find mindfulness-mediated changes in reversal learning following Pavlovian 
(i.e., valence-dependent) prediction errors in individuals without previous meditation-experience. We 
speculate that improvements in valence-dependent reversal learning might be observed in more 
experienced meditators. Future research is required to confirm this hypothesis. 
 As in the previous study in which we report data from a smaller subset of the current 
sample (chapter 5), we did not find evidence of improved eating behavior following the mindful 
eating intervention as would be evidenced by a decrease in anthropometric measures (i.e. BMI, 
waist, WHR) or altered eating behavior as evidenced by self-reported external or emotional eating, or 
eating according to the guidelines for a Dutch healthy diet. This contrasts with several other studies, 
reporting reduced measures of overeating such as consumption of sweets (Mason et al., 2015), 
binges, externally and emotionally driven eating (Alberts et al., 2012) and reductions in BMI (Tapper et 
al., 2009) in non-clinical populations, as well as in number of binges in binge-eating disorder (Kristeller 
et al., 2013). We have previously raised two possible explanations for the absence of reduced 
anthropometric measures of obesity following mindful eating. First, it may take a few months before 
mindfulness manifests itself in an individual’s behavioral patterns (Mason et al., 2015; Tapper et al., 
2009). Longitudinal studies are required to address such long-term changes. Second, mindfulness 
has been found to decrease body image concern in healthy women with disordered eating behavior 
(Alberts et al., 2012). Decreased body image concern may have reduced the explicit motivation to 
lose weight in part of our subjects, despite being healthy. Future studies should take into account 
body image concern to confirm or rule out this possibility. In addition, our subject sample was rather 
heterogeneous in terms of the motivation to take part in the intervention, which may be reflected 
in a lower mean BMI compared with previous studies in healthy populations (Tapper et al., 2009; 
Alberts et al., 2012). As a result, it is difficult to reliably address mindfulness-mediated improvements 
in eating behavior in the current study. Note that we did find a reduction in physical measures (i.e., 
BMI and waist circumference) and an increase in adherence to the guidelines for a Dutch healthy 
diet in the educational cooking group. This might not be surprising given the aim of the educational 
cooking intervention, i.e., following a healthier eating pattern. As part of the homework assignments, 
subjects were instructed to adhere to the guidelines for a Dutch healthy diet, with reduced intake of 
sugar, fats and salt, which is more likely to result in reduced BMI and waist circumference, as well as 
in increased adherence to these guidelines.
 Given the reported health benefits of the educational cooking intervention in this study and 
the cognitive improvement of the mindful eating intervention with significant amount of practice, it 
might be fruitful to develop a program that combines both. Although weight control programs are 
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often successful in producing significant weight loss, they often fail to produce long-term weight 
maintenance (Wilson, 1994). Previous studies investigating factors contributing to successful weight 
maintenance have shown that behavioral flexibility plays a role, i.e. those individuals who had more 
flexible styles of behavioral adjustment in terms of, for example, responding to cravings were more 
likely to maintain a healthy weight or to not become overweight (Elfhag and Rössner, 2005; Lillis et 
al., 2009). We speculate that a combination of the two interventions might lead to health benefits that 
are more easily maintained due to increased behavioral flexibility. 
 In short, we show that behavioral flexibility is improved following an intensive 8-week mindful 
eating intervention in individuals struggling with their eating habits. A mindfulness-mediated increase 
in behavioral flexibility may help overcome undesired eating habits. Future longitudinal studies are 
needed to confirm the hypothesis that a mindfulness-mediated increase in behavioral flexibility might 
result in long-term impact of interventions aimed at changing eating habits such as weight control 
programs, and to assess in more detail the mechanism by which this works. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
Figure S4.1 CONSORT flow diagram 
a Attended <4 sessions of the intervention program. Note that these subjects were invited back to the laboratory 
for the post test session 

Adapted from: Janssen, LK*, Duif, I, Speckens, AEM, van Loon, I, de Vries, JHM, Cools, 
R, Aarts, E (under review). The effects of an 8-week mindful eating intervention on 
anticipatory reward responses in the midbrain.
CHAPTER 5
THE EFFECTS OF MINDFUL EATING ON 
ANTICIPATORY REWARD RESPONSES IN THE MIDBRAIN
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ABSTRACT
Obesity is a highly prevalent disease, usually resulting from chronic overeating. Accumulating 
evidence suggests that increased neural responses during the anticipation of high caloric food 
play an important role in overeating. A promising method to counteract enhanced food anticipation 
in overeating might be mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs). However, how MBIs can affect 
food reward anticipation neurally has never been studied. In this randomized, actively controlled 
study we aimed to investigate whether an 8-week mindful eating intervention decreases reward 
anticipation in striatal and midbrain reward regions. Using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 
we tested 58 healthy subjects with a wide body mass index range (BMI: 19-35 kg/m2), who were 
motivated to change their eating behavior. During scanning they performed an incentive delay task, 
measuring neural reward anticipation responses to caloric and monetary cues before and after 8 
weeks of mindful eating or educational cooking (active control). Relative to educational cooking 
(active control), mindful eating decreased reward anticipation responses to food, but not to monetary 
reward cues, in the midbrain, but not the striatum. These results show that an 8-week mindful eating 
intervention may decrease the salience of food cues specifically, which could result in decreased 
food-cue triggered overeating on the long term.
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INTRODUCTION
Reward-related disorders such as addiction, binge-eating disorder and obesity, are characterized 
by altered responses to reward cues related to the target of abuse (Volkow et al., 2008; García-
García et al., 2014; Val-Laillet et al., 2015). Regions in striatum and midbrain respond to increases 
in appetitive motivation induced by reward cues (Knutson et al., 2005). Altered responses of these 
subcortical reward regions have been related to reward-related disorders. For example, greater BMI 
was associated with increased midbrain responses to risky rewards in adolescents (Delgado-Rico et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, greater midbrain responses to alcohol-related stimuli have been suggested 
to contribute to an attentional bias towards those stimuli in alcoholics (Muller-Oehring et al., 2013). In 
addition, greater responses of ventral striatum to reward cues have been associated with subsequent 
food intake (Lawrence et al., 2012) and future weight gain (Stice et al., 2011; Demos et al., 2012; 
Lawrence et al., 2012). Interventions that diminish subcortical responses to food reward cues may 
therefore be promising for treating and preventing obesity.  
 Mindfulness-based interventions are aimed at cultivating attention to present-moment 
experience, without judgment (Kabat-Zinn, 1984). Protocolized mindfulness interventions, such as 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) have shown to be effective in reducing subcortical 
responses to emotional stimuli in anxiety (Goldin et al., 2012) as well as in healthy individuals (Lutz et 
al., 2013). Importantly, mindfulness-based interventions aimed at changing eating behavior reduced 
obesity-related eating behavior in clinical populations (Leahey et al., 2008; Kristeller et al., 2013) as 
well as abdominal fat (Tapper et al., 2009; Daubenmier et al., 2011), and increased self-reported 
mindful eating  in obese individuals (Mason et al., 2015). However, only two of these studies were 
actively controlled (Kristeller et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2015). It is therefore unclear whether these 
beneficial effects can be attributed to mindfulness per se. In fact, Kristeller and colleagues (2013) 
found that mindfulness-based eating awareness training (MB-EAT) and a psycho-educational/
cognitive-behavioral (i.e., active control) intervention similarly decreased binge-eating symptoms 
relative to a waitlist control group. Given the different nature of these interventions, it is possible 
that reduced symptomatology was mediated by distinct brain mechanisms, as was suggested by 
an actively controlled clinical trial on social anxiety (Goldin et al., 2012). Studies investigating the 
neurocognitive mechanism underlying mindful eating are required to address this issue. 
 Here, we present the first actively controlled randomized study investigating the effects of 
mindfulness on reward anticipation in the brain to be able to understand its mechanisms of action. 
Using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) we investigated the effects of an 8-week 
mindful eating intervention and a carefully matched educational cooking intervention (active control) 
on subcortical reward region responses when rewards could be earned in an incentive delay task 
(Knutson et al., 2001) that has been consistently shown to produce reliable subcortical responses to 
reward cues (Haber and Knutson, 2010). We hypothesized that the mindful eating intervention would 
reduce reward cue responses of these subcortical reward regions. We included both monetary and 
caloric rewards in the task, which enabled us to explore whether the effect on anticipatory reward 
responses is specific to the caloric domain, or generalizes to the monetary domain. 
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METHOD
SUBJECTS
The results reported in this study are based on data from 58 healthy right-handed subjects (48 
women; mean age: 31.6, SD: 11.0, range: 19 – 52 years; mean body mass index (BMI): 26.0, 
SD: 3.68, range: 19.7 – 34.7)(for a flow diagram see Figure S5.1). Subjects were recruited from 
Nijmegen and surroundings through advertisement. Only subjects (aged: 18 – 55 years old; BMI: 
19 – 35 kg/m2) with no (history of) eating disorders or current dieting and who were highly motivated 
to change their eating behavior were included in the study. Crucially, subjects who previously 
participated in an MBSR (Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction) or MBCT (Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy) course were not included in the study (for all exclusion criteria see Supplemental 
Materials). All subjects gave written informed consent and were reimbursed for participation 
according to institutional guidelines of the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands, 2013-188). 
PROTOCOL
All subjects were screened for inclusion and exclusion criteria, and matching criteria (age, gender, 
BMI, experience with meditation and yoga) were assessed by taking physical measures and 
administering self-report questionnaires on a separate intake session. After inclusion, subjects came 
to the laboratory twice, before and after the intervention (Supplemental Materials, Test Sessions). 
Sessions started at 11:00 AM or 12:30 PM. Subjects were instructed to abstain from eating foods 
and drinking anything else than water four hours prior to the start of the test sessions. Subjects were 
encouraged to have a light breakfast before fasting. Furthermore, subjects were instructed to abstain 
from drinking alcohol 24 hours before the test session. Before scanning, physical measurements 
were taken (weight, waist and hip circumference), digit span was assessed (Groth-Marnat, 2009), and 
self-report questionnaires were administered (Table 5.2)(Supplemental Materialsn). Subsequently, 
subjects underwent a one hour MR scanning session in which they performed an incentive delay 
task. 
PARADIGM: INCENTIVE DELAY TASK
We adapted the original incentive delay task (Knutson et al., 2001) to assess reward anticipation to 
monetary as well as caloric cues. For task details see Figure 5.1. In short, on each trial subjects were 
cued as to which of four rewards they could win (monetary: 1 or 50 cents; caloric: a sip of water or 
a high-caloric drink of their choice (orange juice, chocolate milk or regular cola)). As soon as a white 
star (target) appeared on the screen subjects were to press a button with their right index finger as 
fast as possible. If subjects responded within an individually determined time-window they won and 
the reward was added to their cumulative gain. After scanning, subjects received and drank their total 
caloric gain. Their total monetary gain was added to their financial reimbursement. Subjects received 
instructions for the incentive delay task before going into the scanner, and were aware they would 
receive their gain following scanning. Before scanning, subjects rated how much they wanted and 
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liked each reward on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). To expose subjects to the reward outcomes, 
they were provided with the actual coins, and one sip (5 mL) of water and one of the chosen drink 
while rating the VAS. 
INTERVENTIONS 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two intervention programs: mindful eating (ME) or 
educational cooking (EC; active control), using minimization with respect to age, gender, BMI and 
experience with meditation and yoga (for details see Supplemental Materials, Interventions). The 
programs were matched in terms of time, effort, and group contact, but differed significantly in terms 
of content. Both programs consisted of 8 weekly, 2.5 hour group sessions from 7PM-9:30PM, plus 
one day dedicated (6 hours) to the intervention goals. Subjects were asked to spend 45 minutes per 
day on homework assignments and to record the amount of time spent on homework forms. The 
intervention programs were described as “eating with attention” (ME) and “eating with knowledge” 
(EC) to prevent a selection-bias of subjects interested in mindfulness. Only after the first test session, 
subjects were informed about the intervention to which they were randomized, to ensure that baseline 
measurements were not influenced by intervention expectations. Because group size was set to 10 
to 15 subjects per round, included subjects were divided across three rounds for each intervention 
(3xME, 3xEC). The final sample for analyses consisted of 32 subjects in the ME intervention and 26 
subjects in the EC intervention (for a flow diagram see Figure S5.1).
 The aim of the ME intervention was to increase experiential awareness of food and eating 
(e.g. being more aware of food taste and smell, thoughts and feelings during eating or cravings, 
and internal signals like satiety). The aim of the EC intervention was to increase informational 
awareness of food and eating. The program was based on the Dutch healthy diet guidelines (www.
voedingscentrum.nl). For a description of the intervention programs see Supplemental Materials, 
Interventions. 
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Figure 5.1 Incentive delay task. A) Each trial started with a fixation cross, followed by a cue signaling which 
reward could be earned on that trial. Subsequently, a white star (i.e. target) appeared for a brief period and 
subjects were instructed to press a button as fast as possible upon detection using their right index finger. If 
subjects pressed before the response deadline (hit trial), the target remained on the screen, informing subjects of 
the successful registration of their key press. Subsequently, a brief feedback image informing the subjects about 
the total gain was presented. If subjects pressed too late or failed to press at all (too late or miss trial, respectively), 
they were presented with the text message “you win nothing” plus the total gain so far. To ensure subjects 
won similar amounts of each reward, target presentation times were determined individually and adaptively: 
following hit trials the response deadline for that reward cue was decreased with 10 ms, following too late or 
miss trials it increased with 10 ms. B) Reward cues for high and low caloric cues (C: subject’s choice from 
cola, orange juice or chocolate milk vs. W: water) and high and low monetary cues (50 cents vs. 1 cent). The 
task took 20 – 25 minutes to complete. Subjects performed 4 blocks of 25 trials (a total of a 100 trials). A block 
contained either high/low monetary or high/low caloric trials. Each trial type was repeated approximately 25 times 
(M: 24.4, SD: 2.78). Block-presentation was pseudo-randomly distributed and counterbalanced across subjects 
(randomization scheme: ABBA or BAAB).
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES
Between-group comparisons were analyzed using independent-samples t-tests, Fisher’s Exact 
Tests, or Mann-Whitney U tests. Effects of training on physical and neuropsychological measurements 
were analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVA with Time (pre, post) as within-subject factor and 
Intervention (ME, EC) as between-subject factor. Mean latencies of the correct manual responses 
(i.e. when subjects pressed in time) were analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVA with within-
subject factors Reward (high, low), Domain (caloric, monetary), Time, and the between-subject 
factor Intervention (ME, EC). Specific effects were tested with subsequent F-tests. All analyses were 
performed using two-tailed tests in SPSS (version 23.0, Chicago, IL). The significance level was set 
at an alpha of p=.05. 
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FMRI ACQUISITION AND ANALYSES
We acquired whole-brain functional images (multi-echo) to measure blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) contrast, as well as a high-resolution anatomical scan. See Supplemental Materials, Data 
Acquisition for the scanning parameters. 
 Data were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Pre-
processing consisted of realignment, echo combination, slice-timing, co-registration, normalization 
and spatial smoothing and is elaborated on in Supplemental Materials, Preprocessing. 
 Statistical analyses of fMRI data at the individual subject (first) level were performed using 
an event-related approach. For a detailed description of the included regressors, modeling of the 
regressors and filtering see Supplemental Materials, Subject Level Statistical Model.
 We ran two general linear models (GLMs) at the second level: one for reward anticipation 
with high minus low reward cue contrast images, and one for reward receipt with hit minus too late 
contrast images. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed in a full-factorial design, with between-
subject factor Intervention and within-subject factors Time and Domain, resulting in 8 cells. Effects 
were considered statistically significant when reaching a threshold of p<0.05, family wise error (FWE) 
corrected for multiple comparisons at the peak level, whole brain or in the a priori defined regions 
of interest (see below). Interaction effects of interest are also reported at p<.001 (uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons at the peak level). 
 To further investigate the effects of intervention on reward anticipation and receipt, region-
of-interest (ROI) analyses were performed for midbrain and striatum. Bilateral anatomical ROIs were 
obtained from the Hammers-mith atlas (Hammers et al., 2003) as described in Supplemental 
Materials, Anatomical ROIs. Mean beta weights were extracted from all voxels in both ROIs 
separately using MarsBar (Brett et al., 2002) The regionally averaged beta-weights were analyzed 
using ANOVA with the same factors as in the whole-brain analyses. As two ROIs were tested, effects 
were considered significant when reaching a threshold of p<.025 (Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons). 
RESULTS 
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Characterization of intervention groups
The mindful eating (ME) and educational cooking (EC) groups were well matched in terms of the 
minimization factors age, gender, body mass index (BMI) and experience with meditation and 
yoga (Table 5.1). Note that the groups differed marginally significantly in terms of educational level. 
However, post hoc correlation analyses revealed no correlations between  educational level and the 
neural effects described below and is therefore unlikely to drive these effects. Furthermore, the total 
time subjects spent on the intervention, and the number of sessions subjects attended did not differ 
significantly between the two groups (Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 Between-group (ME, EC) comparisons. 
mindful eating  
(ME)
educational cooking  
(EC)
p-value test- 
statistic
n 32 26
Gender (Male:Female) 5  : 27 5  : 21 .740 na a
Age (yrs) 32.3 ±10.8 20-52 30.6 ±11.3 19-51 .546 .607 b
Education (NART) 6.5 ±0.6 5-7 6.2 ±0.7 5-7 .053 304.0 c
Digit span (total score) 15.6 ±3.5 9-23 14.1 ±3.5 9-22 .120 1.577 b
Smoking (FTND score) 0.19 ±1.1 0-6 0.04 ±0.2 0-1 .902 413.5 c
Body mass index (kg/m2) 26.6 ±4.1 19-35 25.5 ±3.4 20-33 .296 1.054 b
Waist circumference (cm) 89.6 ±12.8 72-122 86.5 ±11.7 70-117 .338 .967 b
Yoga/meditation experience (yrs) 1.0 ±2.6 0-14 1.9 ±4.3 0-19 .334 -.974 b
Time on training (hrs) 31.0 ±14.4 2.5-47.8 23.9 ±21.2 0-77.7 .135 1.518 b
Attendance < 4 sessions (n) 5 5 .740 na a
Attendance (number of sessions) 6.5 ±2.5  1-9 6.3 ±2.8 1-9 .738 .336 b
If not otherwise stated, values denote mean±SD, and min-max. NART: National Adult Reading Test (in Dutch 
NLV) was administered to assess education ; FTND: Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence. a Based on 
Fisher’s Exact Test, b Independent samples t-test (degrees of freedom: 56) c Mann-Whitney test
ANTHROPOMETRIC AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES
The interventions had differential effects on the anthropometric measures as indicated by a significant 
Time x Intervention interaction (Table 5.2), i.e. BMI and waist were decreased following EC (main 
Time: BMI: F(1,25)=6.2, p=.020; waist circumference: F(1,25)=17.9, p<.001), but not following ME 
(main Time: BMI: F(1,31)<1, p=.647; waist circumference: F(1,31)<1, p=.504). Furthermore, we 
found that EC subjects reported closer compliance to the Dutch guidelines for healthy eating (main 
Time: F(1,25)=12.8, p=.001) than ME subjects (main Time: F(1,31)=1.4, p=.244) as substantiated 
by a significant Time x Intervention interaction for FFQ-DHD scores (Table 5.2). EC subjects also 
showed a significant increase in knowledge on healthy eating following the intervention (main 
Time; F(1,25)=48.8, p<.001), whereas ME subjects did not (main Time: F(1,31)<1, p=.394) as 
evidenced by a significant Time x Intervention interaction for FBQ scores (Table 5.2). Analysis of 
the other neuropsychological measurements revealed no significant interactions between Time and 
Intervention (Table 5.2). 
89
CH
AP
TE
R 
5
RESPONSE TIMES
On average, 59.6% (SD: 10.0) of the trials were hit trials. Subjects responded faster on high rather 
than low reward hit trials (main Reward: F(1,56)=25.0, p < .001), thus revealing a reward benefit. 
In addition, subjects responded faster to monetary relative to caloric reward cues (main Domain: 
F(1,56)=17.4, p<.001). We observed a reward benefit for both caloric (F(1,115)=5.8, p=.018) and 
monetary trials (F(1,115)=37.3, p<.001), which was, however, larger in the latter trials (Reward x 
Domain interaction: F(1,56)=9.0, p=.004). Finally, subjects’ mean response times were lower on 
post relative to pre test sessions (pre: 310.66 (SD: 21.3), post: 304.60 (SD: 20.8) ms; main Time: 
F(1,56)=17.4, p<.001). We found no significant 4-way interaction with Intervention (F(1,56)<1). 
Table 5.2 Means and standard deviations, pre- and post-training, for each group (ME, EC) separately, 
and Time (pre, post) x Intervention (ME, EC) statistics.
mindful eating  
(ME)
educational cooking  
(EC)
p test- 
statistica
pre post pre post
Physical measurements
BMI (kg/height(m)2) 26.6 ±4.1 26.6 ±4.2 25.5 ±3.4 25.2 ±3.5 .023 5.5
Waist (cm) 89.6 ±12.8 89.3 ±13.2 86.5 ±11.7 84.4 ±11.7 .026 5.2
Neuropsychological measurements  / self-report
Digit Span (total score) 15.6 ±3.5 15.2 ±3.6 14.1 ±3.5 13.5 ±3.7 .689 < 1
PANAS
Positive Affect 31.8 ±6.5 30.0 ±6.1 31.4 ±4.8 29.8 ±5.1 .772 < 1
Negative Affect 12.7 ±2.8 13.9 ±4.3 12.7 ±2.6 13.4 ±3.6 .602 < 1
FTND (smoking score) 0.19 ±1.1 0.19 ±1.1 0.04 ±0.2 0.04 ±0.2 1.000 416b
BIS-11 62.0 ±9.3 62.1 ±9.0 64.5 ±8.7 63.7 ±8.3 .492 < 1
BIS 20.8 ±3.3 20.3 ±3.2 19.8 ±3.3 19.6 ±3.3 .671 < 1
BAS 41.5 ±3.3 42.3 ±4.0 43.2 ±4.1 42.7 ±4.1 .101 2.8
Kirby 0.013 ±0.023 0.015 ±0.023 0.020 ±0.045 0.011 ±0.017 .094 2.9
FFQ – DHD 52.2 ±10.4 54.2 ±10.0 51.6 ±12.0 59.5 ±10.8 .036 4.6
FBQ – short version 64.0 ±7.0 62.8 ±5.6 62.1 ±4.8 62.7 ±6.3 .264 1.3
Knowledge 15.6 ±1.5 15.8 ±1.3 14.9 ±1.5 16.7 ±0.8 <.001 19.6
Temptation 15.0 ±3.2 14.4 ±3.3 14.8 ±3.3 14.5 ±4.0 .729 < 1
DEBQ
Restraint 2.8 ±0.6 2.9 ±0.6 2.9 ±0.7 2.9 ±0.6 .814 < 1
Emotional 2.8 ±0.8 2.8 ±0.8 2.8 ±0.7 2.7 ±0.9 .728 < 1
External 3.2 ±0.4 3.2 ±0.5 3.4 ±0.5 3.1 ±0.5 .120 2.5
FFMQ-SFc 78.1 ±7.7 76.8 ±7.4 76.5 ±8.6 75.7 ±7.9 .671 < 1
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HADS
Anxiety 4.4 ±2.4 6.0 ±2.5 4.8 ±2.5 6.2 ±3.9 .902 < 1
Depression 2.6 ±2.4 2.8 ±2.4 2.4 ±2.3 2.7 ±2.6 .864 < 1
TCQd 30.0 ±7.4 27.8 ±8.4 32.7 ±4.8 32.8 ±8.1 .215 1.6
Wanting for rewards
Low caloric 4.5 ±2.8 4.6 ±2.8 4.5 ±3.1 4.6 ±2.8 .987 < 1
High caloric 6.3 ±2.0 5.8 ±2.4 5.4 ±3.0 5.6 ±2.4 .330 < 1
Low monetary 1.9 ±2.4 1.5 ±2.0 2.2 ±2.5 2.4 ±2.6 .318 1.0
High monetary 5.2 ±2.8 5.4 ±2.7 5.0 ±3.2 5.4 ±2.4 .840 < 1
Liking for rewards
Low caloric 6.4 ±2.3 6.1 ±2.2 6.2 ±2.7 6.6 ±2.2 .187 1.8
High caloric 7.2 ±1.6 6.7 ±2.1 6.8 ±2.9 6.4 ±2.7 .783 < 1
Low monetary 2.2 ±2.4 2.2 ±2.2 2.8 ±2.4 2.8 ±2.3 .967 < 1
High monetary 5.1 ±2.5 5.2 ±2.4 4.4 ±2.7 5.3 ±2.2 .143 2.2
Response Times
Low caloric 313.7 ±41.0 312.4 ±33.8 322.5 ±51.6 312.6 ±43.8 .319 1.0
High caloric 303.4 ±33.8 299.1 ±31.5 322.2 ±50.0 311.8 ±48.4 .471 < 1
Low monetary 313.0 ±47.0 311.2 ±44.2 317.4 ±44.8 313.3 ±49.6 .834 < 1
High monetary 294.7 ±26.2 285.1 ±32.5 302.3 ±41.5 293.9 ±43.0 .874 < 1
Hunger b 5.9 ±2.6 5.9 ±2.7 5.9 ±3.0 5.6 ±2.9 .835 < 1
Thirst b 5.7 ±2.6 5.9 ±2.8 6.0 ±2.4 5.5 ±2.4 .273 1.2
Satiety b 2.3 ±2.1 2.1 ±0.9 1.9 ±1.1 2.1 ±1.2 .345 < 1
If not otherwise stated, values denote mean±SD. PANAS: Positive And Negative Affect Scale; FTND: Fagerstrom 
Test for Nicotine Dependence ; BIS-11: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11; BIS/BAS: Behavioral Inhibition System / 
Behavioral Approach System questionnaire; Kirby: delayed reward discounting questionnaire; FFQ-DHD: Food 
Frequency Questionnaire, Dutch Healthy Diet; FBQ: Food Behavior Questionnaire, a shortened version; DEBQ: 
Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire; FFMQ-SF: Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire – Short Form; HADS: 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; TCQ: Treatment Credibility Questionnaire. Note that the pre-training TCQ 
was filled out at the first training session, not on the pre-training test session, as subjects were unaware of the 
contents of their training at that time. aIf not otherwise stated, the reported test-statistic is the F-value (degrees of 
freedom: 1,56); bMann-Whitney U; cFFMQ-SF: N = 48 (NME = 22, NEC = 26; degrees of freedom: 1,46); 
dTCQ, 
Hunger, Thirst, Satiety: N = 55 (NME = 29, NEC = 26; degrees of freedom: 1,53). 
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
Reward Anticipation
First, brain regions were identified that responded to reward anticipation (main effect of Reward 
condition: high>low). At our whole-brain corrected threshold (FWE<.05, peak-level), this contrast 
yielded significant responses in striatum (bilateral caudate nucleus) and bilateral midbrain regions, 
as well as in occipital, motor and frontal regions (Figure 5.2A; Table 5.3). In addition, striatal (left 
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putamen and right caudate nucleus) and bilateral inferior occipital regions demonstrated greater 
responses for anticipation to monetary than caloric reward cues (i.e. interaction of Domain x Reward)
(Table 5.3).
 Second, we were interested in the effects of ME on reward anticipation in a priori defined 
regions-of-interest (ROIs: striatum and midbrain). When using our ROIs as small search volumes, 
we found a significant Reward x Domain x Time x Intervention interaction in bilateral midbrain 
(FWE<.05, SVC, peak-level; Figure 5.2B; Table 5.3), but not in the striatum. To disentangle the 
observed four-way interaction in the midbrain, we performed ROI analyses (Figure 5.2C) using a 
bilateral structural ROI (see Supplemental Material, Anatomical ROIs). As expected, we found 
the same four-way interaction in the ROI betas (F(1,56)=6.0, p=.018, α=.025). Post hoc analyses 
revealed that this effect was driven by a significant reduction in midbrain responses on post relative 
to pre measurement in anticipation of specifically caloric cues following the ME (Time x Reward: 
F(1,31)=6.4, p=.016, α=.025), but not the EC intervention (Time x Reward: F(1,25)=3.6, p=.070). 
There was no significant difference for the monetary domain following either the ME (Time x Reward: 
F(1,31)=1.9, p=.181) or the EC intervention (Time x Reward: F(1,25)<1). 
 Because we observed significant pre-intervention differences in midbrain caloric reward 
anticipatory activity between the two groups (t(56)=2.4, p=.021)(Figure S5.2), we performed 
post hoc sub-group analyses to test whether the observed four-way interaction was the result of a 
potential floor effect in the EC group. For this analysis, we only included subjects with midbrain ROI 
betas for caloric reward anticipation larger than zero. This resulted in a sample of 20 ME, and 10 EC 
subjects. The same analyses as described previously were performed on this sample. There were 
no between-group pre-differences on the midbrain caloric betas (t(56)=1.3, p=.213) in this sample. 
Importantly, the four-way interaction remained marginally significant (F(1,28)=3.5, p=.072), again 
driven by a significant post versus pre reduction in caloric reward anticipation in ME (Time x Reward: 
F(1,19)=10.5, p=.004, α=.025), but not in EC (Time x Reward: F(1,9)<1). 
 To rule out that the observed interaction effect in midbrain can be explained by the 
group difference in BMI and waist circumference, we added difference scores for BMI and waist 
circumference (post-pre) as covariates to the analyses of the midbrain ROI betas. The Reward x 
Domain x Time x Intervention interaction remained significant when correcting for BMI and waist 
circumference (4-way interaction with BMI covariate: F(1,55)=5.2, p=.026; with waist circumference 
covariate: F(1,55)=7.3, p=.009). 
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REWARD RECEIPT
No significant main effects of Intervention or interactions with Intervention were found for BOLD 
responses to reward receipt in whole-brain analyses, nor in ROI analyses using a priori defined ROIs 
for striatum and midbrain. For main effects and other interaction effects of reward receipt see Table 
S5.2. 
Figure 5.2 Summary of neuroimaging results. A) Main effect of reward. Contrast of high vs. low reward cue trials 
(high > low). Full brain statistical parametric maps were thresholded at p < .05 (FWE-corrected, peak-level). B) 
Axial slice of whole brain interaction effect of Domain x Time x Intervention for the Reward contrast (high > low). 
Statistical parametric maps were thresholded at p < .001 (yellow) and p < .005 (red) uncorrected for visualization 
purposes. Outlined regions are corrected for multiple comparisons within our small search volume, at peak pFWE 
< .05. C) Betas from the bilateral structural midbrain ROI (outlined in blue in panel B). Post- minus pre-intervention 
mean betas based on the high minus low reward contrast are presented for each domain (caloric, monetary) and 
for each intervention group (ME, EC) in arbitrary units (a.u.). Asterisks indicate p < .025 (Bonferroni corrected for 
multiple ROIs). All statistical parametric maps are overlaid onto a T1-weighted canonical image. Slice coordinates 
are defined in MNI152 space and images are shown in neurological convention (left=left).
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Table 5.3 Summary of brain regions exhibiting main effects of reward, domain and/or interactions 
with domain, intervention, and time at the time of reward anticipation.
Label Side  
(Left/Right)
MNI-coordinates 
x, y, z (mm)
Size  
(number of voxels)
pFWE 
(peak-level)
t-valuea 
(peak)
Main effect of Reward: high > lowb
Inferior occipital lobe R 24 -94 -4 1319 < .001 12.99
Cerebellum R 36 -58 -20 < .001 5.96
Inferior occipital lobe L -22 -96 -4 1459 < .001 11.47
Caudate nucleus R 10 10 -2 1145 < .001 7.70
Caudate nucleus L -8 10 -4 < .001 7.49
Thalamus L -4 -18 8    .003 5.48
Superior motor area L -6 -2 58 2134 < .001 6.32
Precentral L -38 -14 52 < .001 6.23
Superior motor area R 6 6 56 < .001 6.23
Precentral R 52 0 50 25    .012 5.13
Premotor cortex R 42 0 58    .037 4.85
Insula L -32 28 4 2    .026 4.94
Midbrain R 8 -28 -8 1    .043 4.81
Midbrain L -6 -28 -8 2    .044 4.80
Insula L -30 28 0 2    .050 4.77
Main effect of Reward: low > high reward b
Frontal superior lobe R 18 26 50 7  .023 4.97
Interaction effect of Reward x Domain: monetary (high > low reward) > caloric (high > low reward)b
Inferior occipital lobe L -20 -96 -4 1511 < .001 19.96
Inferior occipital lobe R 24 -92 -6 1349 < .001 18.71
Putamen L -20 22 -8 1   .037 4.85
Caudate nucleus R 12 10 4 1   .047 4.79
Interaction effect: Reward x Domain x Time x Interventionc
Midbrain R 12 -18 -12 8  .005 3.64
Midbrain L -10 -22 -12 13  .005 3.64
Midbrain L -12 -18 -12  .006 3.54
Midbrain L -8 -18 -14  .010 3.40
a Degrees of freedom: 1, 224; bp < .05, whole brain family wise error (FWE) corrected; cp < .05, small volume, 
FWE corrected. 
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DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of an 8-week mindful eating intervention on 
subcortical reward anticipation using an incentive delay task. Consistent with our hypothesis, we 
found that anticipatory midbrain BOLD responses to caloric reward cues were decreased following 
the mindful eating (ME), but not the educational cooking (EC; active control) intervention. Anticipatory 
sub-cortical BOLD responses to monetary reward cues were not affected by either intervention. 
Physical measures of obesity (i.e. BMI and waist circumference) were decreased following the 
educational cooking intervention, but not following the mindful eating intervention. 
 Dopaminergic midbrain neurons are crucial for processing predicted reward value (Schultz, 
2006; Haber and Knutson, 2010) and, in concert with striatum, modulate motivated behavior such 
as eating (Berridge, 2009). In line with this, Small et al. (2001) showed that midbrain activity as 
measured by positron emission tomography (H2
15O) decreased with reduced self-reported reward 
value of chocolate while individuals ate chocolate beyond satiety. In another study, midbrain BOLD 
responses to sips of palatable milkshake were found to positively correlate with subsequent ad 
libitum milkshake intake (Nolan-Poupart et al., 2013). More specifically, previous studies have shown 
that reduced subcortical reward responses to caloric cues, particularly in striatum are associated 
with obesity (Rothemund et al., 2007; Stoeckel et al., 2008), with weight gain (Demos et al., 2012), 
and with increased snack food intake in healthy-weight to overweight individuals (Lawrence et al., 
2012). Furthermore, both midbrain and striatal BOLD responses to palatable food pictures was 
found to correlate positively with self-reported reward drive (Beaver et al., 2006). In this study we 
observed intervention effects on caloric reward anticipation (i.e. high caloric drink versus water) 
only in the midbrain, and not in the striatum. This is in accordance with a study by O’Doherty and 
colleagues (2002), who found significant responses to cues predicting the receipt of a glucose 
solution versus a neutral taste in midbrain only, whereas both midbrain and striatum were responsive 
to cues predicting the receipt of a sweet versus an aversive salty taste; the latter may be a larger 
contrast in terms of valence. Given the coding of predicted reward in the midbrain, the currently 
observed effect of the mindful eating intervention on anticipatory midbrain responses to caloric cues 
suggests that mindfulness may be a promising method to reduce overeating by reducing the impact 
of food cues on reward processing.  
 Indeed, several studies have found that an intensive mindful eating intervention led to 
reduced measures of overeating such as consumption of sweets (Mason et al., 2015), binges, 
externally and emotionally driven eating (Alberts et al., 2012) and reductions in BMI (Tapper et al., 
2009) in non-clinical populations, as well as number of binges in binge-eating disorder (Kristeller 
et al., 2013). However, in this study we did not find evidence for decreased overeating, as physical 
measures of obesity (i.e. BMI and waist circumference) were not affected in the month following 
the ME intervention. A reason for not finding ME intervention-related reductions in BMI or waist 
circumference is that it may take a few months before mindfulness manifests itself in an individual’s 
behavior following a mindfulness-based intervention (Tapper et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2015). 
Therefore, physical measurements at a follow-up may provide insight into long-term effects of the 
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ME intervention on overeating. In addition, mindfulness is aimed at stimulating acceptance (Bishop 
et al., 2004) and has been found to decrease body image concern in healthy women with disordered 
eating behavior (Alberts et al., 2012). Although we did not measure body image concern, this may 
have reduced the explicit motivation to lose weight in part of our subject sample. In contrast, the EC 
intervention was aimed at following more healthy eating patterns, with reduced intake of sugar, fats 
and salt as part of the homework assignments and, thus, more likely to result in reduced BMI and 
waist circumference.
 Our finding that reduced anticipatory midbrain responses were specific to the caloric domain 
is in line with a previous study showing that only a brief 50-min mindful eating workshop (versus an 
educational video) reduced subsequent impulsive choice patterns for food-, but not money-related 
outcomes (Hendrickson and Rasmussen, 2013). However, meditators have been found to exhibit 
reduced striatal BOLD responses to primary reward prediction errors (Kirk and Montague, 2015) 
as well as monetary reward anticipation (Kirk et al., 2014a) relative to non-meditating controls. In 
the latter study, Kirk and colleagues (2014a; 2015) compared meditators to non-meditators without 
a baseline measurement. The observed decrease in striatal reward processing could thus be 
due to pre-existing between-group differences (Mascaro et al., 2013). Since the present study is 
actively controlled including pre and post measurements, the current effects can be ascribed to 
the mindfulness intervention. Kirk and colleagues (2014b) recently also performed a randomized 
actively controlled study including pre and post measurements and found that vmPFC value signals 
were modulated by the mindfulness intervention for both primary (juice) and secondary (monetary) 
rewards. These general reward effects versus our specific caloric effects might be due to both the 
type of intervention (general MBSR in Kirk et al. (2014b) versus mindful eating presently) as well as 
the study sample. Specifically, in our study, subjects were highly motivated to change undesired 
eating habits and their mindfulness practice was targeted at overcoming those. Our results suggest 
that a targeted mindfulness-based intervention – including homework practices such as resisting 
impulsive eating behaviors – may have highly specific effects on reward processing
 In conclusion, this 8-week intensive mindful eating intervention may be a promising 
target to counteract reward cue-driven overeating by reducing food anticipation, particularly in our 
obesogenic environment with food cues everywhere. Given the success of mindfulness-based 
programs in reducing symptoms of other reward-related disorders such as substance use (Brewer et 
al., 2011; Witkiewitz et al., 2014b) and problem gambling (Toneatto et al., 2014), these interventions 
may also act by reducing anticipatory reward responses to the target of abuse and thereby reducing 
consumption and relapse rate. Future studies unraveling the neurocognitive mechanism underlying 
the beneficial effects of mindfulness-based interventions for reward-related disorders will help in 
understanding for which individuals mindfulness is a particular useful intervention, which should be 
further tested in randomized clinical trials. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
EXCLUSION CRITERIA
Exclusion criteria were: left-handedness, inadequate demand of Dutch, current pregnancy, MRI-
incompatibility, diabetes mellitus, (history of) hepatic, cardiac, respiratory, renal, cerebrovascular, 
endocrine, metabolic or pulmonary diseases, uncontrolled hypertension (diastolic pressure >90 
mmHg, systolic pressure >160 mmHg), (history of) eating, neurological, or psychiatric disorders, 
depression/anxiety state scores >11 on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), current strict dieting, high restrained eating score on the Dutch Eating 
Behavior Questionnaire (DEBQ ≥3.60 for females and ≥4.00 for males; Strien & Frijters, 1986), 
current psychological or dietary treatment, taste or smell impairments, use of neuroleptica or other 
psychotropic medication, food allergies relevant to the study, deafness, blindness, and sensori-
motor handicaps, drug or alcohol addiction, and a change in body weight of more than 5 kg in the 
past two months. Crucially, subjects with previous MBSR (Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction) or 
MBCT (Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy) experience were excluded from the study.
SUBJECT CHARACTERIZATION
To assess education, the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test was administered at the 
(Schmand et al., 1991). On both test days the following self-report questionnaires and scales were 
administered: the Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence (Heatherton et al., 1991) to assess 
smoking and nicotine dependence; the Positive And Negative Affect Scale (Watson et al., 1988) 
to assess positive and negative affect before scanning; the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (Barratt 
and Patton, 1995) to assess impulsivity; the Behavioral Inhibition System / Behavioral Approach 
System questionnaire (Carver and White, 1994) to assess punishment and reward sensitivity; the 
Kirby questionnaire (Kirby, 2009)1996 to assess delayed reward discounting; the Food Frequency 
Questionnaire, Dutch Healthy Diet (van Lee et al., 2013) to assess the degree to which subjects 
eat according to the national guidelines for a Dutch healthy diet; a shortened version of the Food 
Behavior Questionnaire to assess behaviour towards food; the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire 
(van Strien et al., 1986b) to assess emotional, external and restraint eating behavior; the Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire – Short Form (Baer et al., 2006) to assess degree of mindfulness; the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) to assess levels of anxiety and 
depression; a Treatment Credibility Questionnaire (TCQ) to assess how much subjects believed 
the intervention would work for them. Note that the pre-training TCQ was filled out at the first training 
session, not on the pre-training test session, as subjects were unaware of the contents of their 
training at that time. 
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EXCLUDED SUBJECTS
For a CONSORT flow diagram of all excluded subjects, see Figure S5.1. Between groups, the 
number of people excluded from analysis was not significantly different (ME: 28.8%, EC: 44.7%, χ²(1, 
N = 92) = 2.461, p = .117).
Figure S5.1 CONSORT flow diagram 
a Attended <4 sessions of the intervention program. Note that these subjects were invited back to the laboratory 
for the post test session 
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TEST SESSIONS
Following inclusion, subjects came to the lab on two occasions, before and after the intervention, 
referred to as pre and post test session. The pre measurements were performed in the month prior to 
the start of the intervention. The post measurements were performed in the month following the last 
training session. Test sessions always started either at 11:00 AM or 12:30 PM. We aimed to schedule 
subjects’ post test session on the same time as their pre test session to ensure time of day would not 
affect the results. We succeeded in doing so for 52 out of 58 subjects (time difference total sample: 
0.26 ± 1.01 hrs., ME 0.30 ± 1.30 hrs., EC 0.21 ± 0.49 hrs., ns.).
INTERVENTIONS
Minimization 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the interventions through minimization (Scott et al., 2002). 
An algorithm assigned subjects to one of the groups by taking into account the given minimization 
factors, which guaranteed that the groups were balanced in terms of these factors. The minimization 
factors for this study were age (categories: 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55), gender (categories: male, 
female), BMI (categories: 19-24.9 normal weight, 25-29.9 overweight, 30-35 moderately obese) 
and experience with meditation and yoga (categories: never, 0-2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years, >10 
years). Experience with meditation and yoga was assessed by means of an in-house self-report 
questionnaire. 
Mindful eating (ME)
The ME program was based on the original MBSR program developed by Kabat-Zinn et al. (1990) 
at the Stress Reduction and Relaxation Clinic, Massachusetts Medical Center. Subjects performed 
formal mindfulness practices (i.e. body scan, sitting meditation, walking meditation and mindful 
movement), aimed at increasing general mindfulness skills, which were similar to the original 
program. In addition, subjects performed informal mindfulness practices based on the Mindful 
Eating, Conscious Living program (MECL; Bays, 2009), which were mainly directed to mindful eating 
and not part of the original MBSR program. Sessions focused on themes, such as: the automatic 
pilot, perception of hunger and other internal states, creating awareness for boundaries in eating 
behavior, stress-related eating, coping with stress, coping with (negative) thoughts, self-compassion, 
and how to incorporate mindfulness in daily life. Towards the end of the program, subjects had a 
silent day. During this day, the whole group performed formal mindfulness exercises and ate a meal 
together in complete silence. Homework consisted of a formal mindfulness practice, using CDs 
with guided mindfulness exercises, and an informal mindfulness practice directed at one moment 
(e.g. a meal) a day. Time spent on homework was noted on homework forms every day. The ME 
intervention was developed and delivered by qualified psychologists/psychiatrists, who graduated 
from the post-graduate mindfulness teacher training at the Radboud University Medical Centre for 
Mindfulness.
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Educational Cooking (EC)
The EC program was based on the Dutch healthy diet guidelines (voedingscentrum.nl). To establish 
similar group contact and activities (vs. passive listening) as in the ME, subjects were actively enrolled 
in cooking workshops during the group meetings of the EC. Sessions focused on healthy eating, 
healthy cooking of vegetables and fruit, use of different types of fat and salt for cooking, reading of 
nutrition labels on food products, healthy snacking, guidelines for making healthy choices when eating 
in restaurants, and how to incorporate healthy eating and cooking in daily life. Towards the end of 
the program, subjects had a balance day, during which the subjects adhered to all nutritional health 
guidelines for every snack and meal. Homework assignments entailed practicing cooking techniques, 
or grocery shopping with informational awareness (i.e. reading food labels for nutritional content), and 
counting the amount of calorie intake for one meal a day (to be noted in a homework diary). The EC 
intervention was developed and delivered by a qualified dietitian from Wageningen University and the 
cooking sessions were guided by a professional chef. Sessions took place at a large kitchen facility of 
the Nutrition and Dietetics faculty of the Hogeschool of Arnhem-Nijmegen.  
FMRI ANALYSIS
Data acquisition
Whole-brain functional images (multi-echo) were acquired on a Siemens 3T Skyra MRI scanner 
(Siemens Medical system, Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel coil. Before acquisition of 
functional images, a high-resolution anatomical scan was acquired (T1-weighted MP-RAGE, 
voxel size 1 x 1 x 1 mm, TR 2300 ms, TE 3.03 ms, 192 sagittal slices, FoV 256 mm). A multi-echo 
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence was used to acquire 34 axial slices per functional volume 
in ascending direction (voxel size 3.5x3.5x3mm; repetition time (TR) 2070 ms; TE 9ms, 19.25ms, 
29.5ms, and 39.75ms; flip angle 90 ͦ; field of view 224mm). This is a method that uses accelerated 
parallel imaging to reduce image artifacts (in plane acceleration 3) and acquire images at multiple 
TEs following a single excitation (Poser et al., 2006).
Preprocessing
The volumes for each echo time were realigned to correct for motion artifacts (estimation of the 
realignment parameters is done for the first echo and then copied to the other echoes). The four 
echo images were combined into a single MR volume based on 31 volumes acquired before the 
actual experiment started using an optimized echo weighting method (Poser et al., 2006). Combined 
functional images were slice-time corrected by realigning the time-series for each voxel temporally to 
acquisition of the middle slice. Subject-specific structural and functional data were then coregistered to 
a standard structural or functional stereotactic space (Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template). 
After segmentation of the structural images using a unified segmentation approach, structural images 
were spatially coregistered to the mean of the functional images. The resulting transformation matrix of 
the segmentation step was then used to normalize the anatomical and functional images into Montreal 
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Neurological Institute space (resampled at voxel size 2 x 2 x 2). Finally, the normalized functional images 
were spatially smoothed using an isotropic 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Subject level statistical model
The statistical model on the single subject (first) level included 13 regressors-of-interest: 4 regressors 
of interest for cue presentation (high and low caloric cues, high and low monetary cues), 1 regressor 
for target presentation, 4 outcome regressors for hits (high and low caloric hits, high and low monetary 
hits), and 4 outcome regressors for trials on which subjects responded too late (high and low caloric 
too late, high and low monetary too late). If subjects failed to respond on a trial (i.e. a miss), the trial 
was excluded from analyses. Onsets of the regressors were modeled as a stick function (duration=0) 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1998). Twelve rigid-body 
transformation parameters (three translations and rotations, and their linear derivatives) obtained during 
realignment and a constant term were included as regressors of no-interest. High pass filtering (128 
seconds) was applied to the time series of the functional images to remove low-frequency drifts and 
correction for serial correlations was done using an autoregressive AR(1) model.
Anatomical ROIs
We performed region of interest (ROI) analyses  using a priori defined ROIs for midbrain and 
striatum. ROIs were anatomically defined based on the Hammersmith atlas (Hammers et al., 
2003)automated anatomical labeling of individual brain imaging datasets, and the statistical 
assessment of normal ranges for structure volumes and extents. No such manually constructed 
atlas is currently available for the frequently studied group of young adults. We studied 20 
normal subjects (10 women, median age 31 years: bilateral substantia nigra for midbrain (74;75; 
Gousias et al., 2008), and bilateral caudate nucleus (34;35), nucleus accumbens (36;37) and 
putamen (38;39) for striatum (Hammers et al., 2003)automated anatomical labeling of individual 
brain imaging datasets, and the statistical assessment of normal ranges for structure volumes 
and extents. No such manually constructed atlas is currently available for the frequently studied 
group of young adults. We studied 20 normal subjects (10 women, median age 31 years). 
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Table S5.1 Summary of brain regions exhibiting main effects of reward, domain and/or interactions 
with domain, training, and time at the time of reward receipt. 
Label
Side  
(Left/Right)
MNI-coordinates 
x, y, z (mm)
Size  
(number of voxels)
pFWE 
(peak-level)
t-value a  
(peak)
Main effect of receipt: hits (high > low) > too lates (high > low)b
Temporal inferior lobe L -52 -48 -14 36815 < .001 13.32
Striatum L -14 6 -12 < .001 12.08
Caudate R 12 10 -8 < .001 11.27
Frontal medial lobe L -20 24 50 1612 < .001 9.34
Frontal medial lobe L -30 18 54 < .001 8.95
Frontal superior lobe R 22 30 48 318  < .001 6.16
Frontal medial lobe R 30 12 52 < .001 6.08
Frontal superior lobe L 22 6 48     .025 4.98
Frontal inferior lobe R 46 38 16 63     .001 5.70
Thalamus L 0 -14 18 5     .022 5.01
Temporal medial lobe L -62 -12 -22 3     .035 4.89
Main effect of receipt: too lates (high > low reward) > hits (high > low reward) b
Temporal medial lobe R 48 -28 -6 1183 < .001 11.47
Supramarginal R 62 -46 32 < .001 9.15
Temporal medial lobe R 62 -46 12    .004 5.43
Frontal inferior lobe R 46 22 4 837 < .001 7.83
Frontal inferior lobe R 56 24 16    .002 5.53
Insula L -32 20 -10 339  < .001 6.85
Insula L -36 20 8 < .001 6.83
Insula L -30 28 0     .001 5.75
Superior motor area R 8 16 60 235  < .001 6.61
Supramarginal L -62 -44 28 144 < .001 6.61
Temporal medial lobe L -50 -28 -4 61 < .001 6.16
Frontal medial lobe R 26 50 24 108 < .001 5.89
Anterior cingulate R 8 26 32 41     .007 5.30
Anterior cingulate R 10 16 38     .026 4.97
Midbrain L -6 -26 -2 6     .010 5.19
Midbrain R 6 -26 -2 7     .011 5.18
Temporal medial lobe L -54 6 -16 6     .019 5.04
Interaction effect of domain x receipt x reward: monetary > (hits (high > low reward) > toolates  
(high > low reward)) > caloric (hits (high > low reward) > toolates (high > low reward)) b
Lingual R 18 -84 -4 116 < .001 7.02
Lingual L -14 -88 -4 1    .023 5.01
a Degrees of freedom: 1,224; b p < .05, whole brain FWE corrected.
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Figure S5.2 Midbrain caloric ROI betas are presented to indicate between-group pre-differences in midbrain 
reward (high – low) anticipatory activity. Asterisk indicates p = .021.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies presented in this thesis were aimed at elucidating the neurocognitive mechanisms 
underlying bad habits, such as gambling and compulsive eating, and at understanding how an 
intensive mindfulness-based intervention might help break bad habits. By employing a variety of 
cognitive paradigms combined with neuroimaging (chapter 3 and 5) as well as a pharmacological 
(chapter 2) and behavioral intervention (chapter 4 and 5) I investigated in particular reward and 
control processes. 
 In this concluding chapter I will discuss the main findings presented in chapters 2 to 5 in 
the light of the current literature. First, I will focus on what we learned about the possible cognitive and 
neural mechanisms that underlie compulsive behavior in chapters 2 and 3. Second, I will discuss 
how the findings in chapters 4 and 5 add to existing theory on the mechanisms underlying mindful 
eating. Finally, some clinical implications of these findings will be discussed with regard to the current 
debate about food addiction and the use of mindful eating as an approach to treating disordered 
eating behavior. Throughout the discussion below, I will emphasize future directions following from 
my work, as well as its limitations.
NEUROCOGNITIVE MECHANISMS OF COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR
DOPAMINE-MEDIATED ANOMALY IN REWARD PROCESSING
In chapter 2 I showed that blockade of dopamine D2-receptors in a clinical population of disordered 
gamblers did not impair reward- versus punishment-based reversal learning, whereas it did in a 
group of healthy control subjects. In fact, in a subset of gamblers who were free from comorbidities, 
blocking dopamine D2-receptors impaired punishment- rather than reward-based reversal learning. 
These findings strongly suggest that disordered gambling is associated with a dopamine-related 
anomaly in learning from reward and punishment. However, we did not find the hypothesized group 
difference in reward- versus punishment-based reversal learning under placebo. I have speculated 
in chapter 2 that the absence of a baseline difference might reflect the existence of compensatory 
baseline differences in the dopamine system related to, e.g., upregulation of dopamine synthesis 
capacity, dopamine release, or postsynaptic dopamine receptor sensitivity.
 In a follow-up positron emission tomography (PET) study including a largely overlapping 
sample we addressed this hypothesis (van Holst et al., under review). Using 6-[18F]fluoro-L-DOPA 
(FDOPA) PET we measured baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. Indeed, we found increased 
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity in gamblers relative to controls. More specifically, we showed 
significantly greater FDOPA binding potential in bilateral putamen and right caudate nucleus, which 
concurs with previous findings in smokers, alcoholics and ex-ecstasy users (Hou et al., 2014). These 
regions are associated with habit formation and compulsive behavior (Balleine et al., 2007; Balleine 
and O’Doherty, 2010). Crucially, we also found a positive correlation between FDOPA binding 
potential in the right caudate nucleus and the effect of sulpiride on reward- versus punishment-
based reversal learning across groups. Individuals with high dopamine synthesis capacity exhibited 
drug-induced enhancement of reward-based learning, whereas individuals with low dopamine 
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synthesis capacity exhibited the opposite. Together these findings provide direct evidence for a 
hyperdopaminergic state in gambling addiction, complementing a previous [11C]-(+)-PHNO PET-
study that reported enhanced dopamine release in dorsal striatum in response to oral amphetamine 
in disordered gamblers relative to controls (Boileau et al., 2014). 
 In contrast, PET-studies in substance-dependent human subjects have found blunted 
dopamine release in response to an amphetamine or methylphenidate challenge for a variety of 
substance use disorders, including cocaine and alcohol dependence (Volkow et al., 2009). The 
discrepancy with disordered gambling may be due to differences in the target of abuse. Whereas 
excessive drug use can lead to damage to dopamine neurons (Frey et al., 1997; Melega et al., 
2008), gambling has no drug-related neurotoxic effects. A hyperdopaminergic state might thus 
reflect a predisposition to (gambling) addiction. Alternatively, sensitization of dopamine neurons 
might occur due to repeated exposure to gambling, which in turn enhances incentive salience and 
drives excessive reward-seeking behaviors (Robinson & Berridge, 2008). Longitudinal studies are 
required to determine whether enhanced dopamine synthesis capacity is a cause or consequence 
of compulsive gambling, and whether sensitization of dopamine neurons occurs in disordered 
gambling. 
 Given the similarities between addiction and obesity introduced in chapter 1, a pertinent 
question is whether obesity, or more specifically the obesity score as calculated in chapter 3, 
correlates positively with dopamine synthesis capacity as measured with FDOPA-PET. Indirect 
evidence exists for increased dopamine synthesis in obesity. That is, homovanillic acid, a metabolite 
of central dopamine synthesis measured in cerebrospinal fluid, blood or urine, was increased in 
obese adults and children (work reviewed by Horstmann et al., 2015). However, a previous PET-study 
in a similar but much smaller sample (n=15) reported a marginally significant negative correlation 
between BMI and presynaptic dopamine synthesis capacity in dorsal caudate nucleus as measured 
using 6-[18F]-fluoro-L-m-tyrosine (FMT) PET (Wilcox et al., 2010). This was recently replicated by 
Wallace and colleagues (2014) in an independent sample.  
 Similarly contradicting results have been reported for a relationship between obesity and a 
D2/D3 receptor deficit, as well as for obesity-related hypo- versus hyper-reactivity of the striatum to 
appetitive food stimuli, which are claimed to reflect hypo- or hyper-dopaminergic states, respectively 
(Horstmann et al., 2015b; Val-Laillet et al., 2015). Based on these contradicting findings, Horstmann 
and colleagues (2015b) have recently argued for a quadratic rather than a linear relationship between 
the degree of obesity and alterations in the dopaminergic system. This could potentially explain a 
negative relationship between BMI and dopamine synthesis capacity for normal weight to mildly 
obese individuals in the above-mentioned FMT PET-studies (Wilcox et al, 2010; Wallace et al, 2014), 
whereas it predicts a positive relationship for severely obese individuals. The latter group is more 
likely to exhibit severe compulsive overeating and would thus relate more closely to individuals 
diagnosed with disordered gambling. It would be informative if further studies would sample a wider 
BMI range including more severely clinically obese individuals to address Horstmann’s hypothesis. 
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Rather than a link with obesity (score), one could speculate that a neurocognitive measure such as 
obesity-related loss of control as reported in chapter 3 is more closely related to putative dopamine-
abnormalities. Given the enhanced dopamine synthesis capacity in dorsal striatum that we observed 
in gamblers, we might expect an inverse relationship between dopamine synthesis capacity and 
devaluation magnitude in the food-choice satiety task, in particular. Dorsolateral striatum has been 
consistently associated with habitual as opposed to goal-directed behavior in instrumental tasks that 
implement an outcome devaluation procedure (Tricomi et al., 2009; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). 
Note that we did not assess dopamine abnormalities in the sample presented in chapter 3, nor did 
we pharmacologically manipulate dopamine as we did in chapter 2. Future FMT or FDOPA PET-
studies or dopamine manipulations studies that include an outcome devaluation paradigm as well 
as anthropometric measures of obesity could resolve this outstanding question. 
 It should be noted that although dopamine might play a central role in addiction, dopamine 
abnormalities will unlikely be the sole explanation for any form of addiction or compulsive behavior. 
The opioid system, for one, is also strongly involved in reward-related processing (Wise, 2013). 
Specifically, opioids are essential for experiencing the pleasurable effects of rewards. This is not only 
limited to drugs of abuse that directly act on the opioid system. In fact, blocking opioid receptors by 
medication such as naltrexone or nalmefene is one the most effective pharmacological treatments to 
date for alcohol dependence and gambling addiction, and is also suggested to reduce overeating 
(Smith and Robbins, 2013; Nutt et al., 2015).
LOSS OF CONTROL   
In addition to alterations in reward processing, loss of prefrontal cortex-based cognitive control is 
another key characteristic of addiction (Goldstein and Volkow, 2011; Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2013). 
In chapter 3 I aimed to unravel the relationship between degree of obesity and loss of control over 
automatic tendencies that are triggered by food-related stimuli. I focused on two forms of control: 
(1) lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC)-mediated attentional control in the face of distracting food cues 
(food Stroop task), and (2) goal-directed control of food choices following devaluation of one of the 
foods (food-choice satiety task). I also investigated whether those individuals who are more easily 
distracted by food cues are more likely to make habitual food choices as would be predicted from an 
attentional bias hypothesis of obesity. In a large sample (n=76) of healthy individuals in a wide BMI 
range (19-35 kg/m2) I showed that obesity was associated with loss of both forms of control. More 
specifically, with greater obesity scores I found diminished lPFC-mediated attentional control during 
color-naming of food words relative to neutral words. In addition, the degree of goal-directed, as 
opposed to automatic food choices in the food-choice satiety task was reduced with greater obesity 
scores. Notably, the two forms of control did not correlate, suggesting that both, or a loss thereof, 
contribute to obesity separately. 
 Thus, in the current sample diminished attentional control when overcoming food attentional 
bias did not necessarily imply food choices that are insensitive to devaluation. This chimes with 
Hendrikse et al. (2015) who have argued that food attentional bias may make individuals prone to, 
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but will not necessarily lead to overeating (but see Yokum et al., 2011). Sufficient inhibitory control can 
protect against habitual choices when attention is biased towards food. Indeed, a study by Lopez 
et al. (2014) showed that individuals with greater activation in inferior frontal gyrus during an inhibitory 
control task exhibited more successful resistance to food temptations in daily life. In chapter 3, I did 
not specifically measure inhibitory control. Based on these previous findings I hypothesize that a 
cognitive task tapping into inhibitory control more directly than the food Stroop task (which taps into 
multiple constructs, see Field & Cox, 2008), for example, the go/nogo task employed by Lopez et 
al. (2014), might be more predictive of devaluation magnitude on the food-choice satiety task (as a 
proxy for real-life food choices). 
 In contrast to the non-clinical sample that was studied in chapter 3, attentional bias in 
addiction or severe obesity might be more closely related to compulsive reward-seeking behavior. 
Impaired prefrontal cortex-mediated inhibitory control in addiction is thought to play an important role in 
compulsive substance use (Goldstein and Volkow, 2011). As a consequence of low levels of inhibitory 
control, attentional bias for drug-related cues is more likely to lead to compulsive reward-seeking. This 
is in line with the attentional bias model of addiction, in which Franken (2003) proposes that attentional 
bias for drug-related cues modulates craving (and vice versa) and thereby contributes to compulsive 
substance use. Given the current evidence for food attentional bias in obesity (Hendrikse et al., 2015) 
and certain eating disorders (Werthmann et al., 2015) this model might also be a relevant framework 
for understanding overeating behavior in more clinical populations (but see Nijs & Franken, 2012). The 
same may hold for gambling addiction (chapter 2), which has been associated with attentional bias for 
gambling-related stimuli (Hønsi et al., 2013). Future work should address whether the attentional bias 
hypothesis can be extended to compulsive eating and gambling behavior.   
NEUROCOGNITIVE MECHANISMS OF MINDFUL EATING
Although it is notoriously hard to break bad habits, let alone reverse compulsive behavior, it is not 
impossible. A behavioral approach that claims to increase cognitive control and reduce automatic, 
reactive behavior is mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Shapiro et al., 2006; Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang et 
al., 2015a). Up until now, very few studies have focused on the neurocognitive mechanism by which 
mindfulness-based interventions target reward-driven behavior (Papies et al., 2012; Hendrickson 
and Rasmussen, 2013; Kirk et al., 2014a, 2014b; Kirk and Montague, 2015; Van De Veer et al., 2015; 
Tang et al., 2016). 
 In chapters 4 and 5 I aimed to contribute to the understanding of these mechanisms by 
investigating the effects of an 8-week mindful eating intervention – targeted at changing undesired 
eating habits – on neural and cognitive measures of reward processing relative to those of an active 
control intervention (i.e., educational cooking). Before and after the interventions, subjects performed 
a deterministic reversal learning task to assess changes in the ability to adjust behavior following 
both unexpected positive and negative outcomes (chapter 4), and an incentive delay task to assess 
neural reward responses when anticipating caloric and monetary rewards (chapter 5). In chapter 
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4, I found that relative to the active control intervention, greater amount of mindfulness practice was 
associated with improvements in behavioral flexibility, i.e., valence-independent reversal learning. 
Additionally, in chapter 5, in a largely overlapping sample I observed decreased midbrain responses 
to caloric, but not monetary cues following the mindful eating relative to the active control intervention. 
These findings highlight two possible mechanisms at which our mindful eating intervention may act, 
namely behavioral flexibility and food cue-triggered incentive motivation.
BEHAVIORAL FLEXIBILITY
The beneficial effect of mindful eating on behavioral flexibility with greater amount of practice may reflect 
improved cognitive control. The ability to adjust behavior when contingencies change is a key feature 
of cognitive control and implicates medial frontal as well as lateral prefrontal cortex (Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004). Mindfulness-mediated improvements in attentional control have consistently been reported 
(Malinowski, 2013). These attentional skills are thought to underlie behavioral flexibility through the 
cultivation of non-judging awareness (Malinowski, 2013; Malinowski et al 2009). In addition, the ability 
to adjust behavior has been shown to depend on dopamine-mediated modulation of reinforcement 
learning as well (den Ouden et al., 2013). Hence the currently observed improvements in behavioral 
flexibility could also be a consequence of improvements in reinforcement learning, which might have 
occurred either through top-down PFC-mediated downregulation of affective processing or through 
improvements in bottom-up emotion regulation strategies (Chiesa et al., 2013). However, we are 
limited in our interpretation about which of these underlying mechanisms drives the observed effects 
due to the lack of neural measurements in chapter 4 as well as to the particular reversal learning task 
I employed. I will discuss both issues below. 
 Further analyses into the effects of the mindful eating intervention on lateral prefrontal 
cortex-mediated control during the food Stroop task, may clarify whether attentional control has 
indeed improved in our sample. Should that be the case, one might expect the mindful eating 
intervention to remediate the obesity-related loss of lateral prefrontal cortex-mediated attentional 
control in the face of food cues (chapter 3). Also, if the putative improvements in attentional control 
underlie the observed improvement in behavioral flexibility one might expect the two to be correlated 
positively. Note, however, lPFC-mediated attentional control is a different form of flexibility than is 
involved in reversal learning, which rather implicates ventral prefrontal cortex (Clark et al., 2004). 
Future neuroimaging studies are thus needed to confirm whether mindfulness-mediated increases 
in behavioral flexibility as measured with the reversal learning task in chapter 4 indeed reflects 
increased ventral prefrontal cortex-based cognitive control. 
 Moreover, implementing a probabilistic (and instrumental) reversal learning task (den 
Ouden et al., 2013) could also yield a better insight into the computational mechanisms underlying 
mindfulness-mediated improvements in behavioral flexibility. Using sophisticated computational 
modeling Den Ouden et al. (2013) could dissociate immediate from more long term behavioral 
adjustments. This is relevant because the former type of adjustment is thought to reflect immediate 
reinforcement learning relating to a prefrontal-based working memory-based mechanism, whereas 
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the latter is thought to reflect the degree of perseveration (i.e., difficulty reversing learned knowledge 
over trials) relating to compulsive, habitual behavior (den Ouden et al., 2013).   
 We did not observe valence-dependent effects of mindful eating practice on reversal 
learning in chapter 3, which is in contrast to the pharmacological intervention presented in chapter 
2. Rather than targeting a specific dopamine pathway (i.e., the D2-pathway) mindfulness is likely 
to have more general effects on reversal learning through any of the mechanisms mentioned 
above. However, it is also conceivable that our mindful eating intervention had no effect on valence-
dependent reversal learning because the type of compulsive eating behavior under study in our 
non-clinical sample was not characterized by a dopamine-mediated anomaly in valence-dependent 
reversal learning. Future pharmacological studies using D2-receptor antagonists such as sulpiride 
could resolve this issue. 
INCENTIVE MOTIVATION
In addition, the mindful eating intervention led to reduced incentive motivation for caloric (not 
monetary) reward cues (chapter 5). Again the question arises whether this is a top-down or bottom-
up effect. Although speculative, I will discuss both interpretations below.  
 First, increased top-down cognitive control might explain the reduction in midbrain 
responses when anticipating caloric rewards. Our midbrain finding may thus complement current 
theories on mindfulness-based interventions that emphasize improvements in emotion regulation 
through increased prefrontal cortex-mediated top-down control of regions processing affect, such as 
amygdala (Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2015a), vmPFC (Kirk et al., 2014b), or in our case midbrain 
(chapter 4). However, if improvements in reactivity to caloric reward cues were indeed mediated 
by top-down prefrontal control of subcortical reward regions during the incentive delay task I would 
expect to find mindfulness-mediated changes in functional connectivity between midbrain and 
prefrontal areas during caloric reward anticipation, which I did not observe in a post hoc generalized 
psychophysiological interaction (gPPI) analysis (Janssen, unpublished results). An alternative way for 
top-down control to reduce incentive motivation is through extinction during mindfulness practice, 
akin to exposure therapy (Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2015a). Practicing mindful eating requires 
one to actively withhold or interrupt cue-triggered eating, a process that may lead to extinction of 
conditioned responses to highly caloric stimuli (McClure et al., 2003; Hölzel et al., 2011; Schyns 
et al., 2016) as well as to the formation of new memories related to those stimuli (i.e., not reacting 
to them). As a result choices for high caloric foods may be further reduced (Veling et al., 2013a, 
2013b). If this were the case I would expect mindfulness-mediated improvements in the degree of 
goal-directed food choice in the food-choice satiety task (employed in chapter 3) to scale with the 
decrease in midbrain responses to caloric cues reported in chapter 5. Future research should test 
this hypothesis 
 Second, incentive motivation could also be reduced through bottom-up effects on, 
for example, physiological state rather than through extinction. For example, the mindful eating 
intervention may have led to increased awareness of states like hunger or satiety (Van De Veer et al., 
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2015), which are known to modulate conditioned responses to reward-related cues (Dagher, 2012). 
Moreover, stress is a potent modulator of midbrain reward responses (Holly and Miczek, 2016) and 
mindfulness-based interventions have been shown particularly effective in reducing stress levels 
(Chiesa and Serretti, 2009). In fact, the mindful eating intervention implemented in this study was 
adapted from the highly protocolized mindfulness-based stress reduction program (Kabat-Zinn, 
1990). Interestingly, our mindful eating study also included a stress-induction paradigm to compare 
stress-induced food intake following the mindful eating and active control intervention (not part of 
this thesis). Preliminary results indeed suggest a mindfulness-mediated decrease in acute stress 
response (in terms of salivary cortisol) paralleled by a decrease in ad libitum food intake. Note 
that further analyses are required to exclude potentially confounding factors such as differences in 
hormonal state.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
The work presented in this thesis is mostly fundamental in nature, focusing on some of the 
neurocognitive mechanisms underlying compulsive behavior and mindfulness. However, my 
findings also have clinical implications, two of which I will discuss below. First, I will address how our 
studies may contribute to the debate on the existence of food addiction. Second, I will evaluate the 
potential use of our mindful eating intervention for breaking undesired eating habits.
THE FOOD ADDICTION DEBATE
Throughout this thesis I particularly focused on some of the striking similarities between addiction and 
obesity. Although food addiction is a rather common term in everyday life, its use is hotly debated 
in the scientific community (Gearhardt et al., 2011; Ziauddeen et al., 2012; Volkow et al., 2013; 
Ziauddeen and Fletcher, 2013; Hebebrand et al., 2014). Some argue that obesity may be the result 
of food addiction, whereas others have noted more striking similarities between addiction and binge-
eating disorder, including loss of control, tolerance, withdrawal and cravings (Robbins et al., 2012). 
Others argue that support for the existence of a true food addiction in humans is currently lacking, 
in part due to highly inconsistent neurocognitive findings (Ziauddeen et al., 2012). The debate is 
pertinent because ultimately labeling overeating an addiction may have far-reaching implications for 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment, as well as for policy regarding possibly addictive foods.
FOOD VERSUS EATING ADDICTION
Several arguments have been raised to caution against the use of the term food addiction. First, when 
considering clinical similarities between DSM criteria for substance addiction and the proposed food 
addiction equivalent, key symptoms of tolerance (increasing amounts required to reach intoxication) 
and withdrawal (e.g. dysphoria and physical symptoms like shakes and sweats when abstaining) do 
not to translate well to the food domain in humans (Ziauddeen et al., 2012). Note that withdrawal is 
difficult to investigate when it comes to food, as abstaining from food is not an option, nor is it easy 
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to completely abstain from putative addictive foods such as sugar, fat, or refined foods. Moreover, it 
is questioned whether the incentive sensitization theory of addiction holds for excessive food intake 
(Berridge, 2009). Incentive sensitization is a hyperreactivity to the incentive motivational effects of 
substances of abuse due to sensitization of the dopamine system, resulting in compulsive ‘wanting’ 
or craving of the target of abuse (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Whereas hyperreactivity to food 
cues is frequently observed in overweight, obesity and binge eating disorder, this does not imply 
sensitization of the dopamine system per se; increased incentive salience and thus hyperreactivity 
can also result from Pavlovian conditioning (Berridge, 2009). Although a high sugar diet has been 
shown to be able to induce ddiction-like symptoms such as binge-eating and withdrawal syndrome 
in rodents, there is little evidence for such parallels in humans (Hebebrand et al., 2014). 
 Because of this it has been argued that, if anything, compulsive eating may rather be 
considered a behavioral (i.e., eating) rather than a substance (i.e., food) addiction (Hebebrand et 
al., 2014). The discussion on the existence and usefulness of the concept of eating addiction might 
therefore benefit from a comparison with gambling addiction, which is the first behavioral addiction 
that is recognized as such in the DSM-5 (Mitzner et al., 2011; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
We have begun to draw this comparison in chapters 2 and 3 using a cognitive approach borrowing 
from the addiction literature. An important controversy in the obesity and overeating literature is 
whether overeating results from hyper- or hypo-reactivity to food rewards. Based on knowledge 
gained from over a decade of research on the neurocognitive mechanism underlying disordered 
gambling, in which similar inconsistencies have been explained in terms of subtle differences in task 
design (van Holst et al., 2009, 2012; Limbrick-Oldfield et al., 2013), we can begin to refine cognitive 
paradigms in obesity research accordingly. Furthermore, future studies directly comparing (well-
matched) groups of individuals suffering from compulsive gambling and overeating would greatly 
accelerate the field. One could, for example, focus on subcortical anticipatory responses to rewards 
using the incentive delay task presented in chapter 5. In addition, it would be informative to show a 
dopamine-mediated anomaly in reversal learning in clinically obese individuals with and/or without 
binge eating disorder relative to a group of disordered gamblers as we have shown in chapter 2. 
A TRANSDIAGNOSTIC APPROACH TO COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR
A problem when comparing different types of compulsive behaviors, such as gambling and 
overeating (as well as substance use) is that we do not have a good outcome measure to assess 
the degree of compulsivity across domains. In addiction studies, groups of addicted subjects are 
usually compared with healthy matched control subjects, and sometimes self-report measures are 
included to assess severity of the addiction. For overeating the picture is more complex, because 
there is no consensus as to how best define compulsive eating. Some have focused on binge-eating 
disorder because it shows more clinical similarities with addiction in terms of DSM criteria than obesity 
(Robbins et al., 2012). Most have focused on degree of obesity, which is commonly assessed in 
terms of well-defined BMI categories (Box 1.2) or BMI as a continuous measure. Although BMI has 
shown to be a rather good predictor of obesity-related health risks (Nuttall, 2015), it might not be an 
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accurate predictor of the compulsive, habit-like eating behavior that we are interested in (Ziauddeen 
et al., 2012). In chapter 3, we calculated an obesity score that also takes into account anthropometric 
measures of abdominal obesity (i.e., waist and waist-hip-ratio) to have a more informative measure 
of adiposity. Note, however, that the obesity score also does not capture compulsive eating behavior 
per se. It would have been more informative to look at weight change over time or to administer a 
self-report measure of compulsive eating behavior such as the Yale food addiction scale (Gearhardt 
et al., 2009; Meule and Gearhardt, 2014) and relate it to individuals’ obesity scores. Finally, it is not 
obvious how a diagnosis of addiction can be compared to either binge-eating disorder, degree 
of obesity, or BMI class. As a consequence it is presently difficult to draw meaningful inferences 
when comparing findings from studies on addiction and overeating. Taken together this begs for a 
transdiagnostic approach that investigates compulsive behavior across disorders, an idea that has 
been strongly advocated by Robbins et al. (2012), and has been pursued successfully for several 
disorders of compulsivity (Balodis et al., 2013; Voon et al., 2015; Voon et al., 2015). By implementing 
cognitive paradigms borrowed from addiction research I contributed to this by starting to bridge the 
wide gap between compulsive gambling and eating behavior. 
 If we want to understand (at least some form of) overeating in terms of the addiction 
model, as Ziauddeen et al. (2012) has argued, we will need to define more precise measures 
of compulsive eating behavior, going beyond BMI or weight change. Such measures could be 
cognitive paradigms like those presented in this thesis, combined with neuroimaging. For example, 
our findings presented in chapter 3 demonstrate that two different types of control are independently 
related to degree of obesity. We hypothesize that degree of goal-directed choices in the food-
choice satiety task might be a good proxy of overeating. Two major issues of this task should be 
emphasized though. First, subjects are presented with a series of the same two-alternative forced 
food choice. An open question is how closely this type of choice reflects real-life food choices, given 
the abundance of alternatives available at (pretty much) all times in daily life. Second, in the light of 
a transdiagnostic approach, this task is not easily translated to a non-food version because of the 
satiation phase. Although cognitive devaluation procedures that can be more readily translated to 
other reward domains have been implemented in, for example, the ‘slips of action task’ (de Wit et al., 
2012a), and an adapted Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer task (Morris et al., 2015). The food Stroop 
task on the other hand has already been translated to fit different kinds of compulsive behavior, but is 
unfortunately further removed from actual eating behavior and lacks specificity (Field and Cox, 2008). 
Another cognitive paradigm that may prove useful as a proxy for overeating or compulsive behavior 
across domains is a multistep decision task (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Voon et al., 2015). In this task, 
degree of goal-directed and habitual control are thought to be reflected in parameters of ‘model-
based’ and ‘model-free’ choices, respectively, that can be calculated from subjects’ choices. 
MINDFUL VERSUS HEALTHY EATING
In chapter 1 I hypothesized that mindfulness may restore the balance between habitual and goal-
directed control of eating behavior by increasing behavioral flexibility and/or by reducing incentive 
115
CH
AP
TE
R 
6
motivation for rewards. In chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis I reported that behavioral flexibility was 
increased (for those investing more time) and midbrain responses signaling incentive motivation for 
food rewards were decreased following an 8-week mindful eating intervention. 
 However, I did not find evidence for reduced overeating in terms of weight loss in the 
month after completing the intervention program. In fact, I observed beneficial effects of the 
educational cooking (i.e., active control) intervention on weight change and self-reported eating 
behavior without observing any neurocognitive changes for either task. The absence of such 
task effects is in line with the hypothesis that anthropometric effects of the educational cooking 
intervention are not mediated by neurocognitive changes. The lack of evidence for a change in 
eating behavior following mindfulness limits our interpretation though, and raises the question whether 
the observed mindfulness-mediated changes in behavioral flexibility and midbrain responses have 
any predictive value of changes in (compulsive) eating behavior. Also, what does it mean that we find 
reduced brain responses if we cannot link them to task performance or weight change? Does the 
observed reduction have an effect on behavior at all? Perhaps reduced incentive salience for caloric 
cues only affects eating behavior on the long-term. Longitudinal studies assessing weight change 
or better, cognitive measures of overeating (see previous section A Transdiagnostic Approach To 
Compulsive Behavior) in individuals over the course of months or even several years following a 
mindful eating intervention are required to address this question. 
 What might explain the low predictive value of changes in eating behavior observed in this 
study is the heterogeneity of our sample. It is conceivable that the mechanism(s) by which our mindful 
eating intervention acted differed between individuals, clouding our results. One person may benefit 
more from increased behavioral flexibility, whereas another benefits from decreased incentive salience 
of food rewards; and yet another benefits from both. Such individual differences might be related 
to pre-existing neurocognitive differences, but may also reflect differences in individuals’ motivation 
to take part in an intervention (Shapiro et al., 2006), the time invested in the intervention (Chiesa et 
al., 2013) or their preference for certain exercises (Van De Veer et al., 2015). Indeed, as argued in 
chapters 4 and 5, the sample was heterogeneous in terms of motivation to change undesired eating 
habits. Whereas some wanted to lose weight, others wanted a more healthy or regular eating pattern. 
Unfortunately, we did not systematically record or quantify individuals’ motivations, preferences or time 
spent on different types of mindfulness exercises. Sampling from a more homogeneous population in 
terms of motivation and recording these data is advised for future studies. 
 Despite the limitations, the interventions presented in chapters 4 and 5 may be promising 
for targeting bad eating habits. Based on the beneficial neurocognitive effects of the mindful eating 
intervention on the one hand and the beneficial effects in terms of weight change in the educational 
cooking intervention on the other, the programs could be integrated into a comprehensive program. 
Interestingly, previous studies investigating factors contributing to successful weight maintenance 
have shown that behavioral flexibility plays a role, i.e. those individuals who had more flexible styles of 
behavioral adjustment in terms of, for example, responding to cravings were more likely to maintain 
a healthy weight or to not become overweight (Elfhag and Rössner, 2005; Lillis et al., 2009).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Let me get back to my initial questions. How is it that a useful mechanism such as our habit system 
can come to work against us? Why does it happen for only some and not others when faced with 
tempting rewards? And how can we get a handle on our bad habits? In my thesis I aimed to increase 
our understanding of this by investigating the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying bad habits, 
in particular gambling and compulsive eating. I also looked at how an intensive mindfulness-based 
intervention might help break bad eating habits. Now, what have we learned?
 First, we found out that, like addiction, disordered gambling is accompanied by a 
dopamine-mediated anomaly in reversal learning. We did not observe any differences in reversal 
learning between gamblers and control subjects at baseline. This highlights the relevance of a 
transdiagnostic approach, comparing performance on cognitive paradigms across compulsive 
disorders to reveal similarities and dissimilarities. 
 Second, we observed that greater degree of obesity in a large sample of healthy individuals 
was related to diminished food-directed attentional as well as goal-directed control, and that loss of these 
two forms of control was not necessarily related. Comparing two cognitive paradigms within the same 
sample increased our understanding of factors that may contribute to compulsive eating behavior. 
 Lastly, we found that practicing mindful eating affected two neurocognitive processes that 
have been related to compulsive reward-driven behavior. With increased mindfulness practice we 
observed greater behavioral flexibility in reversal learning. We also found reduced incentive salience 
of caloric, but not monetary, reward cues following the mindful eating intervention. These effects were 
independent, as they did not correlate across subjects. Together these findings suggest that individual 
differences can affect mindfulness-mediated effects on factors contributing to compulsive behavior. 
 All in all, the empirical and discussion chapters presented in this thesis demonstrate the 
importance of using a variety of sophisticated cognitive paradigms in the study of how the human 
brain gives rise to behavior (Frank and Badre, 2015). These types of paradigms are crucial to tap into 
the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie compulsive behavior and help us better understand 
how beneficial effects of mindfulness can come about. 
 On a final note, rather than definitive answers the studies presented in this thesis yield 
many exciting new questions, which is after all the good habit of science. 
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SUMMARY
Like any other creatures, human beings are ‘mere bundles of habits’, according to psychologist and 
philosopher William James (1890). Habits result from learning. If something worked well for us in the 
past and it did so repeatedly, such as the delicious taste of chocolate that made us forget all about our 
sorrows, then slowly a habit slips in. The brain creates a shortcut so that whenever we encounter this 
goodness again, we don’t need to think about it but just go for it. Habits can be very efficient when it 
comes to riding a bicycle or brushing our teeth (imagine having to think about every single action every 
time!), but they can also become detrimental. For example, when we always calm our nerves by eating 
chocolate even though we are full – or instead, by smoking, gambling, gaming, or turning to drugs of 
abuse. Once bad habits are acquired they are notoriously hard to break. When habits go from bad 
to worse behavior becomes compulsive, as we see for example in addiction or clinical overeating. 
Compulsive behavior results from a failure to exert control over automatically triggered behavior. 
 How can a useful mechanism such as our habit system come to work against us? Why 
does this happen only for some and not others when faced with tempting rewards? And how can 
we cope with our bad habits? These are the questions that interest me as a cognitive neuroscientist, 
and that were the driving force behind this thesis. 
A NEUROCOGNITIVE APPROACH
With this thesis I aimed to shed light on the neural and cognitive mechanisms that underlie compulsive 
gambling and eating in particular. I also aimed to further our understanding of how mindfulness can 
help break bad eating habits. 
 In order to investigate this, I made use of a variety of experimental computer tasks that 
subjects performed in the lab. These cognitive paradigms have been developed to zoom in on one 
particular aspect of cognition. In my research I zoomed in on processes that are involved in reward 
and control, for example, learning of unexpected positive and negative feedback (chapter 2 and 4); 
control of attention, or instead, of goal-directed choices (chapter 3); and the influence of reward on 
the motivation to act (chapter 5). 
 By asking subjects to perform some of these cognitive paradigms in an MRI-scanner, 
I could also measure the brain in action. This enabled me to link brain activity to the aspect of 
cognition that I zoomed in at during scanning. 
DOPAMINE AND LEARNING IN GAMBLERS 
First, I investigated the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine in learning from positive and negative 
feedback in gambling addiction. People who are addicted may do pretty much anything to gain 
access to the target of their abuse. It is very well possible that people suffering from gambling 
addiction are hypersensitive to the possible rewards associated with gambling (money); on the other 
hand, they may be hyposensitive to the likely negative consequences on the short- or long-term. 
Because a large part of our learning depends on positive and negative feedback, gambling could 
be accompanied by problems in learning.
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So what does dopamine have to do with this? Dopamine is generally known as the pleasure or 
happiness hormone, but that view is outdated. Nevertheless, dopamine is the most important 
neurotransmitter in the brain’s reward system; for example, it plays a key role in learning from positive 
and negative feedback. Previous scientific research has shown a link between dopaminergic 
impairments on the one hand and impaired learning on the other hand for substance addiction. For 
gambling addiction, which has only been formally acknowledged and treated as an addiction by 
psychiatrists since 2013, this link was not yet established. 
 To investigate the role of dopamine, subjects suffering from gambling addiction and 
control subjects without gambling problems have taken part in the same learning experiment on two 
occasions; once they ingested a medicine that temporarily and unnoticeably reduced dopamine’s 
action in the reward system; once they ingested a placebo (medicine without active component). 
What I found was that gambling addiction, like other addictions, was indeed associated with an 
anomaly in dopamine-mediated learning from unexpected feedback. Whereas learning from positive 
feedback was impaired when control subjects had taken the medication, the medication did not alter 
learning in gamblers. So the same dopaminergic medication had a differential effect on learning in 
these two groups, which is a sign of an underlying difference in the dopamine system. 
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND BAD EATING HABITS
To learn more about a different type of compulsive behavior I turned to bad eating habits, which are 
particularly common in the non-clinical population. We are all conditioned for high caloric foods in 
our obesogenic environment, and most of us do lose control every now and then when it comes to 
tasty food. But control (or: cognitive control) is an umbrella term covering different forms of control 
that can use different routes in the brain.
 In chapter 3, I focused on food-directed attentional as well as goal-directed control and 
related both of them to differing degree of obesity in a large group of subjects who were all motivated 
to change some of their bad eating habits. 
 To measure attentional control I distracted subjects from a simple task I had given them 
in the MRI-scanner. In short: subjects were asked to name the color of the words presented on the 
screen as fast as possible. However, knowing that the brain automatically processes the meaning of 
words, I didn’t only show neutral words but also distracting food words (such as chocolate, French 
fries, cake). And indeed, subjects were a little bit slower to respond to distracting words relative to 
neutral words. A region in the front part of the brain that is important for guiding attention in this kind 
of situation is the lateral prefrontal cortex. I found that a higher BMI was associated with less activation 
in this region in response to food words (relative to neutral words). This suggests a reduction in 
prefrontal-mediated control of attention in the context of tasty food words. 
 To measure goal-directed control of food choices in the same subjects, I asked them to 
perform another task outside the MRI-scanner. I gave subjects a set of choices; they simply had to 
choose between a sweet and salty snack that they liked (the snacks were always the same). After 
the set of choices, I asked the subjects to eat as much as they could from one of the snacks (they 
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had access to only one type), so that the snack would be less valuable to them; it was devalued. 
Following devaluation, I again gave thim a set of choices between the sweet and salty snack. If 
people make choices in a goal-directed way, behavior will be adjusted after devaluation because 
one of the snacks no longer has value. If choices are made on autopilot, then behavior won’t differ 
before and after devaluation. Overall my subjects made goal-directed choices, they adjusted their 
behavior. However, higher BMI was associated with the tendency to make less goal-directed choices. 
 It was not the case that those subjects who showed less prefrontal-mediated attentional 
control also made less goal-directed choices. In sum, reduced control in both domains contributed 
to degree of obesity independently. 
MINDFUL EATING
Mindfulness meditation is a big hype, and is all about ‘being in the here and now’, without judging 
what is there. Mindfulness gained in popularity as a result of scientific reports on the beneficial effects 
of highly protocolized intervention programs intervention programs, such as, alleviating stress, anxiety 
and depression. By now, mindfulness-based interventions have also been shown useful for targeting 
overeating. However, the mechanism by which such changes would occur is largely unknown.
 Given the idea that mindfulness may decrease reactive, automatic behavior, I investigated 
in chapters 4 and 5 whether a mindfulness intervention indeed acts at reward processes that are 
known to be affected in compulsive behavior. More specifically, I zoomed in at learning from positive 
and negative feedback (as in chapter 2) and on the reactivity of reward regions deep in the brain 
when rewards can be earned (how strongly is one motivated by the prospect of a reward?) 
 Subjects were randomized to either an intensive 8-week mindful eating intervention or an 
educational cooking intervention (i.e., the active control) that was carefully matched in terms of time 
investment and social contact. The mindful eating intervention was aimed at increasing awareness 
on how to eat, whereas the educational cooking intervention was aimed at increasing awareness on 
what to eat. 
 Practicing mindful eating affected both reward processes. First (chapter 4), more practice 
was associated with increased behavioral flexibility; subjects who had spent more time on the mindful 
eating intervention, got better at learning from unexpected positive and negative feedback. Second 
(chapter 5), one of the deeply located brain reward regions responded less strongly to a stimulus 
predicting the possibility of winning a high-caloric reward after mindful eating. This was not the case 
for stimuli predicting the possibility of winning a monetary reward, suggesting that practicing mindful 
eating specifically affected food-reward related reactivity. 
 Because I took behavioral and neural measures before as well as after both intervention 
programs, the interventions could be directly compared. Also, this approach enabled me to confirm 
that the reported effects were specific for the mindfulness intervention, in contrast to many previous 
studies on mindfulness, in which valid control interventions are lacking. 
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CONCLUSION
In sum, this doctoral thesis has yielded several insights regarding the neural and cognitive 
mechanisms of bad habits. I have shown that gambling addiction is associated with an anomaly in 
learning from unexpected positive and negative feedback. Next, degree of obesity was shown to 
be related to reduced food-directed prefrontal cortex-mediated control of attention, as well as with 
reduced control of goal-directed food choices. Finally, I could show that a mindful eating intervention 
can tap into reward processes that have been affected in compulsive disorders, namely learning 
from unexpected positive and negative feedback, as well as the reactivity of a deeply located reward 
region to the prospect of a high-caloric reward. 
 As with any research, the work presented in this doctoral thesis has not only yielded 
valuable insights, it also led to many new research questions, that will keep scientists busy for the 
next few years. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Net als andere levende wezens zijn mensen niet veel meer dan een verzameling gewoontes, aldus 
psycholoog en filosoof William James (1890). Gewoontes zijn het resultaat van leren: als iets in het 
verleden goed voor ons uitpakte, en dat deed het herhaaldelijk, dan kan een gewoonte ontstaan. 
Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de smaak van chocola, die keer op keer onze zorgen als sneeuw voor de 
zon heeft doen verdwijnen wanneer we er naar grepen. Reden genoeg voor onze hersenen om er 
een shortcut voor te creëren. We hoeven er dan voortaan niet meer over na te denken wat te doen in 
eenzelfde situatie: we nemen gewoon die reep chocola. 
 Gewoontes kunnen heel handig zijn als het gaat om fietsen of tandenpoetsen. Maar ze 
kunnen ook in ons nadeel werken als we bijvoorbeeld altijd automatisch naar chocola grijpen om 
onze emoties te temperen; of in plaats daarvan gaan roken, gokken, gamen of naar drugs grijpen. 
Zodra er een slechte gewoonte ingeslopen is, is die bijzonder lastig te doorbreken. En wanneer 
gewoontes van kwaad tot erger gaan, wordt gedrag zelfs compulsief, zoals in verslaving en klinisch 
overeten. Compulsief gedrag komt voort uit gebrek aan controle over gedrag dat automatisch in 
gang is gezet. 
 Hoe kan het dat een nuttig mechanisme zoals onze ‘gewoontefabriek’ tegen ons kan 
gaan werken? Waarom gebeurt dat voor sommigen wel, maar niet voor anderen? En hoe krijgen 
we grip op onze slechte gewoontes? Dit zijn vragen die mij als cognitieve neurowetenschapper 
bezighouden, en die de drijvende kracht zijn geweest achter dit proefschrift. 
EEN NEUROCOGNITIEVE AANPAK
Het doel van mijn proefschrift was om onze kennis te vergroten over de neurale en cognitieve 
mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan slechte gewoontes, in het bijzonder gokken en 
compulsief eten. Daarnaast heb ik onderzocht hoe een intensieve mindfulnessinterventie slechte 
eetgewoontes kan helpen doorbreken. 
 Om dat te onderzoeken, heb ik gebruik gemaakt van verschillende experimentele 
computertaken die proefpersonen in het lab kwamen doen. Deze cognitieve paradigma’s zijn 
ontwikkeld om steeds op één aspect van cognitie in te zoomen. In mijn onderzoek heb ik ingezoomd 
op processen die een rol spelen bij beloning en controle, bijvoorbeeld leren van positieve en 
negatieve feedback (hoofdstuk 2 en 4); controle over aandacht of juist over het uitvoeren van 
handelingen (hoofdstuk 3); en de invloed van een beloning op de motivatie om een handeling uit te 
voeren (hoofdstuk 5).  
 Door proefpersonen enkele van deze cognitieve paradigma’s in een MRI-scanner te laten 
doen, heb ik ook de hersenen in actie kunnen meten. Vervolgens kon ik de link leggen tussen de 
gemeten hersenactiviteit en het aspect van cognitie dat op dat moment centraal stond. 
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DOPAMINE EN LEERGEDRAG IN GOKKERS
Eerst heb ik gekeken naar de rol van de neurotransmitter dopamine in leren van positieve en 
negatieve feedback in mensen met gokverslaving. Mensen met een verslaving doen vaak koste wat 
het kost om datgene te krijgen waar ze verslaafd aan zijn. Mogelijk zijn mensen met gokverslaving 
extra gevoelig voor de beloning die kan volgen op gokken (een geldbedrag); maar het kan ook zijn 
dat ze juist minder gevoelig zijn voor de negatieve gevolgen van gokken op de korte, dan wel lange 
termijn. Omdat veel van ons leren berust op positieve en negatieve feedback, zou gokken goed 
samen kunnen hangen met leerproblemen. Daar is inderdaad evidentie voor. 
 Wat heeft dopamine hiermee van doen? Dopamine staat in de volksmond vooral 
bekend als genots- of gelukshormoon, maar dat is inmiddels achterhaald. Desalniettemin is het 
de belangrijkste neurotransmitter in het beloningsysteem van het brein; het speelt o.a. een rol in 
leren van positieve en negatieve feedback. Voor andere verslavingen heeft eerder wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek aangetoond dat er een link is tussen afwijkingen in enerzijds het dopaminesysteem en 
anderzijds leren van feedback. Voor gokverslaving, wat pas sinds 2013 officieel als verslaving wordt 
erkend door psychiaters, was deze link nog niet vastgesteld. 
 Om de rol van dopamine te onderzoeken, hebben proefpersonen met en zonder 
gokverslaving tweemaal aan hetzelfde leerexperiment deelgenomen; eenmaal nadat ze een medicijn 
ingenomen hadden dat tijdelijk, onbemerkt, dopamine in het beloningsysteem remde; eenmaal 
nadat ze een placebo (medicijn zonder werking) hadden ingenomen. Ik vond dat gokverslaving, 
net zoals andere verslavingen, inderdaad gepaard gaat met een afwijking in dopamine-gemedieerd 
leren van onverwachtse feedback. Waar niet-gokkers met het medicijn slechter presteerden op leren 
van positieve feedback, had het medicijn geen effect op leren in gokkers. Hetzelfde dopamine-
remmende medicijn had dus een ander effect op deze groepen proefpersonen, wat duidt op een 
onderliggend verschil in het dopaminesysteem tussen de groepen. 
COGNITIEVE CONTROLE EN SLECHTE EETGEWOONTES
Om meer te leren over een andere vorm van ‘compulsief’ gedrag heb ik vervolgens gekeken naar 
slechte eetgewoontes, die niet alleen in een klinische populatie veel voorkomen; we verliezen 
allemaal wel eens de controle als het om lekker eten gaat. Maar controle (of: cognitieve controle) is 
een parapluterm en omvat verschillende varianten die verschillende routes nemen in het brein; denk 
aan motorcontrole, controle over emotie, aandacht, of doelbewust handelen. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 heb ik me geconcentreerd op gedrags- en breinmetingen van twee vormen 
van controle: controle over aandacht en doelbewust handelen. Ik was geïnteresseerd of de mate 
van controle in de context van eten samenhing met de mate van overgewicht in een grote groep 
proefpersonen, die graag wat aan hun slechte eetgewoontes wilden veranderen. Hun BMI varieerde 
van normaal tot obees (19-35 kg/m2). 
 Om controle over aandacht te meten, heb ik proefpersonen in de MRI-scanner afgeleid van 
een taak die ik ze gevraagd had te doen. In het kort: proefpersonen moesten zo snel als ze konden 
de kleur van het woord op het scherm benoemen, heel simpel. Maar omdat ons brein de neiging 
147
AP
PE
N
DI
CE
S
heeft om automatisch de betekenis van een woord te verwerken, voor het geval er iets belangrijks 
langskomt, liet ik proefpersonen niet alleen neutrale woorden zien, maar ook afleidende eetwoorden 
(zoals chocola, friet en taart). En inderdaad, proefpersonen reageerden net wat langzamer op de 
afleidende eetwoorden dan op neutrale woorden. Een gebied vooraan in het brein dat belangrijk is 
voor het controleren van aandacht is de laterale prefrontale cortex. Ik vond dat hoe hoger het BMI 
was, hoe minder sterk dit gebied geactiveerd was voor de eetwoorden (in vergelijking met neutrale 
woorden). Dit duidt op minder sterke prefrontaal-gemedieerde controle over aandacht als het gaat 
om lekker eten. 
 Om controle over doelbewust handelen in dezelfde proefpersonen te meten liet ik ze 
een gedragsexperiment buiten de MRI-scanner doen. Ik vroeg ze een reeks keuzes te maken, 
telkens voor een lekkere zoete of zoute snack (steeds dezelfde zoete en zoute snack). Vervolgens 
vroeg ik ze zich vol te eten aan één van beide snacks, waardoor deze minder waardevol werd; de 
snack werd zogezegd gedevalueerd. Na devaluatie legde ik de proefpersonen nogmaals een reeks 
keuzes voor tussen dezelfde zoete en zoute snack. Het idee is dat wanneer men doelbewust keuzes 
maakt, devaluatie leidt tot verandering van gedrag omdat de snack waar veel van gegeten is niet 
meer interessant is. Kiest men op de automatische piloot, dan verschilt het keuzegedrag voor en na 
devaluatie niet. Mijn proefpersonen namen over het algemeen doelbewuste keuzes, ze pasten hun 
gedrag aan na devaluatie. Wel vond ik dat grotere mate van overgewicht samenhing met de neiging 
om minder doelbewust keuzes te nemen. 
 Het was echter niet zo dat proefpersonen die minder sterker prefrontaal-gemedieerde 
controle over aandacht lieten zien, ook minder doelbewust keuzes namen. Verminderde controle in 
deze twee domeinen leek dan ook los van elkaar bij te dragen aan de mate van overgewicht. 
MINDFUL ETEN 
Mindfulness meditatie is razend populair en draait om ‘in het hier en nu zijn’, zonder een oordeel 
te hebben over wat er is. Mindfulness is vooral bekend geworden vanwege de positieve effecten 
van gestructureerde interventie-programma’s op het verminderen van bijvoorbeeld stress, angst en 
depressie. Inmiddels heeft wetenschappelijk onderzoek ook laten zien dat mindfulness-gebaseerde 
interventies effectief kunnen zijn om overeten te verminderen. Hoe dat precies werkt is nog onduidelijk. 
 Omdat gedacht wordt dat mindfulness reactief, automatisch gedrag kan verminderen, 
heb ik in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 onderzocht of trainen van mindful eten inderdaad aangrijpt op de 
beloningsmechanismen die betrokken zijn bij slechte gewoontes. Daarvoor heb ik gekeken naar 
leren van feedback (zoals in hoofdstuk 2) en op de reactiviteit van diepgelegen beloningsgebieden in 
het brein wanneer calorieën verdiend konden worden (hoe sterk motiveren aangekondigde beloningen 
iemand?). Beide processen zijn in verband gebracht met compulsief, beloningsgedreven gedrag. 
 Proefpersonen (dezelfde als in hoofdstuk 3) werden willekeurig toegewezen aan een 
intensieve ‘eten met aandacht’ interventie of ‘eten met kennis’ interventie. In de ‘eten met aandacht’ 
interventie was het doel om bewuster te worden van hoe men eet (mindful eten), terwijl de ‘eten met 
kennis’ interventie als doel had om bewuster te worden van wat te eten (controlegroep). 
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Het beoefenen van mindful eten had effect op beide processen. Ten eerste (hoofdstuk 4) hing 
meer oefening in mindful eten samen met grotere flexibiliteit; proefpersonen die meer uren aan de 
interventie hadden besteed, leerden beter van onverwachtse positieve en negatieve feedback. Ten 
tweede (hoofdstuk 5) reageerde één van het diepstgelegen beloningsgebied in het brein na de 
mindful eten interventie minder sterk op de stimulus die de mogelijke winst van een hoog-calorische 
beloning voorspelde. Dat gold niet voor de stimulus die de mogelijke winst van een geldbeloning 
voorspelde. Blijkbaar had het trainen van mindful eten specifiek effect op het verwerken van 
eetgerelateerde beloningen. 
 Omdat ik de gedrags- en breinmetingen zowel voor als na beide interventies heb genomen, 
konden de interventies direct vergeleken worden. Ook kon ik bevestigen dat de gerapporteerde 
effecten mindfulness-specifiek zijn, in tegenstelling tot veel eerder mindfulness-onderzoek waarin 
geen goede controle-interventie opgenomen is. 
CONCLUSIE 
Al met al heeft dit proefschrift verschillende inzichten opgeleverd over de neurale en cognitieve 
mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan slechte gewoontes. Zo hebben we gezien dat 
gokverslaving gepaard gaat met een afwijking in dopamine-gemedieerd leren van onverwachtse 
positieve en negatieve feedback. Daarnaast hing de mate van overgewicht samen met verminderde 
prefrontaal-gemedieerde controle over aandacht, als ook met verminderde controle over doelbewust 
handelen in de context van lekker eten. Ten slotte heb ik laten zien hoe een mindfulness-gebaseerde 
interventie gericht op slechte eetgewoontes positief effect kan hebben op beloningsprocessen 
die aangedaan zijn in compulsief gedrag, namelijk leren van onverwachtse positieve en negatieve 
feedback en de reactiviteit van één van het diepstgelegen beloningsgebied in het brein op het 
vooruitzicht van een hoog-calorische beloning. 
 Zoals elk onderzoek, heeft het werk in mijn proefschrift niet alleen tot waardevolle inzichten 
geleid, maar ook tot een legio aan nieuwe fascinerende vragen, waar de wetenschap voorlopig nog 
wel even zoet mee is. 
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For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young scientists. To achieve 
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school in 2009. The Graduate School covers training at both Master’s and PhD level and provides 
an excellent educational context fully aligned with the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students in biology, 
physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and related disciplines. 
Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment of the best and most 
motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni show a 
continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, e.g. Stanford University, 
University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, MPI Leipzig, Hanyang University in 
South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, North Western University, Northeastern University 
in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of Vienna etc.. Positions outside academia spread among the 
following sectors: specialists in a medical environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry 
and neurology. Specialists in a psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, 
psychological diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or lecturers. 
A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, analysts or head of research and 
development. Fewer graduates  stay in a research environment as lab coordinators, technical 
support or policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities are positions in the IT sector and management 
position in pharmaceutical industry. In general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with 
high-quality positions that play an important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit:
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/
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